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I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 30, 2021, two deputies from the Jacksonville Sherriff’s
Office arrived at a domestic violence call at an area hotel.1 There, they would
encounter an individual identified as Michael Leon Hughes, a thirty-two-yearold African American man who was accused of forcing his way into a hotel
room belonging to a female companion.2 Upon arrival, Hughes refused to
leave, so a struggle with law enforcement ensued.3 Hughes obtained one of
the deputies’ tasers during the commotion and shocked him.4 In response, the
officer discharged his firearm and killed Hughes.5
On May 27, 2020, approximately one year before the incident with
Mr. Hughes, the Tallahassee Police Department encountered an African
*
Marc Consalo is a faculty member at the University of Central Florida
(“UCF”) in their legal studies department. He received his LL.M. in Trial Advocacy from
Stetson University Law School in 2016, his J.D. from UCF in 1999, and his B.A. from Rollins
College in 1996. He presently serves as a special magistrate for the Town of Oakland, Florida.
In addition to his teaching duties, Professor Consalo works as a conflict attorney in and for the
Ninth Judicial Circuit in Orange and Osceola Counties. At UCF, he teaches a variety of classes,
including Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, and Trial Advocacy
1.
Marilyn Parker, JSO Identifies Man Shot, Killed by Police at Argyle Forest
Hotel, NEWS4JAX, http://www.news4jax.com/news/local/2021/03/31/jso-identifies-man-shotkilled-by-police-at-argyle-forest-hotel/ (last updated Mar. 31, 2021, 7:15 PM); Mindy Wadley
& Robert Bradfield, ‘It Wasn’t Supposed to Go That Way’: Family of Man Killed by JSO at
Jacksonville Hotel Demand Release of Video, FIRST COAST NEWS (Apr. 6, 2021, 9:04 PM),
http://www.firstcoastnews.com/article/news/local/family-of-man-killed-jso-demandsanswers/77-f0f90fec-9be9-4d36-86de-15938a893509.
2.
Parker, supra note 1.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
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American woman.6 This woman was Natosha Tony McDade, who was
accused of stabbing another individual outside an apartment complex.7 While
reports differ, law enforcement officers asserted that McDade aimed a firearm
at police upon their arrival.8 When she refused to comply with requests to
lower her weapon, officers opened fire and killed her.9
On their face, these two instances seem to share many similarities.10
For instance, both cases involve individuals who died at the hands of law
enforcement.11 Both individuals were African American and both seemed to
have suffered from mental illness.12 Yet, while the similarities between the
alleged perpetrators seem quite evident, what may not be as immediately
apparent are the similarities of the law enforcement officers involved in both
the shootings13 In both instances, the Tallahassee Police Department and the
Jacksonville Sherriff’s Office tried to prevent the identities of the officers and
deputies from being divulged to the public under Florida’s Crime Victim’s Bill
of Rights, more commonly known as, Florida’s version of Marsy’s Law.14
Currently pending before the Florida Supreme Court is a request from
the City of Tallahassee, as well as numerous media groups, to accept
jurisdiction over a First District Court of Appeal case specifically finding that
the officers in these shootings are considered “victims” as defined by the
Florida Constitution, and as such, they enjoy protections guaranteed to them
under Marsy’s Law, specifically preventing the disclosure of their identities to
the public.15
6.
See Dara Kam, Should Victims’ Rights Law Shield Officer’s Identity?,
NEWS4JAX
(June
11,
2020,
8:20
PM),
http://www.news4jax.com/news/florida/2020/06/12/should-victims-rights-law-shield-officersidentity/. It should be noted that while born a female, witnesses report that Ms. McDade selfidentified as a male. Id.; Jeff Burlew, Tallahassee Police Release Name of Person Shot and
Killed
by
an
Officer
After
Stabbing,
TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT.,
http://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/local/2020/05/28/tallahassee-police-releases-namenatosha-tony-shot-and-killed-officer-after-stabbing/5272571002/ (last updated May 30, 2020,
8:18 PM).
7.
Burlew, supra note 6; see also Kam, supra note 6.
8.
Kam, supra note 6.
9.
See Burlew, supra note 6; Kam, supra note 6.
10.
See Kam, supra note 6; Parker, supra note 1.
11.
Kam, supra note 6; Parker, supra note 1.
12.
See Kam, supra note 6; Burlew, supra note 6; Wadley & Bradfield, supra
note 1.
13.
See Kam, supra note 6; Parker, supra note 1.
14.
See Kam, supra note 6; Parker, supra note 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
15.
The News Serv. of Fla., City of Tallahassee & Media Groups Urge Florida
Supreme Court to Hear ‘Marsy’s Law’ Case, WFSU PUB. MEDIA (June 15, 2021, 12:00 PM),
http://news.wfsu.org/wfsu-local-news/2021-06-15/city-of-tallahassee-media-groups-urgeflorida-supreme-court-to-hear-marsys-law-case.
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While the possibility that law enforcement officers may be the target
of a crime is not uncommon, receiving the designation of “victim” after
employing deadly force is a unique and confounding concept worthy of
discussion.16 As such, this Article will attempt to tackle this question and
gauge the argument on both sides as to the applicability of Marsy’s Law in
these scenarios.17
The Article will begin with a discussion of how the State of Florida
has historically defined the term “victim” in criminal law over the years.18
Next, a discussion follows about the history of Marsy’s law and how courts
have interpreted its provisions.19 This Article will then explain in greater detail
the arguments for, and against, Marsy’s Law protecting police identities from
disclosure, especially considering Sunshine Laws and the rights that citizens
enjoy by obtaining access to information.20 Ultimately, this Article attempts
to predict if the Florida Supreme Court does choose to accept jurisdiction for
cases that argue that law enforcement officers are victims under Marsy’s
Law—how the justices will rule on the issues in the case and, moving forward,
where lines will be drawn as to the degree of victimization police must
establish to be protected under Florida’s Crime Victim Bill of Rights.21
II.

IN FLORIDA WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A VICTIM?

The legal definition of what exactly a “victim” is in Florida
jurisprudence is actually not that old of a concept.22 One of the first
explanations of the term comes from a 1969 Florida Fourth District Court of
Appeal case, which involves defendants charged with assault and battery in
Palm Beach County.23 In the case, the appellants focused on the trial court
judge’s use of the term “victim” during his final jury instruction before
deliberation.24 The instruction reads as follows: “One point I made in my
Instructions, I said that—I emphasized you shouldn’t have any sympathy or
compassion either individually or collectively for the defendant in this case,
nor should you have any sympathy or compassion for the victim of this case.”25
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See id.
See discussion infra Part V.
See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part V.
See Lister v. State, 226 So. 2d 238, 239 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
Id. at 238.
Id. at 239.
Id.
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The jury returned a verdict of guilty of the offenses, and on appeal,
the appellants argued that the trial judge created undue sympathy for the victim
of the crimes by referring to him as a “victim.”26 In denying their appeal and
affirming the conviction, the appellate court wrote that the definition of a
victim is simply “someone injured under any of various conditions.”27 Citing
Webster’s Dictionary, the court found that the term, in and of itself, was
neither offensive nor emotion invoking.28 It simply designated the status of a
party in a lawsuit.29
Under this somewhat direct and uncomplicated definition, it is not
surprising that little litigation exists about the term from the perspective of
physical injury.30 Instead, as time progressed, most cases regarding the
concept focused on individuals seeking financial compensation from the
illegal acts of an accused.31 This would often result from those close to an
individual who was the target of the crime making a claim for relief.32 For
instance, in a 1982 case from Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal, the
son of a manslaughter victim sought review of a decision from the Bureau of
Crime’s Compensation for payment of psychiatric bills resulting from his
father’s death.33 The parent had passed away as a result of injuries he sustained
as the victim of a battery.34 In dealing with the murder, the son experienced
an exacerbation of a preexisting psychological issue, including a fixation on
wanting to murder his father’s killer.35
Initially, the boy was denied benefits for his psychiatric treatment.36
He appealed to a deputy commissioner who overturned the denial finding that
the heir of the deceased was a victim under the law at the time, which was
Florida’s Crime Compensation Act.37 The Bureau appealed and ultimately
persuaded the appellate court to rule in its favor.38 In granting the appeal, the
three-judge panel concluded that the appellee did not meet the requisite
26.
Id. at 238–39.
27.
Lister, 226 So. 2d at 239–40.
28.
See id. at 239.
29.
See id.
30.
Cf. Div. of Workers’ Comp., Etc. v. Brevda, 420 So. 2d 887, 889–90 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (analyzing mental health injuries as a result of a physical injury).
31.
See Bureau of Crimes Comp., Etc. v. Traas, 421 So. 2d 50, 51 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1982).
32.
See id.; Koile v. State, 934 So. 2d 1226, 1229 (Fla. 2006).
33.
Traas, 421 So. 2d at 51.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Traas, 421 So. 2d at 51.
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statutory definition of a victim because his injuries were not a “direct result of
the crime.”39 While much of the court’s reasoning centered on the difference
between psychiatric benefits versus non-mental health-related payments,40 a
concern about the causation of the request being linked to the crime itself
appeared germane in determining of victim status.41
Money also seemed to be the primary motivation for the Florida
Supreme Court to finally begin to weigh in on the definition of the term
“victim” in the 1992 case of Battles v. State.42 In Battles, the court weighed
in on a certified question from the district court, specifically, if a good faith
purchaser of stolen goods could be considered a “victim” for purposes of
restitution.43
In trial, Harry Battles, the appellant, was found guilty of selling a
stolen firearm to Gary Murphy, whom the trial court believed had a good faith
basis that the weapon belonged to Battles.44 Murphy later learned that local
law enforcement was investigating the disappearance of a gun belonging to
Kelvin Jordan.45 Having a reason to believe the firearm Battles sold him
actually belonged to Jordan, Murphy turned the gun over to the police.46 As
part of his sentence, the court ordered Battles to pay Murphy forty-five dollars,
the price he sold him the gun for.47
On appeal, Battles argued that Murphy was not a victim of the charge
of dealing in stolen property, so the restitution award was improper.48 The
district court disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s sentence.49 However, the
First District Court asked the Florida Supreme Court to review the decision
with the case posing a novel issue.50
39.
Id.
40.
Id.; see also Div. of Workers’ Comp., Etc. v. Brevda, 420 So. 2d 887, 890
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982). The issue of psychiatric benefits being reimbursable was further
explored. See id. There, the First District Court of Appeal of Florida found that mental health
benefits could be paid out by the victims’ compensation fund if a finding was made that such
treatment was a direct result of the crime. Id. at 889–90. Competent substantial medical
evidence could be provided to show that mental health injuries were also physical injuries under
Florida Statute section 960.03. Id. at 890. This would also be in accordance with Florida Statute
section 960.08 authorizing reimbursement for medical care. Id.
41.
See Traas, 421 So. 2d at 51.
42.
602 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 1992).
43.
Id. at 1287.
44.
See id.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Battles, 593 So. 2d at 1287.
48.
Id. at 1288.
49.
Id. at 1287.
50.
Id.
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In making their judgment to affirm the appellate court’s ruling, the
justices focused on Florida Statute section 775.089, which provides that “the
court shall order the defendant to make restitution to the victim for damage or
loss caused directly or indirectly by the defendant’s offense unless it finds
clear and compelling reasons not to order such restitution.”51 Subsection (1)(c)
of the statute further defines the term victim as a “person who suffers property
damage or loss, monetary expense, or physical injury or death as a direct or
indirect result of the defendant’s offense or criminal episode . . . .”52 The court
found a good faith purchaser is, by the very nature of term, an “aggrieved
party.”53 The only person that the individual can seek restitution from would
be the individual guilty of dealing in stolen property.54
Jordan had been made whole when the firearm was returned to him by
the police.55 However, Murphy was still out of the forty-five dollars he
purchased the gun for.56 As such, the court wrote, “[i]f restitution is not
imposed, we are left with the incongruent result of having Battles, a person
convicted of a felony offense, retain the profits of his criminal enterprise at the
expense of a good faith purchaser.”57 Therefore, with this ruling, we begin to
see a further expansion of the term “victim,” beyond those directly affected by
a crime, and later to those individuals with a familial bond to the targeted
prey.58
As time progressed and additional case law developed on the issue of
the expansion of the term “victim,” it is extremely important to point out that
there is a litany of cases finding that law enforcement agencies are not victims
in some Florida jurisdictions and, in a sense, these cases pull the reigns of the
ever-expanding definition of the term “victim.”59

51.
Id. at 1287–88; FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(a) (2021).
52.
FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(c); Battles, 602 So. 2d at 1288.
53.
Battles, 602 So. 2d at 1288.
54.
See id.
55.
See id.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
See Battles, 602 So. 2d at 1288; FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(c) (2021).
59.
See e.g., Seidman v. State, 847 So. 2d 1144, 1146 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003); Sam v. State, 741 So. 2d 1247, 1247 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam); Taylor
v. State, 672 So. 2d 605, 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam).
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For instance, in 1990, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal
determined that an award of restitution was improper specifically because it
was directed to a police agency which “[i]s not a ‘victim’ . . . ” under the law.60
A similar result occurred in the Second District Court of Appeal in 1994,
where a Sheriff’s department was denied restitution under the statute.61 In
both these cases, it is important to note that these expenditures were
reimbursable under Florida Statute section 939.01.62 Yet, of importance to
this discussion is the Florida Legislature’s responsibility to create an entirely
new statute for the payment of these fees, as opposed to the court’s belief that
it needed to use its discretion in expanding the term “victim.”63
Not surprisingly, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal continued
its retraction of the definition of “victim” in the early twenty-first century,
beyond just law enforcement agencies, with the case of P.H. v. State.64 The
case questioned the validity of a restitution payment made to a mother of a
battery victim who incurred lost wages in the amount of $240.65 In reversing
a trial court’s order granting the state’s request for this amount to be
considered restitution, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal determined
that the mother of the battery victim was not a “victim” under the statute.66
The court reviewed the statute at the time of the victim’s compensation, noting
that it specifically read:
Each person who suffers property damage or loss,
monetary expense, or physical injury or death as a direct or indirect
result of the defendant’s offense or criminal episode, and also
includes the victim’s estate if the victim is deceased, and the
victim’s next of kin if the victim is deceased as a result of the
offense. The term includes governmental entities and political
subdivisions, as those terms are defined in s. 11.45, when such
entities are a direct victim of the defendant’s offense or criminal
episode and not merely providing public services in response to the
offense or criminal episode.67
60.
Bain v. State, 559 So. 2d 106, 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per
curiam); see also Staudt v. State, 616 So. 2d 600, 600 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam)
(reversing a trial court’s decision to award the City of Stuart’s police department restitution,
concluding that investigative costs, while a byproduct of a crime, do not somehow make the
investigative agency a victim under the statute).
61.
Knaus v. State, 638 So. 2d 156, 156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
62.
See id.; Staudt, 616 So. 2d at 600.
63.
Staudt, 616 So. 2d at 600.
64.
774 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
65.
Id. at 729.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(c)(1) (2021).
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Nowhere in the statute does there appear to be any inclusion of
parents’ expenses under restitution.68 Interestingly, the court remarked that if
an argument had been made that the mother’s expenses could have been
“attributed to” her daughter, then a different result may have been reached.69
While the desire to help the mother seemed apparent, the method was not
present in the arguments before the court.70 This final statement by the judges
provides insight into an overarching theme in this Article’s inquiry.71
Perhaps the question is not whether there is a desire among the court
to expand or contract how Florida defines the term “victim.”72 Rather, maybe
the more appropriate examination is whether the courts will follow a strict
constructionist approach and look to the plain meaning of the word, as opposed
to reading something into the term that is not there.73 Assuming this as a
possible guiding principle, the Florida Supreme Court decision in Koile v.
State74 may provide the reader with the most ample guidance of all.75 In Koile,
a defendant charged with murder entered into a plea agreement with the state
during his trial.76 The defendant agreed to serve time in prison and pay an
undetermined amount of restitution.77 The trial court subsequently held a
restitution hearing wherein the deceased’s father testified.78 While evidence
was presented regarding burial expenses and costs associated with the funeral,
the father also explained that he lost $12,000 in income in order to testify and
attend the trial.79 The deceased’s mother made a similar plea for lost income,
except in the amount of $1,500.80
The decedent’s estate made an additional restitution claim for lost
wages on behalf of the murder victim himself.81 He was a first officer for an

68.
See FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(c)(1).
69.
P.H., 774 So. 2d at 729.
70.
See id.
71.
See id.
72.
See id.; FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(c).
73.
See Koile v. State, 934 So. 2d 1226, 1230–31 (Fla. 2006).
74.
934 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 2006).
75.
See id. at 1230–31.
76.
Id. at 1228; see also Willoughby Mariano, Convict in Murder Plot Loses
Appeal-Bond Plea, S. FLA. SUNSENTINEL (Nov. 13, 2003), http://www.sunsentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-2003-11-13-0311121452-story.html.
77.
Koile, 934 So. 2d at 1228.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
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airline and anticipated being promoted to captain soon.82 Ultimately, he would
have earned over three million dollars if he had lived to the age of sixty.83
The trial judge granted both parents’ requests for lost wages.84
Further, an order was entered awarding the decedent’s estate just over two
million dollars in lost wages.85 The defendant appealed to the Fifth District
Court of Appeal, which reversed both awards.86 However, the appellate court
recognized the importance of the decision it faced and certified two questions
to the Florida Supreme Court.87 The first was: “Does section 775.089, Florida
Statutes (2003), authorize a restitution award for the lost wages of a next of
kin voluntarily attending the murder trial of the person accused of killing the
victim?”88 The second was: “Does section 775.089, Florida Statutes (2003),
authorize a restitution award for the estate of a murder victim of an amount
consisting of the lost future income of the victim?”89
After concluding that the standard of review in the case was de novo,
the court decided that it was appropriate to follow strict constructionism and
did not need to expand beyond the statute’s plain language.90 The court first
pointed out that the statute reads, “the term ‘victim’ includes not only the
person injured by the defendant, but also the person’s estate if he or she is
deceased, as well as the person’s next of kin if he or she is deceased as a result
of the offense.”91 As such, both the decedent’s estate and the decedent’s
parents would be eligible for restitution in this scenario.92 The court then
continued reviewing the text of the statute.93
Accordingly, reading section 775.089(2)(a)(3) by using the
full definition of “victim” if a crime results in bodily injury, a court
must “reimburse the victim [including his estate and next of kin] for
income lost by the victim [including his estate and next of kin] as a
result of the offense.”94

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Koile, 934 So. 2d at 1228.
Id. at 1228–29.
Id. at 1229.
Id.
Id.
Koile, 934 So. 2d at 1229.
Id. at 1228.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1229, 1230–31.
Id. at 1231.
See Koile, 934 So. 2d at 1231.
See id.
Id.
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While the court ultimately sustained the Fifth District Court of
Appeal’s decision to deny the parents their lost wages,95 it did conclude the
decedent’s estate was a victim, and as such, entitled to an award of lost wages
nonetheless.96
III.

MARSY’S LAW IN FLORIDA

Voters in 2018 took to the polls to strengthen victims’ rights in the
state with the passage of Amendment 6 to the Florida Constitution.97 The
Amendment was passed with support by more than sixty percent of the state’s
population.98 Touted as Florida’s Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights, Article 1
Section 16 of the Florida Constitution adopted the language of Marsy’s Law
to prevent disclosing the identities of victims to stop others from “harass[ing]
the victim or the victim’s family, or [records] which could disclose
confidential or privileged information of the victim” being made public.99
Marsy’s law originated from a case in California involving an
individual named Marsalee Nicholas who was then a college student.100 In
1983, Ms. Nicholas’ ex-boyfriend murdered her, and years later bumped into
Ms. Nicholas’ family at a local grocery store.101 The family had no idea that
the alleged murderer had been released, causing them a great deal of distress
upon seeing him in the store.102 Since February 2020, voters across the country
have approved versions of Marsy’s Law in California, Illinois, North Dakota,
Ohio, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Nevada, Oklahoma, and South
95.
Id. at 1234. The decision to deny the lost wages claim was not based on a
finding that the parents were not victims under the statute. See id. Rather, the issues focused
on the parents choosing to be present for the entirety of the three-week trial. See Koile, 934 So.
2d at 1234. The court concluded that had the mother and father been subpoenaed to attend the
whole event, the result may have been different. See id. However, because of the voluntary
nature of their attendance, no causal link existed between the crime and the costs. See id.
Interestingly, the possible other outcome may have been a reduction in the amount of the award,
at least for the father, as there was evidence that his testimony was required for a small part of
the event. See id.
96.
Id.
97.
Amendment 6/Marsy’s Law for Florida Approved by Florida Voters,
MARSY’S
L.
FOR
FLA.,
http://www.marsyslawforfl.com/amendment_6_marsy_s_law_for_florida_approved_by_florid
a_voters (last updated Dec. 6, 2018).
98.
Id.
99.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(5).
100.
Amendment 6/Marsy’s Law for Florida Approved by Florida Voters, supra
note 97.
101.
Id.
102.
See id.
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Dakota.103 Marsy’s Law was also passed, but later overturned, in Montana
and Kentucky.104 Additionally, seventy-four percent of the electorate
approved the law in Pennsylvania; however, those results have not yet been
certified because the Amendment’s constitutionality is in litigation.105 A
similar situation now exists in Wisconsin.106
Though it has only been around for a short period of time, there has
already been litigation surrounding Florida’s version of Marsy’s Law and its
implementation in the Sunshine State.107 For instance, in 2019, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal struggled to see with how Marsy’s Law changed the
state’s role in advocating for restitution for a victim in the case of Morrill v.
State.108 In Morrill, the defendant pled guilty to a charge of dealing in stolen
property.109 One of the items that was alleged to have been pawned was a
necklace belonging to the victim.110 During a restitution hearing, the trial court
ordered $2,200 be paid to the victim for the stolen jewelry.111
The defendant appealed the trial court’s valuation based on a failure
to follow the Hawthorne test.112 Hawthorne requires that certain factors be
employed to arrive at a fair determination.113 These factors include: “(1)
original market cost; (2) [the] manner in which the item was used; (3) the
103.
State Efforts, MARSY’S L., http://www.marsyslaw.us/states (last visited Jan.
10, 2021).
104.
Katie Meyer, Marsy’s Law Explained: What You Need to Know About the
Victims’
Rights
Amendment
on
the
Nov.
5
Ballot,
WITF,
http://www.witf.org/2019/10/28/marsys-law-explained/ (last updated Nov. 5, 2019, 8:40 AM).
105.
See id.
106.
Marco Kirchner, State Used Wrong Standard in “Marsy’s Law” Defense,
WIS. JUST. INITIATIVE: BLOG (Mar. 22, 2021), http://www.wjiinc.org/blog/category/marsyslaw.
107.
See Toole v. State, 270 So. 3d 371, 374 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2019). It
should be noted that while Marsy’s Law was only implemented in 2019, case law that predates
its passage plays an important role in understanding its content. See id. For instance, in the
case of Barnett v. Antonacci, the appellate court concluded that that a prosecutor’s decision to
enter a Nolle Prosequi is not a “stage” in the proceeding within the meaning of the constitutional
provision guaranteeing victims of crime the right to be informed, present, and to be heard. 122
So. 3d 400, 406 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). As such, Marsy’s Law would not be applicable
in these instances. Id. Therefore, this decision holds great significance in the discussion of who
a would-be victim would be under the law, as it clearly creates precedent that courts may look
to before 2019 in determining this question and need not attempt to extrapolate beyond previous
case law should guidance already exist. See id.; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b).
108.
268 So. 3d 160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
109.
Id. at 161.
110.
Id.
111.
Id. at 161–62.
112.
See id. at 162.
113.
Morrill, 268 So. 3d at 162.
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general condition and quality of the item; and (4) the percentage of
depreciation.”114 In this case, the state failed to follow these requirements and
only provided hearsay regarding value.115
However, the court did express concern regarding how Marsy’s Law
may have reduced the burden on victims in establishing restitution amounts,
and in fact, the court imposed a new requirement upon prosecutors.116 The
appellate court cited its own recent decision in Toole v. State,117 where it
recognized that “proving restitution continues to be difficult for victims, and
receiving compensation for their loss continues to be elusive.”118 Further, the
court proposed that under Marsy’s Law, the state must now provide assistance
in establishing the condition and quality of stolen property to determine the
replacement cost.119
In Morrill, the court acknowledged that the State had not provided this
assistance.120 In fact, it went as far as to say that the State took no steps to
meet its potential burden to the victim under Marsy’s Law.121 While it
maintained its final ruling in favor of the appellant, it also provided clear dicta
that Marsy’s Law may have created mandates on Florida state prosecutors to
advocate more rigorously for victims’ rights.122
One finds similar advice in a case from Florida’s Third District Court
of Appeal called Alvarez-Hernandez v. State.123 While this case could be
viewed as a cautionary tale regarding vindictive sentencing, it holds equal
relevance to Marsy’s Law in admonishing courts to ensure victims’ have input
in plea negotiations.124 The defendant—charged with second-degree murder
with a deadly weapon, aggravated battery with great bodily harm or with a
114.
Id.
115.
Id.
116.
See id. at 163.
117.
270 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2019). Ultimately, the court in Toole
v. State certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida:
Is Hawthorne’s formula for determining restitution based on the fair
market value of the victim’s property still viable after the passage of Amendment 6
(Marsy’s Law), or should a trial court no longer be bound by fair market value as the
sole standard for determining restitution amounts, and instead exercise such
discretion as required to further the purposes of restitution, including consideration
of hearsay?

Id. at 375. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Florida dismissed the question as moot due to
defendant’s death. State v. Toole, No. SC19-456, 2019 WL 2275025, at *1 (Fla. May 29, 2019).
118.
Toole, 270 So. 3d at 374; Morrill, 268 So. 3d at 163.
119.
Morrill, 268 So. 3d at 163.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
See id.
123.
319 So. 3d 121 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
124.
Id. at 123.
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deadly weapon, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—appealed his
sentence of twenty-five years in prison followed by ten years of probation.125
During a pretrial conference, the state attorney offered the defendant eleven
years in prison.126 The defendant rejected this offer in open court.127 Defense
counsel also alerted the judge, in chambers, that the previously assigned trial
judge had offered the defendant a six-year prison sentence, followed by five
years of probation.128 That too had been spurned by the defendant.129 The
sitting judge then re-extended the six-year offer to the defendant, who again
refused it.130 The defendant argued on appeal that the court’s twenty-five-year
(300 months) sentence, which was over double the minimum sentence on his
criminal code scoresheet, was vindicative.131
While the opinion focused on whether indeed the trial court’s
disposition order constituted vindicative sentencing for exercising one’s right
to go to trial, the appellate court expressed its displeasure that the victim was
not present for the in-chambers plea negotiations.132 “[W]e are concerned by
the in-chambers, off-the-record plea discussions engaged in by the predecessor
judge, and take this opportunity to caution trial judges . . . .”133 The appellate
court further explained that the right for a victim to be present, informed, and
provide input is sacred, especially with the passage of Marsy’s Law.134
This record requirement is all the more important in light of the
provisions of Marsy’s Law, which in 2018 amended Article I,
Section 16 of the Florida Constitution to, inter alia, “preserve and
protect the right of crime victims to achieve justice, ensure a
meaningful role throughout the criminal and juvenile justice
systems for crime victims, and ensure that crime victims’ rights and
interests are respected and protected by law in a manner no less
vigorous than protections afforded to criminal defendants and
juvenile delinquents.”135

But perhaps one of the best examples of how powerful victims’ rights
are under Marsy’s Law can be seen in a recent 2021 case from Florida’s Fourth
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 122.
Id.
Id.
Alvarez-Hernandez, 319 So. 3d at 122.
Id.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 122–23.
Id. at 123, 125.
Alvarez-Hernandez, 319 So. 3d at 125.
Id.
Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I § 16(b)).

14

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

District Court of Appeal, where the appellate court found that a victim’s right
to be present trumps a defendant’s right to have witnesses sequestered.136 In
that case, the defendant and the victim were siblings who got into an
altercation at a family event.137 The defendant found a knife and stabbed the
victim during the squabble, ultimately killing him.138
At trial, the State invoked the rule of sequestration and requested the
defendant’s father—who was also the decedent victim’s father—to wait
outside the courtroom before testifying for the defense.139 The trial court judge
agreed, and ordered the father to leave the courtroom.140 After the completion
of several witnesses’ testimony, the defendant requested that the father be
permitted to return to the courtroom.141 The trial court denied this request.142
Ultimately, the jury convicted the defendant of a lesser included offense, and
the judge sentenced him to thirty years in prison.143
On appeal, the defendant brought forth three issues for review.144
However, the appellate court focused on whether the trial court had violated
the father’s right as the decedent victim’s next of kin to be present under
Marsy’s Law.145 While the appellate court quickly found that any potential
error in excluding the father was harmless error, it still discussed the
importance of the rights of a victim versus the rights of a defendant.146
The court’s analysis referenced a Florida Supreme Court case from
2000 called Booker v. State.147 In that case, similar to Butler v. State,148 the
defendant argued that the victim’s great-niece should have been present during
the sentencing phase of a murder trial.149 However, even though the Florida
Supreme Court found that it was an error to exclude the great-niece, the court
found that the defendant suffered no prejudice, and as such, the error was
harmless.150 Therefore, while the appellate court alluded that the Butler trial
judge incorrectly excluded the father, no harm had occurred, and the
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Butler v. State, 315 So. 3d 30, 34 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
Id. at 32.
Id.
See id. at 33.
See id.
Butler, 315 So. 3d at 32–33.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 32.
See id. at 33.
Butler, 315 So. 3d at 33.
Id. at 33–34; 773 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 2000).
315 So. 3d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
Booker, 773 So. 2d at 1086–87.
Id. at 1095–96.
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conviction was affirmed.151 But in doing this, the appellate court created a
precedent that Marsy’s Law trumps a defendant’s rights in certain
circumstances.152
Perhaps, however, one of the Florida Court of Appeals’ most
important pronouncements as to Marsy’s Law comes not from the analysis of
what the law does but rather what it fails to do.153 In 2020, the Florida First
District Court of Appeal concluded that in the fervor of creating stronger rights
for victims, the legislature had failed to include a method to implement and
protect these rights for the very people the law was meant to protect.154 In the
case of L.T. v. State,155 the appellate court observed “[a]s written, Marsy’s Law
does not provide procedures to implement and enforce the victim’s rights set
forth in the law or remedies for failure to recognize those rights.”156 In the
case, L.T., a juvenile crime victim, claimed the trial court violated her rights
under Marsy’s Law when it failed to notify her regarding certain stages in the
delinquency process.157
After being arrested for the alleged molestation of L.T., the juvenile
defendant attended a detention hearing, where over the state attorney’s
objection, he was released to home detention.158 The victim never received
notice of the detention hearing; however, the Department of Juvenile Justice
did alert L.T. of the court’s final decision after it had occurred.159 The victim’s
mother then filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of the victim.160 A month
later, a second attorney filed a Notice of Appearance indicating she would be
acting as co-counsel for the victim.161 Shortly thereafter, the victim’s attorneys
filed a pleading notifying the court, the State, and the defense of the victim’s
intent to exercise her rights under Marsy’s Law.162
Counsel for the defense moved to strike all pleadings filed on behalf
of L.T., citing a lack of standing as she was not a party to the case.163 During
a hearing, the trial court granted the defense’s request.164 In doing so, the court
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Butler, 315 So. 3d at 34.
See id.
See L.T. v. State, 296 So. 3d 490, 499 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2020).
See id. at 499–500.
296 So. 3d 490 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2020).
Id. at 499.
Id. at 492.
Id.
Id.
L.T., 296 So. 3d at 493.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 494.
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pronounced, “there is no express language contained in [Marsy’s Law] that
allows the victim or the victim’s representative to file a Notice of Appearance
on behalf of the victim and become a party to criminal proceedings.”165
On appeal, attorneys for the victim asserted that under Marsy’s Law,
the legislature envisioned granting victims of crimes similar rights and
protections afforded to defendants in the criminal process.166 Yet, the
appellate court believed that a careful balance between the rights of both
entities needs to occur “without impacting the basic constitutional foundations
of the criminal justice system.”167 While the court believed Marsy’s Law
provided a framework for victims to have a “legally cognizable interest in a
criminal proceeding,” this was not equivalent to elevating them to the status
of a party in the case.168 As such, the appellate court concluded that there was
no error in striking the victim’s pleadings, as she still had meaningful input in
the case pursuant to the requirements of Florida’s Constitution.169
In closing, the District Court of Appeals opined that trial courts lacked
the authority to create a system to implement victims’ rights under Marsy’s
Law.170 Instead, this responsibility rested squarely with the legislature and its
rulemaking authority.171 In response, the Florida Bar created a joint
subcommittee charged with addressing this lack of guidance regarding the
execution of the law.172 Born from that subcommittee, Rule 2.423 of Judicial
Administration has been proposed.173 Rule 2.423 provides three procedures
for the invocation of victim rights.174 The first falls to the filer of the report.175
This could be either the initial law enforcement agency or the intake unit for
the state attorney’s office.176 However, the option provides for the victims
themselves to file a request.177

165.
L.T., 296 So. 3d at 494.
166.
Id. at 495.
167.
Id.
168.
Id. at 497.
169.
See id. at 497, 499.
170.
L.T., 296 So. 3d at 499–500.
171.
Id.
172.
See Rule of Judicial Administration Amendment Concerning Marsy’s Law,
FLA. BAR (Mar. 24, 2020), http://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/rule-of-judicialadministration-amendment-concerning-marsys-law/.
173.
Id.
174.
See id.
175.
Id.
176.
See id.
177.
Rule of Judicial Administration Amendment Concerning Marsy’s Law,
supra note 172.
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Unfortunately, the subcommittee focused only on the confidentiality
right of Marsy’s Law and not the privileges found within the document.178 The
Florida Supreme Court held oral arguments regarding the proposed rule on
June 2, 2021.179 Yet, since writing this Article, no further guidance has been
provided.180 As such, much remains uncertain regarding the interpretation and
realization of Marsy’s Law moving forward.181
IV.

FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASS’N, INC. V. CITY OF
TALLAHASSEE, 314 SO. 3D 796 (FLA. 1ST DCA 2021)

Perhaps one of the greatest debates arising from the text of Marsy’s
Law itself is the self-contained definition of the term “victim.”182 Specifically,
section 16(b)(11)(e) of the Florida Constitution reads in relevant part:
As used in this section, a “victim” is a person who suffers
direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial harm as a
result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime or
delinquent act or against whom the crime or delinquent act is
committed. The term “victim” includes the victim’s lawful
representative, the parent or guardian of a minor, or the next of kin
of a homicide victim, except upon a showing that the interest of such
individual would be in actual or potential conflict with the interests
of the victim. The term “victim” does not include the accused. The
terms “crime” and “criminal” include delinquent acts and
conduct.183

This definition may sufficiently encompass all possible parties
protected under the law; however, like with most instances of newly passed
legislation, a new debate is on the horizon as one turns to the issue of whether

178.
See id.
179.
6/2/21 Florida Supreme Court Oral Arguments: In Re: Amendments to
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.423 SC20-1128, FLA. CHANNEL,
http://thefloridachannel.org/videos/6-2-21-florida-supreme-court-oral-arguments-in-reamendments-to-florida-rule-of-judicial-administration-2-423-sc20-1128/ (last visited Jan. 10,
2022) [hereinafter Oral Arguments].
180.
See id. (noting that a hearing regarding Rule 2.423 by Florida’s Supreme
Court has been the last official conduct on the matter).
181.
See The News Serv. Of Fla., supra note 15.
182.
See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 16, cl. (b)(11)(e).
183.
Id.
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law enforcement officers—in use of force cases—are considered potential
victims under Marsy’s Law.184
After two different encounters, law enforcement in Florida shot and
killed criminal suspects who endangered Tallahassee police officers.185
Following these two events, the City of Tallahassee announced it would
release the names of the officers involved in the shootings.186 In response, the
officers sought to prevent the disclosure of their names through their
bargaining agency—the Police Benevolent Association.187 In doing so, the
Association cited Marsy’s Law, arguing that the officers were victims under
Florida Law and enjoyed the right of confidentiality.188
At the trial court level, the judge found that the officers were not
protected under the confidentiality provision of Marsy’s Law.189 Further, the
trial court judge concluded that this outcome existed for the police even if they
were “victims” under the legislation.190 In doing so, the judge specifically
concluded that “a law enforcement officer acting in his official capacity could
not be a victim under [A]rticle I, [S]ection 16.”191 The trial court’s rationale
focused on the purpose of Marsy’s Law being to protect victims from
harassment and threats from assailant-defendants.192 Here, with their
assailants dead, the officers were not seeking protection from them but from
others in the community who would view the shootings as immoral or
excessive.193 This was not meant to be the purpose of Marsy’s Law.194 The
judge also asserted that the safeguards of the law exist only once “a criminal
proceeding begins.”195
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal began with a reading of
the plain language of the Florida Constitution.196 In doing so, it found that the
trial court judge improperly relied on Article I, Section 24 of the Florida
Constitution when denying the officers’ request, instead of focusing solely on

184.
But see Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Tallahassee, 314 So. 3d 796,
799 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
185.
Id. at 797.
186.
Id.; see also The News Serv. Of Fla., supra note 15.
187.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 797.
188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Id. at 797–98.
191.
Id. at 799.
192.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 801.
193.
See id. at 799.
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
Id. at 799–80.
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the four corners of the document.197 Article I, Section 24 of the Florida
Constitution speaks to the public’s right to information and access to
meetings.198 Although at the trial court level, the judge found Marsy’s Law
and this constitutional section to be in conflict, the appellate court disagreed.199
It determined that no conflict existed, and there was no need to venture beyond
the text of Marsy’s Law to begin with.200
When ruling in this fashion, the appellate court quickly pointed out
that Marsy’s Law represented a clear edict from the Florida citizenry.201 This
was not an occasion where a partisan legislature or a rogue judge diverted from
the clear intent of an already existing law.202 In passing Amendment 6, the
state’s people voiced their belief in how important victim’s rights should be.203
Additionally, Article I, Section 24 of the Florida Constitution includes
language that specifically says:
Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public
record made or received in connection with the official business of
any public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting
on their behalf, except with respect to records exempted under this
section or specifically made confidential by this Constitution.204

Therefore, no conflict between the two constitutional provisions

205

existed.

The appellate court next discussed whether a police officer who is
threatened with deadly force falls within the definition of a “victim” under
Marsy’s Law.206 As stated previously, the Amendment’s text defines the term
“victim.”207 The appellate court noted that it specifically states, “[a] . . . victim
is a ‘person who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or
financial harm . . . .’”208 Thus, a law enforcement officer who is threatened on
the job with deadly force clearly suffers “direct or threatened physical” harm
197.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 800.
198.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a).
199.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 800.
200.
Id.
201.
See id.
202.
See id.
203.
See id.
204.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 801 (emphasis added) (quoting
to FLA. CONST. art. I, §24(a)).
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
207.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(e); see discussion supra Part IV.
208.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 801 (quoting to FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 16(e)).
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and is, therefore, a victim.209 Acting in self-defense or killing the perpetrator
before he or she kills the officer in no way negates this status.210
In making this determination, the appellate court acknowledged the
importance of public interest in holding law enforcement officers responsible
for misconduct while on duty.211 However, the court found that other avenues
could be utilized to hold officers accountable without necessarily revealing
their identities.212
This included procedures such as internal affair
investigations and grand jury proceedings.213 The court also conceded that
Florida’s Sunshine Laws intend to grant public-wide and unhindered access to
information.214 Despite this clear intent, the court remarked it was not the
judicial branch’s prerogative to impute into constitutional text greater breadth
than what exists.215
The appellate court then moved to discuss the trial court’s
determination that one does not become a victim until the criminal process
commences.216 Again, the appellate court found this interpretation was not the
clear wording of Marsy’s Law’s.217 Instead, the document reads that those
rights begin at the time of “victimization.”218 Furthermore, there is no
requirement that a prosecution case be filed for rights to apply in the law
itself.219 While many of the protections found in Marsy’s Law apply to
different proceedings throughout the court process, the appellate court
determined that the trial judge moved beyond the plain language to establish a
requirement that did not exist.220
Lastly, the appellate court addressed the trial court’s belief that
Marsy’s Law applied only to “information” and “records” and not necessarily
the identity of the person’s name.221 It quickly rejected this argument stating
that “information . . . that could be used to locate or harass the victim or the
victim’s family includes records that could reveal the victim’s name or

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 802.
See id.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 802.
Id.
Id. at 802–03.
See id. at 803.
Id.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 803.
Id.
See id. at 802–04.
Id. at 804 (emphasis added) (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(5)).
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identity.”222 To rule otherwise would create a result contrary to the clear intent
of the Amendment’s passage to begin with.223
V.

ANALYSIS

Beginning in 2015, The Washington Post started to keep track of every
individual who was killed by law enforcement in the United States.224 As of
September 30, 2021, that number was over 5,000 individuals.225 While most
of the individuals killed were Caucasian, African Americans were
disproportionately killed in larger numbers.226 In 2019, out of the top twenty
law enforcement agencies with the most killings caused by police, two resided
in Florida.227 The Miami-Dade Police Department was fourteenth in the
nation, and the Jacksonville Sherriff’s Office was sixteenth.228
Since 2005, there have been forty-two officers arrested for murder in
the United States.229 Of those arrested, only five were convicted of murder.230
The most prevalent conviction was for manslaughter, with eleven
convictions.231 However, the list of resolutions run the gamut from improper
discharge of a firearm to involuntary manslaughter.232

222.
Id.
223.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 804.
224.
925 People Have Been Shot and Killed by Police in the Past Year, WASH.
POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ (last
updated Jan. 10, 2022) [hereinafter Shot by Police in 2021].
225.
Id.
226.
Id. While African Americans account for only thirteen percent of the
United States’ population, they make up one-quarter of all police shootings. Id.; Joe Fox et al.,
What We’ve Learned About Police Shootings 5 Years After Ferguson, WASH. POST (Aug. 9,
2019), http://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/08/09/what-weve-learned-about-policeshootings-years-after-ferguson/. Additionally, over one-third of the unarmed victims of police
shootings were also African American. Fox et al., supra. In fact, an African American man is
four times more likely to be shot by police than their white counterparts. Id.
227.
See id.
228.
See id.
229.
Statista Rsch. Dep’t, Number of NonFederal Police Officers Arrested for
Murder Who Have Been Convicted Between 2005 and 2020, by Charge, STATISTA (June 10,
2020),
http://www.statista.com/statistics/1123386/convictions-police-officers-arrestedmurder-charge-us/.
230.
Id.
231.
Id.
232.
Id.
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Noting these statistics, it would be remiss not to point out the political
climate at the time this Article is being written.233 Names like George Floyd
and Breonna Taylor will forever live in infamy as individuals whose deaths
began a conversation about police accountability.234 Equally important are
names like Derek Chauvin and the role public pressure played in demanding
justice in his trial.235 One cannot help but ponder—if Derek Chauvin’s name
was not made public when it was, would a similar result have been reached?*
While examples of public pressure assisting in accountability are available, so
too are examples of when the will of the people thwarted the smooth pursuit
of justice.236
With these realities in mind, predicting that the Florida Supreme Court
will accept jurisdiction over Florida Police Benevolent Ass’n v. City of
Tallahassee237 seems plausible.238 While our highest court may wish to avoid
controversy, it seems evident that with the First District Court’s decision, more
Florida law enforcement agencies will soon follow suit.239 And with media
companies leading the charge for disclosure, there appears to be both people
and money behind both sides.240

233.
See Julie Pierce Onos, How Journalists Cover Police Brutality Is a Matter
of Life and Death, MEDIA DIVERSITY INST. (June 9, 2020), http://www.media-diversity.org/howjournalists-cover-police-brutality-is-a-matter-of-life-and-death/.
234.
Id.; Black Lives Taken: George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud
Arbery, DOSOMETHING.ORG, http://www.dosomething.org/us/articles/black-lives-taken (last
visited Jan. 10, 2022).
235.
See Black Lives Taken: George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud
Arbery, supra note 234; Onos, supra note 233.
236.
See
Promoting
Accountability,
OPPORTUNITY
AGENDA,
http://transformingthesystem.org/criminal-justice-policy-solutions/create-fair-and-effectivepolicing-practices/promoting-accountability/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2021); Importance of
Accountability
in
Law
Enforcement,
POWERDMS
(Dec.
22,
2020),
http://www.powerdms.com/why-powerdms/law-enforcement/importance-of-accountability-inlaw-enforcement. Kim Potter was charged with the death of Daunte Wright in Minneapolis,
Minnesota when she claimed she mistook her firearm for her taser. N’dea Yancey-Bragg,
Prosecutor Assigned to Case of Ex-cop Charged in Daunte Wright’s Death Resigns Over
‘Vitriol’
and
‘Partisan
Politics’,
USA
TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/05/25/prosecutor-assigned-to-kimpotterdaunte-wright-case-resigns/7426386002/ (May 25, 2021, 11:48 AM). The prosecutor
resigned after ten years of service to his community because of the public pressure surrounding
the case. Id. His resignation letter which was made public cited that “‘vitriol’ and ‘partisan
politics’ made it difficult to pursue justice.” Id.
237.
314 So. 3d 796 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
238.
Id. at 803–04.
239.
See id. at 804.
240.
See Onos, supra note 233.
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Surely, the Florida Supreme Court recognizes that striking a balance
between two of the most sacred principles will need to occur.241 On the one
hand, we have a sharp mandate that victims’ rights are of paramount
importance in our communities.242 On the other hand, transparency and access
have been hallmarks of Florida from very early on.243 The existence of our
Sunshine Laws reflect a desire by the public to hold government officials
accountable for misconduct while granting citizens access to information.244
Assuming the Florida Supreme Court does eventually weigh in on the case,
how can one predict what the outcome will be?245
Perhaps, in foretelling the outcome, previous Florida Supreme Court
cases acknowledging the deference that the court provides the will of people
is instructive.246 Indeed, a long line of precedent establishes the court’s
willingness to bend to the desires of its citizenry to the point of permitting
votes, in some circumstances, to overwrite technical or minor defects in the
Amendment process itself.247
With this in mind, all courts that have weighed in on Marsy’s Law
agree that the will of the people was to extend the rights of victims in the State
of Florida.248 Therefore, it would be consistent with this goal not only to
extend the rights of victims, but also who may be considered a victim, to
appease the will of the electorate.249
Yet, it is important to recognize the slippery slope that could occur
should law enforcement officers involved in lethal force cases be granted this
status.250 For instance, would the same argument not apply to officers who are
involved in shootings where the perpetrators do not die?251 In both cases, the
law enforcement officer is “a person who suffers direct or threatened physical,
psychological, or financial harm . . . .”252 For that matter, cases involving
charges of battery on a law enforcement officer or resisting an officer with
241.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 799, 802.
242.
See id. at 802–04.
243.
Joseph T. Eagleton, Walking on Sunshine Laws: How Florida’s Free Press
History in the U.S. Supreme Court Undermines Open Government, FLA. B.J., Sept.–Oct. 2012,
at 23–24.
244.
Id. at 24, 26.
245.
See id. at 31–32; Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314, So. 3d at 803–04.
246.
See Eagleton, supra note 243, at 31–32.
247.
See id. at 31–32; Sylvester v. Tindall, 18 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 1944).
248.
See Morrill v. State, 268 So. 3d 160, 162–63 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
249.
See id. at 163.
250.
See Kam, supra note 6.
251.
See Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, v. City of Tallahassee, 314 So. 3d 796,
801 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
252.
Id.
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violence all potentially possess legitimate legal arguments that Marsy’s Law
is applicable.253 If the Florida Supreme Court does affirm the decision in
Florida Police Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Tallahassee, a potential plethora of
battery and assault cases may emerge, insulating police from disclosure.254
However, even if this were to pass, it is necessary to remind ourselves
that the criminal justice system is built on a foundation to protect the rights of
the accused, not the media nor the public’s right to information.255 If, indeed,
law enforcement is no longer the subject of public scrutiny, ultimately, this
could have very little impact on a defendant accused of a crime.256 Marsy’s
Law refers to public disclosure.257 This does not necessarily equate to private
disclosure to a defense attorney.258 It does not prevent a defense attorney from
taking a deposition, subpoenaing employment records, or cross-examining a
witness.259 It simply requires additional steps to keep this information
private.260
As such, should the Florida Supreme Court affirm the ruling when it
potentially will have little, if any, effect on our criminal justice system as a
whole.261 So, the question remains: how important is knowing who these
officers are to Floridians?262 For many, the answer may simply be: not that
much.263 In a recent article from 2019, Florida was in the top twenty-five states
to be a police officer in.264 Florida is considered to be quite conservative by
many, which some equate to meaning pro-law enforcement.265 Therefore, the
average Floridian may not care if officer names are disclosed or not.266
253.
See id.
254.
See id.
255.
See Eagleton, supra note 243, at 26.
256.
See Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 802.
257.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
258.
See Meyer, supra note 104.
259.
See id.
260.
See id.
261.
See id.
262.
See Amendment 6/Marsy’s Law for Florida Approved by Florida Voters,
supra note 97.
263.
See id.
264.
D’Ann Lawrence White, What State Can Beat Being a Beat Cop in
Florida?, PATCH, http://patch.com/florida/southtampa/how-does-florida-rank-careers-lawenforcement (last updated May 14, 2019, 2:33 PM).
265.
See Emily Ekins & Matthew Feeney, Why Liberals and Conservatives
Disagree on Police:
Column, USA TODAY (Apr. 20, 2017, 4:34 PM),
http://usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/2017/04/20/why-liberals-and-conservativesdisagree-police-column/97827888/.
266.
See Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Tallahassee, 314 So. 3d 796,
800 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
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Ultimately, in deciding whether or not the Florida Supreme Court
decides to address the decision, what the public does or does not want may not
be all that germane to their conclusion.267 The First District Court of Appeal
provided a very rational and logical analysis in employing the plain language
test to the text in Marsy’s Law.268 This strict construction analysis was
consistent with the approach that multiple courts have used in Florida for over
fifty years when defining the term “victim.”269 The District Court of Appeals
also recognized the traditional role of the judiciary and did not extend its
authority by creating new law, rather, the court simply interpreted the existing
law.270 As the appellate court wrote, should the public wish to exclude officers
from Marsy’s Law, mechanisms already exist to accomplish that very goal.271
These include a proposal of a joint resolution of the legislature, a constitution
revision commission, a citizen initiative petition, a constitutional convention,
or a taxation and budget reform commission.272 But having judges discern
exclusions into already existing laws would be improper.273 Simply stated, it
does not fall on the courts to read an exclusion into a portion of the Florida
Constitution when one clearly does not exist there to begin with.274 Why
would the Florida Supreme Court, therefore, engage in such a practice, when
instead they could continue the time-honored practice of using strict
constructionism and follow the document’s plain language?275
VI.

CONCLUSION

At the time of writing this Article, the Florida Supreme Court has yet
to decide if it will accept jurisdiction over the case of Florida Police
Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Tallahassee.276 The court may be waiting to see if
other district courts weigh in on the issue and if a conflict between jurisdictions
267.
See The News Serv. of Fla., supra note 15.
268.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 803–04.
269.
Id. at 802; see, e.g., L.T. v. State, 296 So. 3d 490, 499 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2020); Koile v. State, 934 So. 2d 1226, 1231 (Fla. 2006).
270.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 802–03.
271.
Id. at 803.
272.
Id.
273.
See, e.g., Eagleton, supra note 243, at 32 (criticizing a Florida judge’s
decision to hold The Miami Herald in contempt for publishing a cartoon that was critical of the
judicial system). Id. (“[T]he conduct of the judges in the case represented both an abuse of
power and a constraint on the core liberty enshrined in the First Amendment”).
274.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 802–03.
275.
See id. at 804 (finding the trial court’s construction of Article I, Section 16
of the Florida Constitution incorrect and straying from the plain meaning of the words).
276.
The News Serv. of Fla., supra note 15.
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arises.277 On the other hand, the court may simply be deciding if the case is
truly worthy of review, depending on the amount of public outcry.278 In either
scenario, Marsy’s Law may ultimately be a cautionary tale for people to be
careful what they wish for, or rather, the electorate to be careful what they vote
for.279
As stated previously, Amendment 6—Marsy’s Law—passed in 2018,
with over sixty-one percent of the electorate voting “yes.”280 In a state where
thirty-six percent of voters identify as Republican and thirty-six percent as
Democrats, the Amendment appeared to have bipartisan support.281 Of course,
billed as a victim’s bill of rights, few, if any, could have foreseen the proposal
as a tool to hide the identities of officers in fatal shootings. 282 But even if this
outcome was unforeseeable, it may not necessarily matter to many.283
While the role of the press in identifying certain law enforcement
misconduct is undeniable, it may not always be understood.284 In a June 2020
article composed by Julie Pierce Onos for Media Diversity Institute, the author
wrote, “[f]or Black people, media coverage of police brutality is a matter of
life and death.”285 The article surmises that the role of the press in shining a
light on the injustices suffered by African Americans at the hands of law
enforcement is undeniable.286 In fact, the author argues if the press had not
been so slow to recognize its role in supporting minorities, many past
injustices may have been resolved differently.287 But while the public is now
waking up to the vital role the press plays in exposing police brutality, this
arousal is only recent.288 As such, many do not realize how the press’s inability

note 97.

277.
278.
279.

See id.
See id.
Amendment 6/Marsy’s Law for Florida Approved by Florida Voters, supra

280.
Marsy’s Law for Florida Passes!, MARSY’S L. FOR FLA.,
http://www.marsyslawforfl.com/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
281.
Voter Registration by Party Affiliation, FLA. DIV. ELECTIONS,
http://dos.myflorida.com/elections/data-statistics/voter-registration-statistics/voterregistration-reportsxlsx/voter-registration-by-party-affiliation/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2021);
Amendment 6/Marsy’s Law for Florida Approved by Florida Voters, supra note 97.
282.
The News Serv. of Fla., supra note 15.
283.
See id. (explaining that the interpretation of Marcy’s Law is a question
which turns on state constitutional interpretation and thus the “Supreme Court is the final
arbiter”).
284.
Phil Sudo, The News Media: Fourth Branch of Government, SCHOLASTIC
UPDATE, Sept. 8, 1989, at 15, 15.
285.
Onos, supra note 233.
286.
See id.
287.
Id.
288.
See id.
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to report on these matters could impact justice in these cases.289 This may
result in numerous Floridians not recognizing the role the media plays in
obtaining justice for minorities when identifying individual officers in fatal
shootings.290
Ultimately, the effect of Marsy’s Law in protecting the identity of law
enforcement in use of force cases may already reflect the will of most
Floridians.291 However, if this comes at the cost of allowing the public to
supervise potentially the most powerful branch of government, for some, the
cost may be too high.292 If the Florida Supreme Court does weigh in on the
issue, the justice who submits their opinion will most likely affirm the First
District’s decision.293 In doing so, the outcome may do a little more than
retrace the well-thought-out and reasoned opinion of the lower court.294
Additionally, this approach will be consistent with precedent in following
strict constructionism and adhering to the plain language of the text.295 But in
doing so, the outcome may forever weaken what some call the fourth branch
of government—the press.296 For if the press cannot ultimately provide
oversight in these cases, is the public ready for the police to police their
own?297

289.
See id.
290.
See Onos, supra note 233; Amendment 6/Marsy’s Law for Florida
Approved by Florida Voters, supra note 97.
291.
See Amendment 6/Marsy’s Law for Florida Approved by Florida Voters,
supra note 97.
292.
See The News Serv. of Fla., supra note 15; Rule of Judicial Administration
Amendment Concerning Marsy’s Law, supra note 172.
293.
See The News Serv. of Fla., supra note 15.
294.
See Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Tallahassee, 314 So. 3d 796,
804 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
295.
See id. at 803–04.
296.
See id.; Sudo, supra note 284, at 15.
297.
See Ann C. Hodges & Justin Pugh, Crossing the Thin Blue Line: Protecting
Law Enforcement Officers Who Blow the Whistle, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 1, 39 (2018).
For those interested in the police’s ability to police itself, this is an excellent law review article
detailing the legal ramifications when officers report fellow officers for misconduct and the
potential blowback they face. See id. at 1–2.
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INTRODUCTION

Social media platforms have become one of the most prevalent forms
of communication and will undoubtedly continue to be the preferred and most
pervasive form of communication worldwide.1 Social media is one of the
fastest adopted technologies, with about 4.48 billion users today.2
Approximately 56.8% of the world’s population uses some form of social
network, including 231.47 million people in the United States.3 According to
a Pew Research Center poll, Americans under fifty years old turn to digital
devices for news.4 In addition, social media serves as the primary news source
for eighteen through twenty-nine-year-olds.5 Today’s leading social media
companies are Twitter, Facebook, Google, TikTok, YouTube, and Instagram.6
Collectively, they are commonly referred to as “Big Tech.”7
The pervasiveness of information posted on these social media sites
prompted the federal government, under former President Bill Clinton, to sign
into law section 230 of the Communications Decency Act in 1996.8 The Act
served as a way for Big Tech to censor indecent material on the internet.9
After several lawsuits challenging the law’s constitutionality, section 230 was
amended in 1998 and 2018.10 Now, section 230 provides tech companies with
legal protection from civil liability for hosting the content of others and from
1.
See discussion infra Part II; Brian Dean, Social Network Usage & Growth
Statistics:
How Many People Use Social Media in 2021?, BACKLINKO,
http://backlinko.com/social-media-users (last updated Oct. 10, 2021).
2.
Dean, supra note 1.
3.
Id.
4.
Elisa Shearer, More Than Eight-in-Ten Americans Get News From Digital
Devices, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2021), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2021/01/12/more-than-eight-in-ten-americans-get-news-from-digital-devices/.
5.
See id.
6.
Dean, supra note 1; see discussion infra Section II.B.
7.
See discussion infra Section II.B.
8.
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 501, 110
Stat. 133–143; see also Adi Robertson, Section 230 is 25 Years Old, and It’s Never Been More
Important, VERGE (Feb. 8, 2021, 2:08 PM), http://www.theverge.com/22268421/cda-section230-25th-anniversary-reform-stakes-big-tech-internet.
9.
See discussion infra Section II.B; Communications Decency Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 501, 110 Stat. 133–143 (1996); Mary Graw Leary, The Indecency and
Injustice of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 553,
559 (2018).
10.
Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub.
L. No. 115–164, § 4(a), 132 Stat. 1253, 1254 (2018); see discussion infra Section II.B; see also
47 U.S.C. § 230; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (challenging the constitutionality
of provisions of the Communications Decency Act seeking to protect minors from indecent
material posted on the internet).
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restricting access to or availability of material they deem “obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable.”11
On May 24, 2021, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed into law
Senate Bill 7072 (“SB 7072”), which is aimed at these Big Tech companies.12
The law comes as a response to Big Tech’s alleged bias and censorship of
conservative views, especially at the height of the 2020 election.13 Most
notable was the removal of former President Donald J. Trump from Twitter.14
According to Governor DeSantis, social media is allegedly responsible for
censoring conservative views and prioritizing “Silicon Valley leftist
narratives.”15 SB 7072 provides penalties of $250,000 a day for deplatforming
a candidate for state office and $25,000 a day for deplatforming a local
government candidate.16 SB 7072 also requires social media companies to
publish detailed standards on how it determines to deplatform and shadow ban
their users and disclosure of post-prioritization algorithms on its users.17
This Bill is the first of its kind.18 SB 7072 mirrors some of the
language in section 230 of the Communications Decency Act; however, critics
claim the law is not only preempted by the federal statute, but it goes too far.19
Others argue that the law itself is unconstitutional.20 Not even three days after
11.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(a).
12.
S.B. 7072, 27th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021); Catherine Thorbecke,
Critics Slam Florida’s Law Banning Big Tech ‘De-Platforming’ as ‘Unconstitutional’, ABC
NEWS (May 25, 2021, 4:27 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/critics-slam-floridas-lawbanning-big-tech-de/story?id=77891650.
13.
Fla. S.B. 7072; see discussion infra Section II.C; Thorbecke, supra note 12.
14.
See William L. Kovacs, Section 230’s Unconstitutional Delegation of
Power
to
Big
Tech,
HILL
(Jan.
23,
2021,
6:00
PM),
http://thehill.com/opinion/technology/535497-section-230s-unconstitutional-delegation-ofpower-to-big-tech.
15.
Fox10 News, Governor Ron DeSantis Press Conference in Miami,
YOUTUBE (May 24, 2021), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O67BF-2IWiY [hereinafter
DeSantis Press Conference].
16.
Fla. S.B. 7072.FLA. STAT. § 106.072(3) (2021).
17.
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(a) (2021); see discussion infra
Section III.B.1.
18.
Fla. S.B. 7072; see DeSantis Press Conference, supra note 15; Casey
Feindt, Gov. DeSantis Signs Bill Aimed at Holding ‘Big Tech’ Firms Accountable for Banning,
Blocking Accounts, FIRST COAST NEWS (May 24, 2021, 12:23 PM),
http://www.firstcoastnews.com/article/news/regional/florida/watch-governor-ron-desantisspeaks-in-miami/77-f1bd0b1e-decf-4843-9e5b-d203752d1353.
19.
Fla. S.B. 7072; see Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104–104, § 501, 110 Stat. 133–143 (1996); Complaint at 2, NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Moody, (No.
21-CV-220), 2021 WL 2690876, at 2 [hereinafter NetChoice Complaint]; 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(2)(a).
20.
Thorbecke, supra note 12.
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Governor DeSantis signed the Bill into law, NetChoice and Computer and
Communications Industry Association (“CCIA”), two large not-for-profit
trade associations whose members include social-media providers, filed suit
in federal court challenging the Bill’s constitutionality and seeking to enjoin
its enforcement.21 SB 7072 was to take effect July 1, 2021; however, on June
30, 2021, a Federal Judge granted CCIA’s preliminary injunction.22 This Note
will explore the constitutionality of SB 7072.23 Part II will discuss the events
that led to the drafting of the Bill, Part III will describe its contents, and Part
IV will explore whether SB 7072 is constitutional.24
II.
A.

EVENTS THAT LED TO SENATE BILL 7072

Marketplace for Ideas

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states,
“[C]ongress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . .”25 The Supreme Court has classified certain types of speech, like
political speech, as warranting more protection than others.26 A regulation
that directly infringes on political speech will only be upheld if the
government meets the high burden of showing that the law is “narrowly
tailored to [achieve] a compelling [government] interest.”27 Classifications of

21.
Fla. S.B. 7072; see Jordan Kirkland, DeSantis’s “Big Tech” Crackdown
Bill Slapped with Free Speech Lawsuit, CAPITOLIST (May 28, 2021),
http://thecapitolist.com/desantiss-big-tech-crackdown-bill-slapped-with-free-speech-lawsuit/.
22.
Fla. S.B. 7072; see Renzo Downey, Judge Blocks Florida Law Aimed at
Punishing Social Media, FLA. POL. (July 1, 2021), http://floridapolitics.com/archives/438675judge-halts-big-tech-bill-hours-before-it-kicks-in/.
23.
See discussion infra Part IV; Fla. S.B. 7072.
24.
See discussion infra Parts II–V; Fla. S.B. 7072.
25.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26.
See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. Of Educ. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(finding a school board resolution that required students to salute the American flag during
activity programs in all public schools unconstitutional because it compelled involuntary
speech).
27.
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231–32 (2015) (striking
down a town ordinance that restricted the postage of certain signs because the government’s
purpose for the regulation, which was aesthetic appeal and traffic management, was not a
compelling reason and the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s
purpose, thus failing the strict scrutiny standard applied).
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speech such as obscenity,28 fighting words,29 true threats,30 incitement to
violence,31 and defamation,32 on the other hand, are considered low-value
speech that does not receive the same heightened legal protection as political
speech.33 Laws that regulate these lower-level categories of speech will be
upheld if they are rationally related to a legitimate interest,34 or sometimes,
upon a showing that the law is substantially related to an important state
interest.35
The high protection of political speech evinces the Founding Fathers’
aversion to tyrannical British regulations on expression, such as the licensing
laws that plagued the sixteenth century.36 These were followed by
prosecutions for seditious libel in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries.37 With the advent of the printing press in the sixteenth century,
licensing laws sought to punish those who published material criticizing the
King.38 Licensing in the colonies was considered inconsistent with freedom
of expression and was interpreted as prior restraints on speech.39 According
to one commentator, “since licensing schemes had expired in England in 1695
and in the colonies by 1725, the Framers of the First Amendment intended to
28.
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
29.
See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The
Supreme Court found that the First Amendment does not protect “fighting words” — words
that are “likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the
peace.” Id. at 574.
30.
See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). “True threats” occur
when the speaker “means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” Id. Not to be confused
with “political hyperbole.” Id.
31.
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
32.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)
(requiring the showing of actual malice to prove the publication was defamatory against a public
official). Depending on who the speech was intended for, like a public official, the Supreme
Court requires different levels of intent to prove that the statement was defamatory. Id.
33.
VICTORIA L. KILLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11072, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: CATEGORIES OF SPEECH 1–2 (2019).
34.
See, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (upholding a
village zoning ordinance under the rational basis standard that restricted land use to a family
dwelling).
35.
See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994). This
is the intermediate scrutiny standard, which the Court uses when a classification based on
gender or legitimacy is involved. Id.
36.
See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR. ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES
& THEORY 5–6 (3d ed. Wolters Kluwer 2017).
37.
Id. at 6–7. These prosecutions were much like those involving libel of
private persons. Id. at 7.
38.
Id. at 5–6.
39.
See id. at 9.
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do more than simply prohibit prior restraints.”40 Colonial defenders of free
expression, like Thomas Jefferson, argued that free debate would lead to
truth.41 The learned John Stuart Mill knew the value of truth and the
importance of expressing one’s views in an open marketplace for ideas:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that
it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more who hold
it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of
exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as
great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of
truth produced by its collision with error.42

Essentially, the free marketplace fosters debate and the exchange of
ideas in pursuit of the truth.43 According to Thomas Jefferson, “[t]ruth . . .
will prevail if left to herself. . . . [S]he is the proper and sufficient antagonist
to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict unless by human
interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument, and debate.”44
Today’s marketplace for ideas has changed from the public square to virtual
platforms.45 These virtual platforms provide avenues for historically

1950).

40.
41.

KROTOSZYNSKI, JR. ET AL., supra note 36, at 9.
Id. at 13–14; 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 546 (Julian P. Boyd ed.,

42.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 87 (David Bromwich & George Kateb
eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859).
43.
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes J.,
dissenting).

Id.

Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical.
If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with
all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all
opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the
speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do
not care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your
premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas —
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to
wager our salvation upon some prophesy based upon imperfect knowledge.

44.
KROTOSZYNSKI, JR. ET AL., supra note 36, at 13–14.
45.
See Mason C. Shefa, First Amendment 2.0: Revisiting Marsh and the
Quasi-Public Forum in the Age of Social Media, 41 U. HAW. L. REV. 159, 161–62 (2018).
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unprecedented amounts of speech.46 Never has material traveled so quickly
and reached so many people.47 Also unprecedented, however, is the
concentrated control of so much speech in the hands of a few private parties.48
B.

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act

In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,49 the plaintiff sued
Prodigy, an interactive computer service, for defamatory comments made by
an unidentified third party on one of Prodigy’s bulletin boards.50 The New
York court held Prodigy strictly liable for the defamatory post because
Prodigy acted more like an original publisher than a distributor.51 Original
publishers of defamatory statements are held strictly liable for any defamatory
information they publish.52 On the other hand, distributors like book stores
and libraries are held to a lower knowledge standard, in which liability is
imposed on the distributor of defamatory statements if it is proven that the
distributor knew of the statement’s defamatory nature.53 The Stratton
Oakmont court found that Prodigy was acting more akin to a publisher because
it advertised its practice of controlling content on its service and because it
actively screened and edited messages posted on its bulletin boards.54
Congress enacted section 230 of the Communications Decency Act to
remove the disincentives to self-regulate created by the Stratton Oakmont
decision.55 Under the court’s decision, interactive computer services would
be opening themselves to liability for regulating the material posted on their
platforms because such regulation casts the service provider in the role of a
publisher.56 Congress, recognizing the importance of the Internet’s continued
growth and the need to regulate indecent online material, drafted section 230
of the Communications Decency Act codified in Title V of the
46.
See id. at 164. (“[A]s early as 2001, courts have treated computers and
Internet access as ‘virtually indispensable in the modern world of communications and
information gathering.’”) (quoting United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2001)
(per curiam)).
47.
See id. at 165.
48.
See id. at 161–62.
49.
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
50.
Id. at *1–*2.
51.
Id. at *4.
52.
See id. at *3.
53.
Id.; see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
54.
Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *4.
55.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230; John A. LoNigro, Comment, Deplatformed: Social
Network Censorship, the First Amendment, and the Argument to Amend Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 37 TOURO L. REV. 427, 459–60 (2021); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
56.
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
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Telecommunications Act of 1996.57 Nebraska Senator James Exon and
Washington State Senator Slade Gorton introduced section 230 to the Senate
Committee of Commerce, Science, and Transportation in 1995.58 According
to Senator Exon, the Act’s purpose was to “provide much needed protection
for children” from indecent material posted on the Internet.59 The Act
prohibits the knowing dissemination of obscene material to children and
empowers “interactive computer service[s]” to remove such content from their
platforms without risk of liability.60 “‘Interactive computer service’ [is
defined as] any information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet
and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.”61 This definition includes social media networks.62 Thus,
Twitter, Instagram, Google, YouTube, and Facebook are all covered under
section 230.63
1.

Policy Goals

The Act’s policy is explicitly outlined in the text, and provides that it
is the policy of the United States:
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet
and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; (3) to encourage
the development of technologies which maximize user control over
what information is received by individuals, families, and schools
who use the Internet and other interactive computer services; (4) to
remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
57.
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 501, 110
Stat. 133–143 (1996); Leary, supra note 9, at 558–59.
58.
Senator
J.
James
Exon,
CONGRESS.GOV,
http://www.congress.gov/member/john-exon/E000284?r=2&q=%7B%22billstatus%22%3A%22introduced%22%7D (last visited Jan. 10, 2022); S.314, 104th Cong. (1st
Sess. 1995).
59.
See Leary, supra note 9, at 559 n.19 (quoting Senator Exon, author of the
CDA) (“The fundamental purpose of the Communications Decency Act is to provide much
needed protection for children.”).
60.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
61.
Id. § 230(f)(2).
62.
See LoNigro, supra note 55, at 457–58.
63.
See id.
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blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict
their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online
material; and (5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking,
and harassment by means of computer.64

The Act was first struck down in Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union65 in 1997 when the Supreme Court held that portions of the Act were
unconstitutionally vague.66 For instance, the Act’s prohibition of the
“transmission of ‘indecent material’” was specifically found to be vague.67
However, the Act itself was not challenged, and remains effective law today.68
2.

Publisher vs. Distributor

Section 230 explicitly exempts interactive computer services as
“publishers of information” posted on their platforms by third parties.69 This
designation came as a response to the Stratton Oakmont decision.70 One year
after section 230 was enacted, the Fourth Circuit dealt with the publisher
versus distributor distinction in Zeran v. American Online, Inc.71 The plaintiff,
Zeran, sued AOL for failing to remove defamatory messages posted by an
unidentified third party, failing to screen for similar posts thereafter, and
refusing to post retractions of those messages.72 Zeran argued that Congress’
chosen designation, to explicitly treat interactive service providers as
publishers, means that they did not mean to limit distributor liability by
exclusion.73 Therefore, because AOL knew of the defamatory nature of the
posts, they should be held liable as distributors.74
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that “imposition of
distributor liability . . . is merely a subset, or a species, of publisher liability,
and is therefore also foreclosed by [section] 230.”75 The distinction between
publishers and distributors is important because section 230 has granted social
64.
47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
65.
521 U.S. 844 (1997); see also Leary, supra note 9, at 559.
66.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 874; Leary, supra note 9, at 559.
67.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 870–74; Leary, supra note 9, at 559.
68.
Leary, supra note 9, at 559.
69.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
70.
LoNigro, supra note 55, at 464.
71.
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Leary, supra note 9, at 575.
72.
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328.
73.
Id. at 331. Zeran notified AOL “repeatedly” about the defamatory posts.
Id. at 329. Thus, the Company was on notice. See id.
74.
See id. at 331.
75.
Id. at 332.
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media platforms free reign to remove content they otherwise find
objectionable without being classified as a publisher of such editorial
choices.76 As such, Big Tech companies are immune from civil liability.77
C.

2020 Election

With more Americans turning to social media for their daily news, it
is no surprise that political candidates have relied so heavily on these virtual
platforms.78 Social media platforms are amenable to political candidates’
messages because of their capacity to reach a vast amount of people.79 The
2020 election was unprecedented in that it occurred in the middle of a
pandemic, where the majority of Americans were forced to stay at home and
connect with people via social media.80 Political ads on these social networks
were an essential tool used by 2020 candidates to reach voters throughout their
campaigns.81
While political ads that run on broadcast television remain the largest
expenditure, online political ads are not far behind.82 From 2018 through
2019, former President Donald J. Trump spent the most money of all online
ad-spenders and more on Google and Facebook political advertisements than
every other 2020 candidate.83 Former President Trump spent approximately
$852,000 on Facebook advertisements, which surpassed every other

76.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
77.
See id. at § 230(e). The only exceptions to the liability shield granted to
Big Tech companies is if they violate a criminal law, violate intellectual property laws, or
violate sex trafficking laws. Id. at § 230(e)(1)–(5).
78.
See LoNigro, supra note 55, at 429.
79.
See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (“While
in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places — in a spatial
sense — for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace — the ‘vast
democratic forums of the Internet’ in general, and social media in particular.”) (citation
omitted).
80.
See Miles Parks, Social Media Usage Is at an All-Time High. That Could
Mean a Nightmare for Democracy, NPR (May 27, 2020, 5:02 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2020/05/27/860369744/social-media-usage-is-at-an-all-time-high-thatcould-mean-a-nightmare-for-democr.
81.
See Statista Rsch. Dep’t, 2020 Presidential Election and the Media –
Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Feb. 25, 2021), http://www.statista.com/topics/5934/2020presidential-election-and-the-media/.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.

2021]

FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE ERA OF SOCIAL MEDIA

39

candidate’s spending.84 Twitter85 and TikTok86 currently prohibit political
ads, but Facebook does not.87 While these amounts may seem staggering to
the average person, to a political candidate, they are essential to reach the
voters.88 For instance, every 2020 presidential candidate had a Twitter
account.89 One of the Democratic candidates in the 2020 presidential race,
Bernie Sanders, had over ten million followers on Twitter, while President Joe
Biden had over four million.90 Former President Trump had nearly 88.9
million followers before he was banned from Twitter on January 7, 2021.91
Former President Trump’s use of Twitter was widely criticized, and according
to a poll mid-way through his presidency, sixty percent of the pollsters
claimed his Tweets were inappropriate.92
Whatever the content of his tweets, former President Trump was able
to speak directly to his millions of followers and skip the middleman of
mainstream news that would require one to sift through and interpret what the
former President “meant.”93 In fact, he was not the only politician to see the

84.
Id.
85.
Political Content, TWITTER BUS., http://business.twitter.com/en/help/adspolicies/ads-content-policies/political-content.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2022) (“Twitter
globally prohibits the promotion of political content. . . . [w]e define political content as content
that references a candidate, political party, elected or appointed government official, . . .
referendum, ballot measure, legislation, regulation, directive, or judicial outcome.”).
86.
Blake Chandlee, Understanding Our Policies Around Paid Ads, TIKTOK
NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/understanding-our-policies-around-paid-ads,
(last visited Jan. 10, 2022) (“[W]e will not allow paid ads that promote or oppose a candidate,
current leader, political party or group, or issue at the federal, state, or local level — including
election-related ads, advocacy ads, or issue ads.”).
87.
See Get Authorized to Run Ads About Social Issues, Elections or Politics,
FACEBOOK
FOR
BUS.,
http://www.facebook.com/business/help/208949576550051?id=288762101909005
(last
visited Jan. 10, 2022) [hereinafter Get Authorized to Run Ads] (requiring advertisers that wish
to run or edit political ads on Facebook in the United States to get special authorization first).
88.
See Statista Rsch. Dep’t, supra note 81.
89.
See Bridget Coyne, Helping Identify 2020 U.S. Election Candidates on
Twitter,
TWITTER:
BLOG
(Dec.
12,
2019),
http://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/helping-identify-2020-us-electioncandidates-on-twitter (noting that all presidential candidates that have been confirmed by
Ballotopia will have Election Labels — the blue checks — next to their name).
90.
Statista Rsch. Dep’t, supra note 81.
91.
Twitter ‘Permanently Suspends’ Trump’s Account, BBC NEWS,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55597840 (last visited Jan. 10, 2022).
92.
Statista Rsch. Dep’t, supra note 81.
93.
See Twitter ‘Permanently Suspends’ Trump’s Account, supra note 91;
Brice C. Barnard, Comment, The Tweet Stops Here: Politicians Must Address Emerging
Freedom of Speech Issues in Social Media, 88 UMKC L. REV. 1019, 1025 (2020).
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value in speaking directly to his constituency.94 President Biden relied heavily
on social media networks, especially to connect with younger voters.95
D.

Deplatforming of Candidates

Claims of Big Tech’s censorship have recently come to the forefront
of the news.96 Because of section 230’s protection, these companies do not
risk civil liability for removing content posted on their platforms that violate
their “terms of service.”97 Algorithms, which automate the detection of
“misinformation” and violations of these platforms’ terms of services, enable
Big Tech to remove content, usually without warning and without a clear
explanation of the standards that resulted in the removal.98 Although
technically not state actors, Big Tech companies have amassed such a large
base and influence that they should be held to the same degree of scrutiny as
government actors.99 The fact that a few private companies essentially have
an editorial monopoly over the vast amount of content posted on their sites is
contrary to the principles of the Constitution.100 Ostensibly, these social media
sites should serve to foster more speech.101 Big Tech’s censorship of certain
viewpoints was evident throughout the 2020 election.102

94.
See Twitter ‘Permanently Suspends’ Trump’s Account, supra note 91; Peter
Suciu, Social Media Proved Crucial for Joe Biden — It Allowed Him to Connect with Young
Voters and Avoid His Infamous Gaffes, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2020, 4:35 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2020/11/17/social-media-proved-crucial-for-joebiden--it-allowed-him-to-connect-with-young-voters-and-avoid-his-infamousgaffes/?sh=b49856841482.
95.
Suciu, supra note 94.
96.
See, e.g., How Big Tech Censorship is Harming Free Speech, LIBERTIES
(May 5, 2021), http://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/big-tech-censorship/43511.
97.
LoNigro, supra note 55, at 431; Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER,
http://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited Jan. 10, 2022). Under its terms of service, Twitter can
“suspend or terminate your account or cease providing you with all or part of the [s]ervices at
any time for any or no reason . . . .” Id.
98.
See How Big Tech Censorship is Harming Free Speech, supra note 96.
99.
See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (finding companyowned town was subject to the First Amendment because town was open to the public and used
for public purposes, similar to the government); see LoNigro, supra note 55, at 429.
100.
See discussion supra Section II.A; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
101.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230.
102.
See discussion infra Section II.D.1; Carla Marinucci & Daniel Strauss,
Tulsi Gabbard Sues Google Over Post-Debate Ad Suspension, POLITICO (July 25, 2019, 1:35
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/25/tulsi-gabbard-sues-google-accountsuspension-1435405.
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Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard

The 2020 Democratic Party presidential candidate, Tulsi Gabbard of
Hawaii, fell victim to Big Tech’s censorship during her campaign.103
Throughout her campaign, Representative Gabbard was critical of Big
Tech.104 Gabbard frequently voiced her concern about Facebook banning
users and voiced her support for net neutrality as a “cornerstone of our
democracy.”105 Right after the Democratic presidential debate in June 2019,
Google suspended Gabbard’s campaign ad account.106 Only hours after the
debate, Gabbard’s performance earned her the title of one of Google’s most
searched candidates.107 It was never proven why her campaign ad account
was suspended at such a critical time.108 Gabbard only received a message
from Google that said her account was suspended “for violations of billing
practices and advertising practices.”109 In July 2019, Representative Gabbard
filed suit against Google, claiming they violated her First Amendment right of
free speech by suspending her campaign account.110 In a short decision, the
court dismissed the case, finding Google was not a state actor and, therefore,
not subject to the First Amendment.111
Representative Gabbard is not the only political official who faced
Big Tech’s censorship.112 On September 13, 2019, Twitter suspended
Republican Texas House Representative Briscoe Cain’s account for one
103.
Marinucci & Strauss, supra note 102; see LoNigro, supra note 55, at 430.
104.
Marinucci & Strauss, supra note 102.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
See id.
109.
Marinucci & Strauss, supra note 102.
110.
See id.; Tulsi Now, Inc. v. Google, LLC, No. 2:19-CV-06444, 2020 WL
4353686 at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2020).
111.
Tulsi Now, Inc., 2020 WL 4353686 at *2.

Id.

What Plaintiff fails to establish is how Google’s regulation of its own
platform is in any way equivalent to a governmental regulation of an election.
Google does not hold primaries, it does not select candidates, and it does not prevent
anyone from running for office or voting in election. To the extent Google
“regulates” anything, it regulates its own private speech and platform.

112.
See Marinucci & Strauss, supra note 102; Joseph Menn & Katie Paul,
Twitter, Facebook Suspend Some Accounts as U.S. Election Misinformation Spreads Online,
REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2020, 5:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-electionsocialmedia/twitter-facebook-suspend-some-accounts-as-u-s-election-misinformationspreads-online-idUSKBN27J2S4 (“Twitter, Inc.[] and Facebook, Inc.[] on Tuesday suspended
several recently created and mostly right-leaning news accounts posting information about
voting in the hotly contested U.S. election for violating their policies.”).
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hundred forty-one days.113 On January 17, 2021, Twitter suspended
Republican House Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene for twelve hours.114
On June 11, 2021, Republican Senator Ron Johnson was suspended from
YouTube for seven days,115 and on January 9, 2021, Republican House
Representative Barry Moore’s Twitter account was suspended temporarily.116
2.

Former President Donald J. Trump

During his presidency, former President Trump was also critical of
Big Tech and called for the policing of section 230.117 On May 28, 2020,
President Trump issued an Executive Order (“EO”) that commented on the
selective censorship that Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube were
exercising over Americans.118 One of the directives in the EO ordered the
Department of Justice to develop proposed amendments to section 230 that
113.
Dave Montgomery & Nick Corsaniti, Exchange Over Texas Ballot’s
‘Purity’ Puts G.O.P. Firebrand in Hot Seat, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2021, at A19; Texas Tribune
Staff, Briscoe Cain Says His “My AR is Ready For You” Tweet Benefited Him, Beto O’Rouke,
TEXAS TRIB. (Sept. 28, 2019, 3:00 PM), http://www.texastribune.org/2019/09/28/briscoe-cainbeto-orourke-gun-tweet/ (discussing how Republican Representative Briscoe Gain’s Twitter
account was suspended after he tweeted an alleged death threat towards Democratic presidential
candidate Beto O’Rourke).
114.
Bill Chappell, Twitter Suspends Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene's Account,
NPR
(Jan.
17,
2021),
http://www.npr.org/sections/insurrection-at-thecapitol/2021/01/17/957891462/twitter-suspends-rep-marjorie-taylor-greene-s-accounttemporarily; Twitter Suspends Republican Lawmaker’s Account Over Violations of ‘Integrity
Policy’,
KOREA
TIMES,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2021/09/133_302634.html?KK (Jan. 18, 2021, 1:48
PM) (explaining how Representative Greene’s account was suspended for tweeting about
alleged 2020 election fraud, which was in violation of Twitter’s civic integrity policy).
115.
Shawn Johnson, Republican US Sen. Ron Johnson Suspended from
YouTube, WIS. PUB. RADIO (June 11, 2021, 5:50 PM), http://www.wpr.org/republican-us-senron-johnson-suspended-youtube (discussing how Senator Johnson was suspended for
“violat[ing] the company’s [COVID-19] medical misinformation [policy]”).
116.
See Zack Budryk, Newly Sworn in GOP Rep Deletes Twitter Account After
Suspension Following Controversial Riot Posts, HILL (Jan. 11, 2021, 11:52 AM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/533625-newly-sworn-in-gop-rep-deletes-twitter-accountafter-suspension-following; Barry Moore Deactivates Twitter Account After Being Suspended
From Platform, ALA. NEWS NETWORK, http://www.alabamanews.net/2021/01/11/barry-mooredeactivates-twitter-account-after-being-suspended-from-platform/ (Jan. 11, 2021, 3:04 PM)
(discussing how House Representative Moore’s Twitter account was suspended after tweets he
shared following the riot at the U.S. Capitol).
117.
Talia Kaplan, Trump Lawsuit Against Big Tech Could ‘Break New Ground’
on First Amendment Protections: Parler Interim CEO, FOX NEWS (July 8, 2021),
http://www.foxnews.com/media/trump-lawsuit-big-tech-first-amendment-parler-ceo;
see
Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020).
118.
See Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079.
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would promote the policy goals outlined within the EO.119 One of those goals
was the “commitment to free and open debate on the internet” because it is
“essential to sustaining our democracy.”120
On January 8, 2021, Twitter permanently banned President Trump’s
account.121 Following the United States Capitol protest—turned riot by
fringed far-right members—on January 6, 2021, Twitter decided to
permanently disable the President’s account.122 Twitter initially locked
President Trump’s account citing that “the risks of keeping his commentary
live on its site [were] too high.”123 The company told former President Trump
that he would be allowed back onto his account, provided he remove the
offending posts.124 After removing the posts that allegedly violated Twitter’s
policies, former President Trump was reinstated onto the site.125 Shortly after
being reinstated, the former President posted two tweets: one calling his

119.
See id. (“Free speech is the bedrock of American democracy. Our
Founding Fathers protected this sacred right with the First Amendment to the Constitution. The
freedom to express and debate ideas is the foundation for all of our rights as a free people.”).
120.
Id. The Department of Justice hosted a “Public Workshop,” a private
“Expert Roundtable” discussion and “Industry Listening Sessions” where “the Department met
individually with a diverse group of businesses that had attended the public event or otherwise
expressed interest in Section 230.” Department of Justice’s Review of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. ARCHIVES,
http://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/department-justice-s-review-section-230-communicationsdecency-act-1996 (last visited Dec. 29, 2021) (“[These meetings] were private and confidential
to foster frank discussions about their use of Section 230 [of the Communications Decency Act
of 1996] . . . .”).
121.
Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER: BLOG (Jan. 8,
2021), http://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.
122.
Id.; see also Kate Conger & Mike Isaac, Twitter Permanently Bans Trump,
Capping Online Revolt, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/technology/twittertrump-suspended.html (last updated Jan. 12, 2021).
123.
Conger & Isaac, supra note 122. The events that led to Former President
Trump’s first temporary suspension resulted from a rally held on the White House Ellipse,
where the former President said:
Now it is up to Congress to confront this egregious assault on our democracy, and
after this, we’re gonna walk down and I’ll be there with you. We’re gonna walk
down . . . to the Capitol and we’re gonna cheer on our brave Senators and
Congressmen and women and we’ll probably not gonna be cheering so much for
some of them because you’ll never take back our country with weakness. You have
to show strength, and you have to be strong.

NBC News, Trump Encourages Those at His Rally to March to the Capitol NBC News NOW,
YOUTUBE
(Jan.
7,
2021),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5fiT6c0MQ58&ab_channel=NBCNews.
124.
Conger & Isaac, supra note 122.
125.
Id.
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supporters “American Patriots” and another informing his followers that he
would not be attending President Joe Biden’s inauguration.126
Twitter found these tweets to condone the United States Capitol riot
and claimed that the President was inciting violence.127 A Twitter employee
told the Washington Post that a petition signed by hundreds of employees
asked the company to immediately remove President Trump’s account.128
After a meeting, Twitter stood by its decision and permanently banned the
President from its platform.129 Facebook, Snapchat, YouTube, and Reddit
followed suit and limited the President’s access to their platforms as well.130
Both Twitter and Facebook have decided to maintain their ban on the
former President.131 As a result, on July 7, 2021, President Trump filed a class
action lawsuit in Federal court challenging Twitter’s unilateral decision to ban
him from its platform.132 The lawsuit alleges that the Tech giant violated his
First Amendment right to free speech.133 As a way around the lack of state
action that has already been alleged by various suits challenging Big Tech’s
censorship,134 Trump claims that Twitter has been “engag[ing] in
impermissible censorship resulting from . . . legislative action, a misguided
reliance upon [s]ection 230 of the Communications Decency Act . . . and
willful participation in joint activity with federal actors.”135 Twitter’s status,
the lawsuit goes on to say, “rises beyond that of a private company to that of
a state actor, and as such, [Twitter] is constrained by the First Amendment

126.
Id. (“In one, he wrote: ‘The 75,000,000 great American Patriots who voted
for me, AMERICA FIRST, and MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN, will have a GIANT
VOICE long into the future. They will not be disrespected or treated unfairly in any way, shape
or form!!!’”); Twitter ‘Permanently Suspends’ Trump’s Account, supra note 91.
127.
See Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, supra note 121.
128.
Conger & Isaac, supra note 122.
129.
Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, supra note 121.
130.
Conger & Isaac, supra note 122.
131.
See Haley Messenger, Twitter to Uphold Permanent Ban Against Trump,
Even
if
He
Were
to
Run
for
Office
Again,
NBC
NEWS,
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/twitter-uphold-permanent-ban-againsttrump-even-if-he-were-n1257269 (last updated Feb. 10, 2021, 10:36 AM); Facebook’s Trump
Ban Upheld by Oversight Board for Now, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology56985583 (last updated May 25, 2021).
132.
Complaint at 1–2, Trump v. Twitter, Inc., 21-CV-22441 (S.D. Fla. July 7,
2021) [hereinafter Trump Complaint].
133.
Id. at 3.
134.
See, e.g., Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2020)
(“Because the state action doctrine precludes constitutional scrutiny of YouTube’s content
moderation pursuant to its Terms of Service and Community Guidelines, we affirm the District
Court’s dismissal of PragerU’s First Amendment claim.”).
135.
Trump Complaint, supra note 132, at 2.
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right to free speech in the censorship decisions it makes.”136 This arm of the
government argument has not been alleged in any suit against Big Tech
companies before, and we will have to wait to see if it will be successful.137
As a result of these events, on May 24, 2021, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis
signed into law SB 7072.138 With the midterm elections just a year away, it is
no surprise that the Governor does not want to be the next victim of Big Tech’s
censorship and thus fashioned a law that would monetarily affect Big Tech’s
decision to deplatform a candidate.139
III.

SENATE BILL 7072

The impetus for SB 7072 was to hold Big Tech accountable for
silencing dissent and certain viewpoints that were not consistent with “the
dominant Silicon Valley ideology.”140 Lieutenant Governor of Florida,
Jeanette Nuñez, commented that “by signing SB 7072 into law, Florida is
taking back the virtual public square as a place where information and ideas
can flow freely.”141 The Governor went on to note that many of Florida’s
constituents have had experience living in countries where speech is silenced,
specifically in Venezuela and Cuba.142 Florida Senator Ray Rodrigues, one of
the co-sponsors of the bill, said that “[r]equiring Big Tech to define the
behaviors that will lead to someone being deplatformed is a significant victory
for free speech . . . .”143

136.
Id.
137.
See Kaplan, supra note 117.
138.
S.B. 7072, 27th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021); see DeSantis Press
Conference, supra note 15.
139.
See discussion infra Part III; Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the
Censorship of Floridians by Big Tech, RON DESANTIS 46TH GOVERNOR OF FLA. (May 24, 2021),
http://www.flgov.com/2021/05/24/governor-ron-desantis-signs-bill-to-stop-the-censorship-offloridians-by-big-tech/; Dan Trujillo, DeSantis Running for Re-election and Not Considering
Presidential Run, Governor Announces, WFTS ABC ACTION NEWS (Oct. 1, 2021, 2:18 PM),
http://www.abcactionnews.com/news/state/desantis-running-for-re-election-and-notconsidering-presidential-run-governor-announces.
140.
Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of Floridians by
Big Tech, supra note 139 (“A social media platform may not take any action to censor,
deplatform, or shadow ban a journalistic enterprise based on the content of its publication or
broadcast.”); see also Fla. S.B. 7072
141.
Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of Floridians by
Big Tech, supra note 139; see also Fla. S.B. 7072.
142.
Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of Floridians by
Big Tech, supra note 139.
143.
Id.
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SB 7072 creates three new Florida Statutes: section 106.072, section 287.137,
and section 501.2041.144 Under SB 7072, all Floridians, not just political
candidates, will be able to directly sue companies that violate the law and seek
monetary damages.145 The bill enables the Attorney General of Florida to
bring an action against Big Tech for violating the law under Florida’s Unfair
and Deceptive Practices Act.146 Violations of antitrust laws will also enable
the Attorney General to bring an action against the technology companies, and
will result in these companies being added to an “antitrust violator vendor
list.”147 Being placed on the antitrust violator vendor list will affect these
companies’ ability to receive government contracts.148 Finally, the law
imposes monetary repercussions with fees of up to $250,000 a day for state
and local offices deplatforming political candidates.149
A.

Section 2
1.

Removing Candidates

Section 2 of SB 7072 is entitled: “Social media deplatforming of
political candidates.”150 Under this section, “‘[d]eplatform’ has the same
meaning as [it does] in [Florida Statute section] 501.2041,” which defines
“[d]eplatform” as “the action or practice by a social media platform to
permanently delete or ban a user or to temporarily delete or ban a user from
the social media platform for more than [fourteen] days.”151 Social media
platform is defined as:
[A]ny information service, system, Internet search engine, or access
software provider that: [p]rovides or enables computer access by
144.
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 106.072 (2021); FLA. STAT. § 287.137 (2021);
FLA. STAT. § 501.2041 (2021); NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 21-CV-220, 2021 WL 2690876,
at *2 (N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021).
145.
Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of Floridians by
Big Tech, supra note 139; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(6); Fla. S.B. 7072.
146.
Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of Floridians by
Big Tech, supra note 139; see also Fla S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041.
147.
Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of Floridians by
Big Tech, supra note 139; see also FLA. STAT. § 287.137(2)(a)–(b).
148.
FLA. STAT. § 287.137(2)(a)–(b) (“A public entity may not accept a bid,
proposal, or reply from, award a new contract to, or transact new business with any person or
affiliate on the antitrust violator vendor list . . . .”).
149.
FLA. STAT. § 106.072(3); Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the
Censorship of Floridians by Big Tech, supra note 139.
150.
Fla. S.B. 7072 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 106.072 (2021)).
151.
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(c) (2021).
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multiple users to a computer server; . . . [o]perates as a sole
proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, corporation,
association; . . . [d]oes business in the [S]tate [of Florida], and
[either] [h]as annual gross revenues in excess of $100 million . . .
[or] [h]as at least 100 million monthly individual platform
participants . . . .152

The definition of “social media platform” explicitly exempts “any
information service, system, Internet search engine, or access software
provider operated by a company that owns and operates a theme park or
entertainment complex . . . .”153
Section 2 goes on to prohibit the willful deplatforming of “a candidate
for office who is known by the social media platform to be a candidate,
beginning on the date of qualification and ending on the date of the election
or the date the candidate ceases to be a candidate.”154 As noted above,
violating section 2 of SB 7072 may result in “the social media platform [being]
fined $250,000 per day for a candidate for statewide office and $25,000 per
day for a candidate for other offices.”155 Section 2 also states that any willful
free advertising provided by the social media platform must be disclosed to
the candidate.156 Explicitly in section 2 is a provision that states the law “may
only be enforced to the extent not inconsistent with federal law and 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(e)(3) . . . .” otherwise known as the Communications Decency Act.157
B.

Section 4

Section 4 of the bill, which creates Florida Statute section 501.2041,
is entitled: “Unlawful acts and practices by social media platforms.”158
Section 4 provides that “[a] social media platform that fails to comply with
any of the provisions of this subsection commits an unfair or deceptive . . .
practice . . . .”159

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(g).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(g).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 106.072(2).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 106.072(3).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 106.072(4).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 106.072(5); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230.
Fla. S.B. 7072 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 501.2041 (2021)).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2).
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Censor, Shadow Ban, and Use of Post-Prioritization Algorithms

Section 4 prohibits any social media platform from “censor[ing]” or
“shadow ban[ning] a user’s content . . . or deplatform[ing] a [candidate],”
without first notifying them of the action taken against them.160 “Shadow ban”
is defined in this section to be “action by a social media platform . . . to limit
or eliminate the exposure of a user or content or material posted by a user to
other users of the social media platform.”161 “Censor” is also defined in
section 4 to include “any action taken by a social media platform to delete,
regulate, restrict, edit, alter, inhibit the publication or republication of, suspend
a right to post, remove, or post an addendum to any content or material posted
by a user.”162
Any use of “post-prioritization,” which is “action by the social media
platform to place, feature, or prioritize certain content or material ahead of,
below, or in a more or less prominent position than others in a newsfeed, feed,
or search results,” is also prohibited against any political candidate.163 The
social media platform must allow “user[s] to opt-out of post-prioritization and
shadow ban[] algorithms . . . .”164 These platforms must also provide an annual
notice to users on the use of such algorithms and shadow banning and to
reoffer the opt-out opportunity annually.165 The prohibition on postprioritization algorithms, however, does not apply to advertisements or
content the platform is paid to carry.166
2.

Consistent Application of Standards

The provisions of this subsection require “[a] social media platform .
. . [to] publish the standards, including detailed definitions, it uses . . . [to]
determin[e] how to censor, deplatform, and shadow ban” a user.167 The social
media platform must apply those detailed standards “consistent[ly]” among
all users on the platform.168 Section 4 goes on to require “social media
platform[s] [to] inform each user about any changes to its user rules, terms,
and agreements before implementing the changes . . . .”169
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(d).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(f).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(b).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(e), (2)(h).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(f)(2).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(g).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(e).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(a).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(b).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(c).
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Damages

A private citizen can bring a cause of action against a social media
platform for violating this section, for failing to apply consistent censorship
standards among its users, or for shadow banning a user without notice. 170 The
remedy provides “$100,000 in statutory damages per . . . claim” along with
“actual damages,” “punitive damages”—"if aggravating factors are
present”—and “other forms of equitable relief”.171 Further, if the user was
deplatformed in a manner that is inconsistent with the detailed standards
required by section 4, then the user is entitled to “costs and reasonable attorney
fees.”172
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 2 AND 4 OF SENATE BILL
7072

In analyzing the constitutionality of the regulation at issue, a court
must first determine if the speech is content-based or content-neutral, which
in turn, determines the appropriate standard of review.173 Laws that
distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or
views expressed are content-based and are subject to strict scrutiny.174 By
contrast, laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without
reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content-neutral
and are subject to intermediate scrutiny.175 Cases have recognized that even a
regulation neutral on its face may be content-based if its manifest purpose is
to regulate speech because of the message it conveys.176
A.

NetChoice v. Moody

Three days after SB 7072 was signed into law by Governor DeSantis,
NetChoice and CCIA sued to enjoin its enforcement.177 Count one of the
complaint alleged that SB 7072 violated the plaintiff’s First Amendment free
speech rights by interfering with the providers’ editorial judgment, compelling

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Fla. S.B.7072; see FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(6).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(6)(a)–(d).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(6)(e).
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994).
Id. at 642, 658.
Id. at 642.
See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990).
Kirkland, supra note 21; Fla. S.B. 7072.
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speech, and prohibiting speech.178 Count two alleged that SB 7072 was vague,
and therefore in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.179 Count three
claimed SB 7072 violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause by impermissibly discriminating between providers that do or do not
meet the bill’s size requirements.180 Count four alleged that SB 7072 violated
the Constitution’s Dormant Commerce Clause,181 and count five alleged that
the bill was preempted by federal statute, namely section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act.182
The discussion below will address the constitutionality of certain
provisions of sections 2 and 4 of the bill, which encompasses counts one and
five of the complaint.183 On June 30, 2021, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida granted NetChoice and CCIA’s
preliminary injunction against SB 7072’s enforcement.184 Judge Robert
Hinkle’s order discussed the constitutionality of the provisions of SB 7072 to
assess whether there is a likelihood of success on the merits because it is one
of the elements a court must consider when issuing a preliminary injunction.185
Judge Hinkle noted that further factual developments may change the
analysis of the constitutionality of the challenged sections of the law and that
statements about the merits should be understood only as statements about the
likelihood of success.186
1.

Content-Based Restrictions

One of the first arguments the plaintiffs made was that SB 7072
violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.187 Specifically, sections
2 and 4 were alleged to “restrict speech based on its content and based on its
178.
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 44–54; Fla. S.B. 7072.
179.
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 55–58; Fla. S.B. 7072.
180.
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 59–62; Fla. S.B. 7072.
181.
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 62–64.
182.
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 64–68.
183.
Fla. S.B. 7072; see discussion infra Sections IV.A.1–3.
184.
NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 21-CV-220, 2021 WL 2690876, at *12
(N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021); see also Fla. S.B. 7072.
185.
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *2; see also Fla. S.B. 7072; see, e.g.,
Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. Cox, 408 F.3d 1349, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005)
As a prerequisite to a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction does not issue, that the threatened injury outweighs whatever
damage the proposed injunction may cause a defendant, and that the injunction will
not be adverse to the public interest.

NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *2.
186.
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *2.
187.
See NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 45; Fla. S.B. 7072.
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speaker . . . .”188 The plaintiffs contended that SB 7072, namely section 4,
“authorizes the State to engage in highly intrusive investigations of content
moderation processes and judgments, . . . ” which requires detailed
explanations of the algorithms used to censor political candidates.189 Because
both these provisions are content-based, the plaintiffs argued they are subject
to strict scrutiny.190 The plaintiffs claimed that neither section survives strict
scrutiny because the government has no legitimate interest that supports
sections 2 and 4’s constraints, let alone a compelling interest.191
In the preliminary injunction, the court agreed with the plaintiffs,
noting that “[t]he Florida Statutes at issue are about as content-based as it
gets.”192 First, Florida Statute section 106.072 only applies to the
deplatforming of political candidates, no one else.193 This, the court writes, is
a content-based restriction.194 Second, the court points to the factual support
asserted by the plaintiffs of the actual motivation for the legislation, which
“was hostility to the social media platforms’ perceived liberal viewpoint.”195
According to the complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that the core goal
of SB 7072 was to “punish the targeted companies because the Legislature
and Governor dislike[d] the perceived political and ideological viewpoints
that those private businesses supposedly express[ed] through their content
judgments.”196 The order quotes the Lieutenant Governor, who said:
‘What we’ve been seeing across the U.S. is an effort to silence,
intimidate, and wipe out dissenting voices by the leftist media and
big corporations . . . . Thankfully in Florida we have a Governor
that fights against big tech oligarchs that contrive, manipulate, and
censor if you voice views that run contrary to their radical leftist
narrative.’197

188.
See NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 45; Fla. S.B. 7072.
189.
See NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19; Fla. S.B. 7072.
190.
Id.; see Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding
Content-Based Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 273, 285 (2009).
191.
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 45. (“Because the State has no
legitimate —much less compelling— governmental interest that supports these provisions, and
because none of the provisions are narrowly tailored, they do not survive strict scrutiny. Indeed,
they would fail under any standard of review.”); see Fla. S.B. 7072.
192.
NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 21-CV-220, 2021 WL 2690876, at *10
(N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021).
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 50; see Fla. S.B. 7072.
197.
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *10.
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The State could not assert a justification for the law, and the court
contended that leveling the playing field by promoting speech on one side of
an issue, or restricting speech on the other, was not a legitimate state
interest.198 According to the court, because the law was clearly motivated by
the content of the speech, strict scrutiny applied, and the government’s
asserted reason, or lack of reason, for the legislation was neither legitimate
nor compelling.199
2.

Compelled Speech

Next, the plaintiffs asserted that SB 7072 compels speech by forcing
the private social media platforms to carry content that the companies would
not otherwise host.200 The plaintiffs argued that they have a right to choose
what to post on their platforms and section 4 of SB 7072 directly infringed on
their protected editorial ability to do so.201 The plaintiffs cited three cases to
support their argument: (1) Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo;202 (2)
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.;203
and (3) Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (“PG&E”) v. Public Utilities Commission
of California.204 In Tornillo, the Supreme Court struck down a Florida law
that required newspapers to offer candidates a right to reply to the newspapers’
published criticisms of candidates.205 The Supreme Court held that this was a
form of compelled speech which infringed on the publishers’ editorial
freedom, and was therefore unconstitutional.206
Similarly, in Hurley, the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group of Boston (“GLIB”) challenged a decision of the South Boston Allied
War Veterans Council (“Veterans Council”) that denied GLIB the opportunity
to walk in an annual parade organized by the Veterans Council as being a
violation of Massachusetts’ public accommodations law.207 The Veterans
Council claimed that including GLIB in their parade would contravene what
the association was attempting to communicate.208 The Supreme Court held
198.
Id. at *11; see also Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 749 (2011).
199.
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *10.
200.
See NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 46; see Fla. S.B. 7072.
201.
See NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 2–3.
202.
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
203.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
204.
475 U.S. 1 (1986); see also NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *7–*8.
205.
See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256–57.
206.
See id. at 258.
207.
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561.
208.
Id. at 562–63.

2021]

FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE ERA OF SOCIAL MEDIA

53

that the Veterans Council had a First Amendment right to exclude GLIB from
the parade because a state may not require a private group to include a group
whose message the organizers do not wish to promote.209 Lastly, the
legislation being challenged in PG&E required a private utility company to
include newsletters from other organizations that held differing views from
those of PG&E in their billing envelopes.210 The Supreme Court held this
legislation to be unconstitutional because it was a form of compelled
speech.211
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
found that these three cases established that a “private party that creates or
uses its editorial judgment to select content for publication cannot be required
by the government to also publish content with which [they] disagree[d]” or
would not otherwise publish.212 Further, the court noted that social media
providers’ editorial process was different than those of the cases cited, in that
the social media providers post material invisibly.213 Algorithms do much of
the sorting of the content posted by third parties, as opposed to the social
media providers doing the sifting themselves, like a traditional publisher
would.214
The State offers two cases in support of their legislation: (1) Rumsfeld
v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.215 and (2) PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins.216 In Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court upheld a
Federal statute that conditioned law schools’ receipt of Federal funds on
allowing military recruiters access to the school’s campus.217 The Court found
that this was conduct, not speech; thus, the Federal law was not compelling
the law school to adhere to the military’s speech, but rather, they were simply
opening their doors to the recruiters.218 Similarly, in PruneYard, the Supreme
Court found no First Amendment violation when the California Supreme
Court upheld students’ right to peacefully solicit signatures in a private
209.
See id. at 575–76. (“[W]hatever the reason, it boils down to the choice of a
speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond
the government’s power to control.”).
210.
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 15–16
(1986).
211.
Id. at 20–21.
212.
NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 21-CV-220, 2021 WL 2690876, at *8
(N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021).
213.
Id.
214.
See id.; see discussion supra Section II.B.2.
215.
547 U.S. 47 (2006).
216.
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
217.
F. for Acad. & Inst. Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 51, 70 (2006).
218.
Id. at 56–57.
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shopping mall that removed the students from the premises because the
students were violating PruneYard’s regulations that forbade their conduct.219
The Northern District Court of Florida, in ruling on NetChoice and
CCIA’s preliminary injunction, noted that the cases raised by the State only
established that:
[C]ompelling a person to allow a visitor access to the person’s
property, for the purpose of speaking, is not a First Amendment
violation, so long as the person is not compelled to speak, the person
is not restricted from speaking, and the message of the visitor is not
likely to be attributed to the person.220

SB 7072 is different, the court concluded, because it explicitly forbids
social media platforms from adding their own statements, such as warnings to
posts by other users and compelling speech by requiring the social media
platforms to arrange their material in a certain way.221
3.

Preemption

The plaintiffs also assert that SB 7072 is preempted by section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act, and the Florida District Court agreed.222
As noted above, section 230 provides a legal shield for interactive computer
services—social media platforms—for “[any] action voluntarily taken in good
faith to restrict to or availability of material that the provider or user considers
[to be] obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected . . . .”223 Thus, social media providers will likewise not be held liable
for action taken to restrict access to material described above.224
According to the Florida District Court, because section 4 of SB 7072
explicitly imposes a daily fine for deplatforming a candidate and gives private
citizens statutory damages for shadow banning them, SB 7072 contravenes
section 230.225 The Federal statute also explicitly states that “[n]o cause of
219.
PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 88.
220.
NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 21-CV-220, 2021 WL 2690876, at *9
(N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021).
221.
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *9; S.B. 7072, 27th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 2021).
222.
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at at *6; NetChoice Complaint, supra note
19, at 67–68; Fla. S.B. 7072; 47 U.S.C. § 230.
223.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A); see discussion supra Section II.B; NetChoice,
2021 WL 2690876, at *6.
224.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B); see discussion supra Section II.B.
225.
Fla. S.B. 7072; 47 U.S.C. § 230; see NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *6.
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action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or
local law that is inconsistent with this section.”226 The District Court found
that the plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their challenge of the preempted
provisions of SB 7072.227
V.

CONCLUSION

The Florida District Court’s discussion of the constitutionality of SB
7072 was only to assess the likelihood of success on the merits as part of the
ruling on the preliminary injunction.228 With further discovery, it may be
found that these social media companies are not actually removing and
regulating content on their platforms in good faith, which would affect their
legal immunity.229 Governor DeSantis fully expected a challenge to SB 7072
and filed a Notice of Appeal of the District Court’s decision on July 12,
2021.230 Texas, Louisiana, and North Carolina have recently passed laws
similar to Florida’s SB 7072.231
One of the arguments that the defendants may raise on appeal is the
invisible editorial process.232 The District Court notes that social media
platforms are different from traditional publishers in that they do not sort and
sift through the material, rather they use algorithms to conduct this editorial
feature.233 If social media companies are creating the algorithmic equations
to sort out certain material, however, then there is an argument that such
invisible editing is actually manufactured to remove and filter material
outlined by the companies and codified in their algorithms.234
Many of the District Court’s decisions pertaining to the
constitutionality of SB 7072 will likely be upheld because certain provisions

226.
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
227.
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *6; see Fla. S.B. 7072.
228.
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *2.
229.
See id. at *2, *6.
230.
Notice of Appeal at 1, NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Moody, (No. 21-CV-220),
2021 WL 2690876, at *1; see Fla. S.B. 7072.
231.
Debra Kaufman, Federal Judge Blocks Florida Law That Restricts Social
Media, ETCENTRIC (July 2, 2021), http://www.etcentric.org/federal-judge-blocks-florida-lawthat-restricts-social-media/; see Fla. S.B. 7072.
232.
See discussion supra Section IV.A.2; NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *8.
233.
See discussion supra Section IV.A.2; NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *8.
234.
See Chris Meserole, How Misinformation Spreads on Social Media — and
What to Do About It, BROOKINGS (May 9, 2018), http://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2018/05/09/how-misinformation-spreads-on-social-media-and-what-to-do-about-it/.
After Twitter moved away from chronological feeds in 2016, they incorporated algorithmic
feeds, which sort material that the user would find most relevant. Id.
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seem to be a clear case of the government interfering with private speech.235
Presumably, Governor DeSantis thought it necessary to act when Congress
did not.236 Calls to reform section 230 are mounting from both sides of the
political spectrum.237 Federal government officials have discussed potential
regulatory intervention, legislative reform, and amending or even dispensing
section 230 entirely.238 Even Justice Clarence Thomas has commented on the
expansive scope of section 230 immunity and how it has exceeded its initial
intended goal.239
One legislative proposal to change section 230 is the Eliminating
Abusive and Rampant Neglect of Interactive Technologies Act (“EARN IT
Act”).240 Proposed in early March 2020 and sponsored by bipartisan
legislators, the EARN IT Act would change section 230 by exempting “‘child
exploitation law’” from its scope of immunity.241
The EARN IT Act proposes to remove section 230 immunity for
challenges brought by minors who were victims of sexual abuse material
posted on social media platforms.242 Critics of the EARN IT Act claim the act
violates the First and Fourth Amendments of the Constitution by
impermissibly regulating online platforms’ editorial activity and allowing
online platforms to engage in government action by searching users’ accounts
without a warrant based on probable cause.243
Other proposed legislation to curtail section 230 immunity includes,
“‘Stop the Censorship Act of 2020,’”244 “‘Online Freedom and Viewpoint
235.
See discussion supra Part IV; Fla. S.B. 7072.
236.
See Ryan Mrazik & Natasha Amlani, Cover Story Section 230: A Law on
the Cusp of Change?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2020, at 26, 27–28 (discussing the various bills the
legislature has proposed to curtail section 230, but that have not “progressed meaningfully”);
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19 at 3–5.
237.
See Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 26.
238.
Id.; Chris Riley & David Morar, Legislative Efforts and Policy Frameworks
Within the Section 230 Debate, BROOKINGS TECHSTREAM (Sept. 21, 2021),
http://www.brookings.edu/techstream/legislative-efforts-and-policy-frameworks-within-thesection-230-debate/.
239.
See Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 26; Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma
Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 13 (2020).
240.
See Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 27–28; S. 3398, 116th Cong. § 3
(2020).
241.
Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 27; see S. 3398.
242.
Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 27; see S. 3398.
243.
Sophia Cope et al., The EARN IT Act Violates the Constitution, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 31, 2020), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/03/earn-it-act-violatesconstitution; S. 3398.
244.
Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 28. Legislation proposed by
Republican Congressman Paul Gosar. Id.; H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2019).
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Diversity Act,’”245 “‘Stopping Big Tech’s Censorship Act,’”246 “‘Limiting
Section 230 Immunity to Good Samaritans Act,’”247 and “‘Ending Support for
Internet Censorship Act.’”248 None of these bills have progressed as far as the
EARN IT Act, but they are all aimed at what the representative sponsors
believe to be politically biased removal and censorship of content by social
media providers.249
Another approach worth noting is one proposed by Justice Clarence
Thomas in his concurring opinion in Biden v. Knight First Amendment
Institute at Columbia University.250 Justice Thomas suggests that the
doctrines that limit the right of a private company to exclude might be the
proper avenue to combat Big Tech’s centralized control on communication,
as opposed to First Amendment grounds.251 One such doctrine is the treatment
of certain large, private entities as common carriers, like communication and
transportation providers.252 In exchange for regulating these industries,
federal and state governments have given these massive industries special
government favors, such as liability immunity from suit.253 Similarly, section
230 already grants Big Tech civil immunity from suit; however, serious
regulation of these tech industries is missing.254
Justice Thomas also suggests that public accommodation laws are
another avenue in which the government has limited a company’s right to
exclude.255 Digital platforms may be subject to public accommodation laws
because of the services they provide to the general public at large.256 The
Legislature may choose to treat Big Tech companies as public
accommodations, making them susceptible to anti-discrimination laws such
that digital platforms deal with consumers equally.257 Justice Thomas notes,
245.
Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 28. Legislation proposed by
Republican Senator Roger Wicker. Id.; S. 4534, 116th Cong. § 1 (2020).
246.
Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 28. Legislation proposed by
Republican Senator Kelly Loeffler. Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 28; S. 4062, 116th
Cong. (2020).
247.
Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 28. Legislation proposed by
Republican Senator Josh Hawley. Id.; S. 3983, 116th Cong. (2020).
248.
Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 28. Legislation proposed by
Republican Senator Josh Hawley as well. Id.; S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019).
249.
See Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 28.
250.
141 S. Ct. 1220 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring).
251.
See id. at 1222.
252.
Id. at 1222–23.
253.
Id. at 1223.
254.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
255.
Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. at 1223.
256.
See id. at 1225.
257.
Id. at 1225–26.
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however, that the change would be better served coming from Congress.258
Nonetheless, these are two arguments that potential plaintiffs may soon
assert.259
Whichever approach the legislature ultimately decides to take, it is
evident that Big Tech is affecting the dissemination of speech in the United
States, and the rest of the world.260 Many argue that allowing social media
companies free reign to remove, silence, and otherwise edit content with
impunity requires oversight.261 SB 7072 will likely be struck down as
unconstitutional, but that does not mean that Americans cannot act by voting
for candidates that fight for a marketplace of ideas that is open and robust with
debate in search of the truth.262 In the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
Jr., “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out.”263 Holmes continues, “[t]hat at any
rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.”264

258.
Id. at 1226.
259.
Id. at 1223.
260.
See discussion supra Sections II.C–D; Gregg Jarrett, Gregg Jarrett: It's
Time to Crush Big Tech Censorship Before Facebook, Twitter and Others Crush Us, FOX NEWS
(May 12, 2021), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/big-tech-censor-gregg-jarrett.
261.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020).
262.
S.B. 7072, 27th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021); see discussion supra
Section II.A; Thorbecke, supra note 12; WFLA 8 On Your Side Staff, Big Tech Associations
Sue Florida Over New Social Media Censorship Law, WFLA (May 27, 2021, 4:48 PM),
http://www.wfla.com/news/politics/big-tech-associations-sue-florida-over-new-social-mediacensorship-law/.
263.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
264.
Id.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
against cruel and unusual punishment.1 This constitutional right is afforded to
prison inmates to ensure that prison systems refrain from unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain on those convicted of crimes.2 This right includes
adequate healthcare for prison inmates.3 The Supreme Court has declared that
*
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1.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2.
Id.; see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
3.
Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103.
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prison officials have an obligation to all prisoners to provide adequate medical
care for severe medical conditions under the Eighth Amendment.4 Among
those entitled to adequate healthcare are incarcerated transgender prisoners
suffering from a severe illness called “gender dysphoria.”5 This Comment will
discuss the appropriate standards of care for treating transgender inmates and
the responsibility of Florida prisons to adopt a necessary treatment option.6
Part II of this Comment will briefly examine the history of gender dysphoria
in prison systems, the cases that made it possible to consider the standards of
care necessary to treat gender dysphoria, and the necessity for sex
reassignment surgery.7 Part III of this Comment will explain the cases that
sparked the conversation of applying the deliberate indifference standard to a
prison’s refusal to provide sex reassignment surgery and the need for Florida
prisons to adopt this specific standard of care.8
II.

HISTORY OF GENDER DYSPHORIA IN TRANSGENDER PRISON
INMATES

Protecting transgender prisoners has not always been at the forefront
of America’s framework.9 However, courts and prison systems have recently
attempted to provide legal protections for transgender prisoners.10 In 2013,
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders coined the term
“gender dysphoria” as a “psychological . . . [illness] that results from . . . [a
discrepancy] between one’s sex assigned at birth and one’s gender identity.”11
In other words, gender dysphoria is when a person feels as though their
external genitalia does not match the gender they are born with.12 Gender
dysphoria may be experienced and diagnosed in adolescents and adults, with
manifestations lasting at least six months.13 These manifestations include:
4.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); see also Gamble, 429 U.S.
at 103–05.
5.
Lindsey Ruff, Note, Trans-cending the Medicalization of Gender:
Improving Legal Protections for People Who Are Transgender and Incarcerated, 28 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 127, 142–43 (2018); see also Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103.
6.
See discussion infra Parts II–III.
7.
See discussion infra Part II.
8.
See discussion infra Part III.
9.
See Ruff, supra note 5, at 127.
10.
Id.
11.
What
is
Gender
Dysphoria?,
AM.
PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N,
http://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria (last
visited Jan. 10, 2021); see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013).
12.
See What Is Gender Dysphoria?, supra note 11.
13.
Id.
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“[a] strong desire to be rid of one’s primary . . . sex characteristics, . . . [a]
strong desire to be treated as the other gender,” and a firm conviction of having
“typical feelings and reactions of the other gender.”14 Gender dysphoria may
produce symptoms of anxiety, depression, and suicidal thoughts.15
There are specific treatments that the World Professional Association
for Transgender Health (“WPATH”) has deemed appropriate to treat gender
dysphoria.16 It may be treated in several ways, including “changes in gender
expression and role, hormone therapy, and psychotherapy . . . .”17
Accordingly, sex reassignment surgery is appropriate for inmates who suffer
from severe cases of gender dysphoria.18 To be in accordance with the
principles that govern inmate care, an inmate is entitled to be provided with
adequate medical care.19 This right came from the seminal case Estelle v.
Gamble,20 where the Supreme Court ruled that deliberate indifference to an
inmate’s medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.21
A.
Estelle v. Gamble’s Role in Securing Adequate Medical Care for
Inmates
Before the ruling in Gamble, prison policies did not implicate the
Eighth Amendment in prioritizing the medical needs of inmates.22 This
Supreme Court case created the serious medical need standard used today to
bring a successful Eighth Amendment claim.23 The Court held that when
prison authorities are deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical
need, those actions constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.24 Due to an inmate’s inability to care for themselves
medically because of their incarceration, the Court reasoned that an inmate
14.
Id.
15.
Victor J. Genchi, Note, Sex Reassignment Surgery & the New Standard of
Care: An Analysis of the Role the Federal Court System, the States, Society, and the Medical
Community Serve in Paving the Way for Incarcerated Transgendered Persons’ Constitutional
Right to a Sex Change, 22 BARRY L. REV. 93, 94 (2016).
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
20.
429 U.S. 97 (1976).
21.
See id. at 101, 104.
22.
See Alexa Raspa, Note, Protecting Transgender Prisoners: Defending
Access to Gender Confirmation Surgery, 27 WIDENER L. REV. 91, 96 (2021).
23.
Id.
24.
See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 101, 104.
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must rely on prison authorities to treat his or her medical needs.25 If prison
authorities ignore an inmate’s medical needs, their actions could produce
excruciating physical pain for the inmate, or even worse, death.26 Therefore,
the effects that come from ignoring an inmate’s medical needs can lead to a
wanton infliction of pain and suffering in violation of a prisoner’s right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment.27
Although Gamble ensured that medical care is given to prisoners, a
later case provided a two-prong analysis to determine what constitutes an
Eighth Amendment violation.28 In Kosilek v. Spencer,29 the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit established a two-prong test that an
inmate must satisfy to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim.30 To prove an
Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate must: (1) provide proof of a serious
medical need, and (2) show prison authorities’ deliberate indifference to that
need.31 The first prong is an objective standard, where an inmate’s need can
be satisfied by a diagnosis from a physician, or the need is so apparent that “a
layperson would easily recognize the necessity for medical” treatment.32 The
second prong is a subjective standard that requires a showing that prison
authorities purposefully failed to treat an inmate’s serious medical need.33
There has not been a clear, concise definition of what a “serious” medical need
is, yet many courts acknowledge diagnosis by physicians.34 Although the
court in Kosilek held that denial of gender confirmation surgery was not a
violation of the Eighth Amendment, it grappled with whether the treatment
plan prison authorities provided violated the Eighth Amendment.35
The court in Kosilek analyzed each prong respectively, holding, as to
the objective prong, it was adequate medical care to provide the inmate with
hormone therapy, mental health counseling, facial hair removal, and feminine
clothing.36 Regarding the subjective prong, the court held that the treatment
plan provided, and did not blatantly ignore, the inmate’s medical needs.37 The
court stated that when two treatment options relieve an inmate’s pain and
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Raspa, supra note 22, at 96; see Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103.
Raspa, supra note 22, at 96; Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103.
See Raspa, supra note 22, at 96.
Id. at 97; see also Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014).
774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014).
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 83.
Raspa, supra note 22, at 97; Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 82.
See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 89.
See id. at 90.
See id. at 91–92.
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suffering, courts do not have to force medical professionals to adopt a specific
one.38 There is no genuine dispute that gender dysphoria is a serious medical
need under the Eighth Amendment, which satisfies the objective prong of
Kosilek’s two-prong test.39 Several federal appellate courts have recognized
that gender dysphoria is a serious medical need to be taken seriously with
adequate medical care.40 The debate, on the other hand, is whether inmates
diagnosed with gender dysphoria have been given suitable treatment.41
B.

Standards of Care Suitable to Treat Gender Dysphoria

The Standards of Care under the WPATH have become a popular
source for managing the health of transsexuals.42 Since 1979, the WPATH has
been recognized, both internationally and locally, by health professionals as a
guide on managing transsexual and transgender people seeking medical
attention.43 Although there are highly suggested treatment options offered by
the WPATH, treatment ultimately depends on the person.44 The treatment
options include: hormone therapy, feminine or masculine products,
psychotherapy, mental health counseling, and sex reassignment surgery.45
Some individuals may benefit from hormones, and others may benefit from
psychotherapy; however, it is clear that each treatment option, including sex
reassignment surgery, is not adequate for every individual diagnosed with
gender dysphoria.46
1.

Hormone Therapy

Severe forms of gender dysphoria may produce harmful effects such
as psychological distress, self-mutilation, depression, and suicide.47
Individuals that experience a severe form of gender dysphoria may be
prescribed hormones to relieve the effects of psychological distress.48 In cases
where one does not wish to undergo surgery, hormone therapy is a desirable
38.
Id. at 90.
39.
See id. at 86.
40.
Yvette K. W. Bourcicot & Daniel Hirotsu Woofter, Prudent Policy:
Accommodating Prisoners with Gender Dysphoria, 12 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 283, 295 (2016).
41.
Id. at 296.
42.
Id. at 299.
43.
See id. at 299–300; Genchi, supra note 15, at 101.
44.
Ruff, supra note 5, at 139.
45.
See Bourcicot & Woofter, supra note 40, at 299–300.
46.
See id. at 300.
47.
See id. at 285–86.
48.
Id. at 305.
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treatment option.49 To be prescribed hormone therapy, one must have
“[p]ersistent, well-documented gender dysphoria”, “[c]apacity to make a fully
informed decision and consent to treatment”, meet the age required for that
jurisdiction, and any “significant medical [and] mental health concerns . . .
must be reasonably well-controlled.”50
Hormone therapy can, and is intended to, cause male-to-female
transsexual individuals to experience breast enlargement, sterilization, and the
feeling of living their lives as the gender they believe they are.51 In instances
where hormone therapy is not maintained, it may result in pain, suffering, and
even life-threatening conditions.52 Courts have not always encouraged prisons
to offer hormone therapy due to the high-security risks of providing a real-life
experience to transgender inmates.53 Therefore, prisons have been more
willing to offer less invasive treatments, such as psychotherapy, instead of
hormone therapy.54 Courts rarely require prisons to adopt policies that require
hormone therapy.55 Instead, the medical opinion of prison physicians is
considered and given deference when needed.56
2.

Psychotherapy

Psychotherapy is a treatment that encourages gender identity, gender
role, and gender expression, as well as the familiarization of the negative
impact of gender dysphoria by addressing one’s mental health related to
suffering from gender dysphoria.57 Unlike hormone therapy or sex
reassignment surgery—where the form of treatment targets one’s
physicality—psychotherapy focuses more on an individual’s mental stability
and how he or she can seek relief psychologically from the pressures and
symptoms of gender dysphoria.58 To be prescribed psychotherapy, an
individual is encouraged to be evaluated by a health professional.59 A
“[m]ental health professional[] may serve as a psychotherapist, counselor, or
49.
WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR
HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER-NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 24, 34
(2012), http://www.wpath.org/publications/soc.
50.
Id.
51.
Bourcicot & Woofter, supra note 40, at 305.
52.
Id.
53.
See id. at 307.
54.
See id. at 306.
55.
See id. at 307.
56.
Bourcicot & Woofter, supra note 40, at 307.
57.
WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 49, at 10.
58.
See id. at 10, 29.
59.
Id. at 28.
THE
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family therapist,” where they determine an individual’s reason for seeking
treatment based on that person’s particular issues.60 The evaluation includes
“an assessment of gender identity and gender dysphoria,” a discussion of the
“history and development of gender dysphoric feelings,” an assessment of the
“impact of stigma attached to gender nonconformity on mental health,” and
considers the available support from family, friends, and peers, if there is
any.61
While hormone therapy is a prerequisite for sex reassignment surgery,
psychotherapy is not.62 Psychotherapy is a recommended treatment, but it is
still effective in matters where an individual’s needs are severe.63 According
to the WPATH, psychotherapy assists transsexuals and transgender people
with the following:
(i) clarifying and exploring gender identity and role, (ii) addressing
the impact of stigma and minority stress on one’s mental health and
human development, and (iii) facilitating a coming-out process,
which for some individuals may include changes in gender role and
expression and the use of feminizing [or] masculinizing medical
interventions.64

In cases where an individual who suffers from gender dysphoria
severely needs psychotherapy, it may also treat anxiety and depression.65
3.

Sex Reassignment Surgery

Sex reassignment surgery is a medical procedure that involves genital
reassignment, chest surgery, facial reconstruction, liposuction, gluteal
augmentation, and feminine or masculine surgery.66 In instances where an
individual’s gender dysphoria is severe, sex reassignment surgery is almost
necessary.67 According to the WPATH, for an individual to qualify for sex
reassignment surgery, one must meet the following criteria:

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
(citations omitted).
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 23.
Id.
See WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 49, at 28.
See Bourcicot & Woofter, supra note 40, at 300–01.
WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 49, at 29
Id.
Bourcicot & Woofter, supra note 40, at 307–08.
Id. at 307.
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(1) persistent, well-documented gender dysphoria, (2) capacity to
make a fully informed decision and to consent for treatment, (3) age
of majority in the individual’s given country, (4) well-controlled
significant medical or mental health concerns (when present), (5)
twelve continuous months of hormone therapy as appropriate to the
patient’s gender goals (unless hormones are not clinically indicated
for the individual, and (6) twelve continuous months of living in a
gender role that is congruent with the patient’s gender identity.68

The WPATH does not require an individual to meet all of the criteria,
but inmates suffering from gender dysphoria are better inclined to need sex
reassignment surgery if he or she can meet all of the criteria.69 Sex
reassignment surgery involves many types of procedures.70 For transgender
men, it may encompass the removal of ovaries, restructuring the clitoris,
performing a hysterectomy, and removing the fallopian tubes.71 For
transgender women, it may include genital castration, creating a neovagina,
and any other post-operative changes needed.72 Members of the medical
community have advocated for sex reassignment surgery as a necessary
treatment for severe forms of gender dysphoria.73 However, the courts and
many prison systems have not agreed that it is a treatment option that should
be adopted everywhere.74 A few reasons for this include the cost and security
risks that exist with affording every transgender inmate with surgery.75 In
addition, transgender inmates suffer an increased risk of sexual violence
compared to any other inmate.76 Some courts have held that the denial of sex
reassignment surgery is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment, while other
courts have agreed that surgery is a necessary procedure in extreme cases.77
However, in many cases, inmates are not provided just surgery alone but are
treated with a combination of treatment options that are part of a routine
prescribed by the prison’s physician.78
Since sex reassignment surgery is unnecessary for every transgender
person and an inmate’s condition solely individualizes it, the courts place a
68.
Id. at 308.
69.
See id.
70.
Travis Cox, Comment, Medically Necessary Treatments for Transgender
Prisoners and the Misguided Law in Wisconsin, 24 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 341, 368 (2009).
71.
Id. at 367.
72.
Id.
73.
See Bourcicot & Woofter, supra note 40, at 308.
74.
Id. at 308–09.
75.
See id. at 298–99; Ruff, supra note 5, at 148; Cox, supra note 70, at 349.
76.
Ruff, supra note 5, at 149.
77.
See Bourcicot & Woofter, supra note 40, at 309; Ruff, supra note 5, at 145.
78.
Bourcicot & Woofter, supra note 40, at 309.
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great deal of deference on prison authorities and physicians to provide the best
possible forms of care to treat gender dysphoria.79 This is not always efficient
because, although the Eighth Amendment does not explicitly require sex
reassignment surgery, it does require inmates to be provided adequate
treatment options.80 With this sentiment in mind, prison authorities are put in
a position to assess the inmate’s condition balanced with what treatment can
be feasibly provided by the prison to be under the Eighth Amendment.81
Accordingly, one issue that has been presented as a challenge for prison
systems regarding transgender inmates and the medical care they are given is
housing restrictions.82 Historically, prison systems did not adopt policies
determining housing placements based on an inmate’s gender identity, but
instead on his or her sex assigned at birth.83 When an inmate sought to be
placed in a housing facility equal to an inmate’s gender identity, he or she must
have legally changed his or her sex.84 Therefore, most states require that a
physician provide a medical opinion towards a person seeking genital
reassignment or body modification.85 Even then, surgery is not always
performed due to issues affecting the transgender population, such as being
underage, poor, or the individuals are not citizens of the country they are
seeking the surgery from.86
Sex reassignment surgery is ultimately considered the last step in
treating gender dysphoria because it is the most invasive treatment option.87
For some, surgery is unnecessary, but for others with severe gender dysphoria,
surgery may be the only option for relief.88 Furthermore, it may be important
for individuals with severe gender dysphoria to undergo genital surgery to be
comfortable in society.89 In addition to feeling more comfortable in their own
bodies, surgery can help alleviate discomfort in settings such as doctors’
offices, swimming pools, and health clubs.90 Therefore, sex reassignment
surgery is often necessary for individuals who have tried other forms of
treatment, but have not felt complete relief from the symptoms of gender
79.
See id. at 287, 309.
80.
Id. at 291; Know Your Rights: Medical, Dental and Mental Health Care,
21 NAT’L PRISON PROJECT J. 13, 16 (2009).
81.
Bourcicot & Woofter, supra note 40, at 292.
82.
Ruff, supra note 5, at 138.
83.
Id.
84.
Id. at 138–39.
85.
Id. at 139.
86.
Id.
87.
See WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 49, at 54.
88.
Id.
89.
See id. at 54–55.
90.
Id. at 55.
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dysphoria.91 Although it may be a necessary form of treatment, the underlying
ethical issues that it can present may be looked at as disturbing for health
professionals.92 Health professionals take an oath to “above all do no harm,”
so to reconstruct, remove, and add functions to one’s normal body may cause
some health professionals to feel as though they are behaving unethically.93
Therefore, it is important for health professionals to understand that: (1) the
symptoms the individual is experiencing are severe, and (2) surgery is the last
resort and may be the only thing that can help.94 This requires the professional
conducting the surgery to ask various questions, discuss the patient’s history,
and request the patient provide insight on what led to the decision to have the
surgery.95 Once the surgeon has been informed of the patient’s pertinent
information, it is also important for the surgeon to discuss the limitations,
risks, advantages, and disadvantages of the surgery.96
After consulting a health professional and securing a surgeon,
transgender and transsexual individuals who decide to have surgery may be
prevented from undergoing surgery for lack of health care coverage.97 Unless
the individual seeking sex reassignment surgery can pay for the operation out
of pocket, it may be difficult to receive the operation because some private
insurance companies decline to cover this type of operation.98 Due to the
nature of the operation, many transgender and transsexual individuals
experience discrimination and hostility, which causes that individual to be
declined health care coverage for the surgery.99 The denial of sex
reassignment surgery is largely due to some states declaring that surgery is not
medically necessary and placing the surgery in the category of “cosmetic”
services.100 This belief cannot be further from the truth.101 Treatments such
as hormone therapy, psychotherapy, and sex reassignment surgery are as
medically necessary for treating gender dysphoria as pain medication is for
treating a bodily injury.102 Preventing this treatment option from happening
could have severe health consequences including depression, anxiety, and
91.
Id. at 54–55.
92.
WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 49, at 55.
93.
Id.
94.
See id. at 55.
95.
Id. at 55–56.
96.
Id. at 56.
97.
Nancie Palmer et al., Identity: Societal and Legal Ramification with Special
Focus on Transsexuals, 39 NOVA L. REV. 119, 154 (2015).
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
100.
Id. at 155.
101.
Id.
102.
See Palmer et al., supra note 97, at 155.
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suicide.103 This is not to say that a few states have not taken action to reduce
the health care discrimination directed toward transgender people and
transsexuals.104 For example, California has expressly prohibited health
insurance discrimination against transgender people, thus making equal access
to healthcare possible.105 Following California, states such as Colorado,
Oregon, and Vermont have prohibited health insurance discrimination based
on gender identity and expression related to transgender and transsexual
people.106 The majority of states in the United States should model California,
Colorado, Oregon, and Vermont in outlawing insurance discrimination
because equal access to healthcare should be provided to all people of any
race, gender, gender preference, or nationality.107
III.

WHY FLORIDA PRISONS SHOULD ADOPT SEX REASSIGNMENT
SURGERY AS A SUITABLE TREATMENT OPTION

According to the Florida Department of Corrections, Florida has the
third-largest state prison system in the country with about 80,000 incarcerated
inmates and a budget of $2.7 billion dollars.108 In addition, the Florida
Department of Corrections happens to be Florida’s largest state agency.109
Prisons and correctional facilities are required to provide health care and
adequate health care to their inmates.110 In the larger prison systems, on-site
infirmaries exist to provide medical care to the inmates.111 Unfortunately,
those sentenced to incarceration are usually low-income and uninsured people,
and a considerable amount of inmates enter the prison system with significant
physical and mental health needs.112 These needs include tuberculosis, HIV,
Hepatitis B and C, arthritis, diabetes, and sexually transmitted diseases, with
almost half of the prison population suffering from mental health disorders.113
103.
Id. at 156.
104.
Id.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Palmer et al., supra note 97, at 157.
108.
About the Florida Department of Corrections, FLA. DEP’T CORR.,
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/about.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2022).
109.
Id.
110.
See Alexandra Gates et al., Health Coverage and Care for the Adult
Criminal
Justice-Involved
Population,
KFF
(Sept.
5,
2014),
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/health-coverage-and-care-for-the-adult-criminaljustice-involved-population/.
111.
Id.
112.
See id.
113.
Id.

70

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Accordingly, there are approximately 300 transgender individuals in Florida's
state prisons.114 When inmates enter the prison system, they are required to
go through “reception,” where they are examined by doctors and interviewed
about their medical and emotional needs.115 In addition, an inmate may
disclose his or her level of education, drug abuse history, and sexual
orientation for the prison to be informed of the necessities an inmate may need
during their incarceration.116 Therefore, transgender inmates are able to
express their preferred gender and disclose relevant information to prison
officials who can subsequently decide what accommodations are afforded for
that particular inmate.117 However, Florida prisons base an inmate’s housing
on the gender he or she has at birth, so it is not a smooth transition for
transgender people when sentenced to incarceration after living a transgender
life in society.118
In situations where transgender inmates live their life as their preferred
gender outside of prison, then enter the prison system living a completely
different life, the immediate change can be traumatic.119 This can produce a
tremendous amount of mental and physical distress that requires prison
officials to comply with the ruling of providing adequate medical care to all
incarcerated persons.120 With gender dysphoria becoming more prevalent
across the nation and incarceration rates significantly rising, there have been
increasing civil and constitutional rights claims that further the conversation
of allowing suitable treatment options.121 However, the conversation did not
start in Florida prisons, nor is it a recent conversation.122 The 1994 Supreme
Court case Farmer v. Brennan123 became a vital case to the transgender and
transsexual community because it held that prison officials might be held
liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with “deliberate indifference”
to an inmate’s health or safety.124 This not only held prison officials

114.
Romy Ellenbogen, Outcasts Among the Outcasts, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 17,
2019, at A1.
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
117.
Id.
118.
See id.
119.
See Armstrong v. Mid-Level Practitioner John B. Connally Unit, No. SA18-CV-00677, 2020 WL 230887, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2020).
120.
See id.; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
121.
See Armstrong, 2020 WL 230887, at *4.
122.
See id. at *4–5.
123.
511 U.S. 825 (1994).
124.
See id. at 825, 828, 832.
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accountable for turning a blind eye to inmates’ needs, but it ensured inmates
received proper food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.125
In Farmer, the petitioner, Dee Farmer—who is biologically male but
identifies as a woman—is a transsexual sentenced to incarceration for credit
card fraud.126 The petitioner was diagnosed by medical personnel of the
Bureau of Prisons as suffering from a rare psychiatric disorder, similar to
gender dysphoria, where she felt consistently uncomfortable with the genitals
she was born with.127 According to the American Medical Association
Encyclopedia of Medicine, this psychiatric disorder can be treated with
hormone therapy and surgery to provide relief and ultimately permanently
change one’s sex.128 Since the history of prisons has been to house inmates
according to their biological sex, it is utterly traumatic for inmates to live their
lives as the sex they feel they are, only to be incarcerated as the opposite sex,
creating an almost out-of-body experience.129 In this case, before becoming
incarcerated, the petitioner essentially lived life as a woman by wearing
women’s clothing, undergoing estrogen therapy, having breast implants, and
unsuccessfully trying to receive “testicle-removal surgery” from the black
market.130 Since petitioner exhibited feminine behavior inside and outside of
prison, it was no surprise that she was subjected to physical and sexual
violence after being transferred to a high-security prison that generally houses
inmates with more troublesome factors than medium or low-security
prisons.131 The petitioner alleged she was beaten and raped by another inmate
in her cell within two weeks of transferring to the United States Penitentiary
in Terre Haute, Indiana, after she was placed in the general population with
the other inmates.132
Before the ruling of this case, it was not common knowledge for
prison officials to take delicate care in treating transgender people and
transsexuals with proper confinement conditions.133 However, it can be said
that prison officials—who know that the prison has a violent atmosphere
because of the number of violent inmates it houses and the history of inmate
assaults or deaths—should provide certain precautions for incoming
125.
Id. at 832.
126.
Id. at 829.
127.
Id.
128.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829 (citing 2 AM. MED. ASS’N, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MED.
1006 (Charles B. Clayman ed., 1989)).
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vulnerable inmates like the petitioner, Dee Farmer.134 Although prison
officials failed to do this in the petitioner’s case, the Supreme Court did not
outrightly rule the prison’s actions as deliberately indifferent because the
petitioner never voiced any concern for her safety.135 Therefore, with Gamble
setting a standard for adequate medical care to all inmates and Farmer holding
prison officials accountable for not only inmates’ health but also their safety,
there is a clear line to draw when it comes to transgender people receiving
proper confinement conditions under the Eighth Amendment.136
Nearly twenty years later, the conversation of deliberate indifference
under the Eighth Amendment has been introduced into the transgender
community in the 2013 case De’lonta v. Johnson.137 The District Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that Ophelia De’lonta, an incarcerated
transsexual, had a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials
that had denied De’lonta consideration for sex reassignment surgery.138
De’lonta was convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to incarceration at the
Virginia Department of Corrections for seventy-three years.139 Not only is she
a preoperative transsexual, but she also suffers from an illness, much like
gender dysphoria, that causes mental anguish called “gender identity
disorder.”140 Gender identity disorder is described as the “feeling of being
trapped in a body of the wrong gender. . . .” and produces severe forms of
mental pain and agony.141 De’lonta expressed to prison officials, on numerous
occasions, her desire to self-castrate and perform her own sex reassignment
surgery because the distress of her gender identity disorder was too much to
bear.142 As outlined above, the adequate treatment options for disorders
pertaining to gender happen to be hormone therapy, psychotherapy, and, in the
most severe cases, sex reassignment surgery.143 Since an inmate is not entitled
to all forms of treatment options under the Eighth Amendment, but is still
entitled to an adequate treatment option, an inmate in De’lonta’s position
should be considered for sex reassignment surgery.144 In response to
De’lonta’s condition, the Virginia Department of Corrections allowed
De’lonta to live as a woman inside the prison system and provided hormone
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
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144.
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therapy, as well as allowing her to wear women’s clothing and obtain
consistent psychological counseling.145
However, despite the treatment plan for De’lonta, she still felt an
overwhelming need to self-castrate and even wrote countless letters and
formal grievances to prison officials to notify them of the inadequacy of the
treatment provided.146 Unfortunately, after years of inadequate treatment and
ignored repeated pleas for help, De’lonta was hospitalized after attempting to
self-castrate.147 This is a direct violation of an inmate’s Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because De’lonta
underwent the treatment plan provided by prison officials, voiced her concerns
that the treatment had not provided relief, and ultimately was harmed after
prison officials refused to consider other options.148 Moreover, prison officials
cannot hide behind the excuse of not knowing a substantial risk of harm exists
when inmates outrightly request a certain type of treatment option.149 The
WPATH considers sex reassignment surgery a last resort option, and since
De’lonta did many years of hormone therapy, psychiatric counseling, and is
now requesting sex reassignment surgery, it is in accordance with the
Standards of Care for transgender health.150 The Virginia Department of
Corrections denied De’lonta consideration for sex reassignment surgery
despite all the factors and threats of self-mutilation, and such denial should
constitute a deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs.151
However, the court in De’lonta’s case did not decide that Virginia Department
of Corrections’ prison officials acted with deliberate indifference; rather, the
court held that De’lonta had a “sufficient basis” for an Eighth Amendment
violation.152
This is an unfortunate conclusion to the traumatic experience of
De’lonta; it should not take an attempt to severely harm oneself for the
intervention of the justice system.153 Nor should a possible life-threatening
situation occur to hold prison officials accountable for their blatant disregard
for an inmate’s life.154
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Although the ruling in De’lonta made it possible for transgender
inmates to bring forth an Eighth Amendment claim due to inadequate
treatment options, later cases are split on whether sex reassignment surgery is
a necessary treatment option.155 Gibson v. Collier156 expanded the
conversation of what actions rise to the level of deliberate indifference related
to a medical professional’s opinion of treatment.157 The Fifth Circuit Court
held that a “[p]laintiff’s disagreement with the diagnostic decisions of medical
professionals does not provide the basis for a civil rights lawsuit.”158 Now,
this ruling imposes a cap on Eighth Amendment claims that can be brought;
while it is possible to bring forth an Eighth Amendment claim based on
inadequate treatment, an inmate must now provide a showing more than just a
mere disagreement or dislike in the treatment being delivered.159 Therefore,
in cases where transgender inmates are suffering from gender dysphoria, it is
not enough to just express that a treatment option is not working.160 One
example of this is Scott Lynn Gibson, a transgender prison inmate at the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, who was convicted of two counts of
aggravated robbery.161 Gibson is biologically male but suffers from gender
dysphoria, and has identified as a female since the age of fifteen.162 Due to
her illness, she experiences acute distress, depression, and has attempted selfcastration and suicide.163 As a result, the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice started her on mental health counseling and hormone therapy, which
Gibson expressed to prison officials did not fully relieve her symptoms of
gender dysphoria.164
After receiving hormone therapy and counseling, Gibson requested
sex reassignment surgery; she asserted that the prison’s policy of evaluation
by appropriate medical and mental health professionals, along with treatment
determined individually, reflected the accepted standards of care.165
155.
See De’lonta, 708 F.3d at 526; Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 221 (5th
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 653 (2019); Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 767 (9th
Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 141 S. Ct. 610 (2020);
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Unfortunately, the court concluded that since there is no consensus in the
medical community about the necessity of sex reassignment surgery, there are
no standards binding medical professionals to provide it.166 The court relied
on the fact that Gibson never actually harmed herself, coupled with the
existence of alternative treatment options that the WPATH also recommends
in cases similar to Gibson’s.167 This case gives great deference to medical
professionals who may or may not have experience treating transgender
inmates diagnosed with gender dysphoria, instead of considering the
WPATH’s recommendation that sex reassignment surgery is a last resort
option.168 It should be quite clear that when treatment options are not working,
the consideration of a treatment that has not been used is the next best thing.169
Prisons that refuse to consider sex reassignment surgery and ignore an
inmate’s plea for efficient care should be declared as going against the very
principle set out under the Eighth Amendment: To provide adequate care and
confinement conditions to inmates.170 In fact, the dissent in this case correctly
explains that the Eighth Amendment requires individualized assessments of
an inmate’s medical needs, and should not provide a blanket ban on sex
reassignment surgery as a whole solely because the majority of the medical
community has yet to adopt it.171 Unfortunately, the court did not decide this
case in the best interest of a human life suffering mental distress, but rather
took the side of medical professionals, who simply did not believe in a
treatment that could very well relieve symptoms of an illness that neither the
court nor medical professionals had ever experienced.172
Interestingly, a case in the same year took a different route and finally
decided in favor of sex reassignment surgery, making significant headway in
the conversation concerning transgender inmates and gender dysphoria.173 In
Edmo v. Corizon, Inc.,174 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
transgender prisoner’s treating psychiatrist acted with deliberate indifference
to that inmate’s serious medical needs after denying her a gender confirmation
surgery.175 Adree Edmo, a male-to-female transgender prisoner serving a
166.
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prison term at the Idaho Department of Correction, suffers from gender
dysphoria.176 Edmo has experienced severe mental distress, which caused her
to attempt to remove her male genitalia twice.177 Although Edmo experienced
the same symptoms as the plaintiff’s in cases mentioned above, her case and
the ruling of the Ninth Circuit are different because prison authorities were
deliberately indifferent to Edmo’s ongoing, extreme suffering.178 Edmo’s first
attempt at castration occurred after she was being treated with hormone
therapy and attending counseling.179 Although unsuccessful, it was noted by
Edmo’s treating physician that Edmo left a note stating that she did not want
to commit suicide—instead, she just wanted to help herself.180 At that time,
the treating physician reviewed the prison’s policy which stated that gender
confirmation surgery would not be considered within the Idaho Department of
Correction, unless deemed medically necessary according to the treating
physician.181 Even after Edmo’s first castration attempt, gender confirmation
surgery was not contemplated.182
Unfortunately, Edmo’s second attempt was successful, and she was
able to self-mutilate by removing her genitals with a razor blade.183 Still, she
only received hormone therapy, and prison officials refused to consider gender
confirmation surgery, even after the gruesome attempt from Edmo to perform
the procedure herself.184
At this point, something should be said about how much emotional
and mental torment the transgender community must go through in order to
have their rights protected.185 It is not enough for transgender prisoners to
contemplate enduring life-threatening injuries, suffer physical or mental
turmoil, and submit countless complaints of inadequate medical care, as they
are only considered for an alternative form of treatment after they have injured
themselves.186 The Ninth Circuit Court should be applauded for coming to the
proper ruling, however, the cost that Edmo—and all the other transgender
prisoners that came before—had to pay hardly seems like a win for the
transgender community.187 In reaching their holding, the court considered the
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record and the judgments of prison medical officials versus the views of
prudent medical professionals in the field to decide whether the decision of
prison medical officials was acceptable.188 The court assured its ruling did not
stem from pitting both sides of medical professionals against each other;
instead, they gave great deference to Edmo’s medical experts, who had years
of experience in treating individuals with gender dysphoria, and correctly
decided that Edmo needed gender confirmation surgery based on her ongoing
and extreme suffering.189 The court ultimately found that the prison’s medical
professionals, acting as the State’s expert witnesses, lacked the qualifications
and expertise necessary to treat inmates with gender dysphoria and
inappropriately decided that gender confirmation surgery was unnecessary.190
Unfortunately, subsequent cases that do not hold a similar record as
Edmo get the same results as cases holding that sex reassignment surgery is
medically unnecessary for inmates with severe gender dysphoria.191 For
example, in Armstrong v. Mid-Level Practitioner John B. Connally Unit,192
the San Antonio District Court held that an inmate’s medical records lacked a
showing of deliberate indifference.193 Perzia Bakari Armstrong was sentenced
to life imprisonment in 1995.194 Since childhood, she identified and lived as a
woman despite being born a biological male.195 In 2016, Armstrong was
diagnosed with gender dysphoria and expressed “great mental and physical
distress . . . threaten[ed] self-castration, attempt[ed] suicide, and engag[ed] in
drug use . . . .” to cope with her illness.196 Armstrong was prescribed hormone
therapy, the common treatment option, but still felt that it was insufficient to
deal with her symptoms.197 After Armstrong initiated the lawsuit against the
prison, the District Court reviewed her medical records and decided that
deliberate indifference did not exist because there was no evidence suggesting
inadequate treatment, despite her claims that hormone therapy was not
helping.198

188.
Edmo, 935 F.3d at 786.
189.
Id. at 787.
190.
Id.
191.
See id. at 767; Armstrong v. Mid-Level Practitioner John B. Connally Unit,
No. SA-18-CV-00677, 2020 WL 230887, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2020); Gibson v. Collier,
920 F.3d 212, 221 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 653 (2019).
192.
Armstrong, 2020 WL 230887, at *1.
193.
Id. at *4–5.
194.
Id. at *1.
195.
Id.
196.
Id.
197.
Armstrong, 2020 WL 230887, at *1
198.
Id. at *2, *6.

78

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Accordingly, the precedent that has been set across the nation for
transgender inmates suffering from gender dysphoria is clear, absent actual
physical harm, no relief is granted to inmates suffering from severe gender
dysphoria.199 Unfortunately, this 2020 case is no different, illustrating that
even as time goes on and courts become more aware of what the transgender
community is experiencing, not much progress has been made in securing the
rights of transgender people who are also incarcerated.200
However, it should be noted that while many gender dysphoria
inmates do in fact need and rightfully request reassignment surgery, not all
transgender prisoners suffering from gender dysphoria meet the requirements
to undergo sex reassignment surgery and therefore, prison officials should not
be forced to incur the monetary and physical constraints that come with
housing a post-operative inmate.201 Sex reassignment surgery, on the other
hand, should be performed in prisons as a treatment of last resort when
alternative and less invasive treatments fail to alleviate the pain and suffering
from these individuals, therefore, it is critical to distinguish an eligible
candidate from an inmate with gender dysphoria who seeks the comfort of
having genitalia they identify with, but who does not otherwise meet the
criteria for a sex reassignment surgery.202 This in no way suggests that prisons
should have unfettered discretion to deny sex reassignment surgeries—this
outcome should only be reached after properly consulting with medical
professionals who are experienced with the transgender community.203
Similar to the state prisons mentioned above, Florida has not adopted sex
reassignment surgery as an adequate treatment option.204 In fact, Florida
prisons are less progressive than the prisons previously examined because, in
Florida, a transgender inmate cannot receive the common forms of treatment
to treat gender dysphoria.205
In Keohane v. Florida Department of Corrections Secretary,206 the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that denying a transgender inmate’s
social-transitioning related requests did not amount to deliberate
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indifference.207 Reiyn Keohane is a male-to-female transgender inmate
serving a fifteen-year sentence at the Florida Department of Corrections for
attempted murder.208 At fourteen years old, she began identifying as female,
and by the time she turned sixteen, she was diagnosed with gender
dysphoria.209 At nineteen years old—six months before starting her
incarceration sentence—Keohane began the hormone therapy prescribed by
her pediatric endocrinologist.210 Surprisingly, she was denied hormone
therapy when she was housed at a county jail following her arrest.211 Months
later, when she was transferred to the Florida Department of Corrections and
was again denied hormone therapy treatment, even after submitting a written
grievance stating she would have harmed herself and considered suicide
without it.212 For the next two years, despite Keohane’s continued requests
and repeated threats to harm herself, every single request was denied due to
the prison’s “freeze-frame policy” that stated: “Inmates who have undergone
treatment for [gender dysphoria] will be maintained only at the level of change
that existed at the time they were received by the Department.”213 This means
that inmates suffering from gender dysphoria can only receive the treatment
they were receiving at the time of their incarceration; thus, the care of an
inmate is not determined by an inmate’s current medical needs.214
The treatment options that Keohane requested included her ability to
live consistently with her identity by dressing in female undergarments,
wearing makeup, and utilizing women’s hairstyles.215 Since Keohane had not
undergone these social-transitioning steps before incarceration, prison
officials refused to grant her requests, claiming it would violate the prison’s
policy of requiring male inmates to wear undershorts and cut their hair.216 In
addition, the prison officials noted safety concerns associated with Keohane’s
social-transitioning that would have resulted in the use of additional protection
for Keohane and extra responsibility for prison officials to prevent future
endangerment.217
As a result of the prison’s denial of Keohane’s social-transitioning
requests, she tried to hang herself as well as castrate herself as a result of the
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distress caused by her gender dysphoria.218 It was only after a lawsuit was
initiated that the prison referred her to an endocrinologist who immediately
prescribed hormone therapy.219 This is yet another devastating instance where
a transgender inmate believed they had no other choice but to physically harm
themselves in order to successfully petition the courts to receive some type of
relief.220 Thereafter, the Florida Department of Corrections attempted to
rectify their behavior by lifting the freeze-frame policy and replacing it with a
policy that permits the individualized assessment and treatment of inmates
suffering from gender dysphoria.221 However, despite the new policy, prison
officials refused to grant Keohane’s social-transitioning requests, except for
allowing a sports bra to assist with her breast enlargement that stemmed from
hormone therapy.222
Like the cases discussed above, the opinions of the medical
professionals differed in Keohane.223 During the bench trial, Keohane
presented a medical expert who confirmed that social transitioning to
encourage gender dysphoria patients to live out their gender identity is
medically necessary.224 The medical expert testified:
(1) [A]llowing an individual to present consistently with
her gender identity is one “of the medically necessary components
for the treatment of Gender Dysphoria,” (2) that it would be
“medically and logically inconsistent” and “potentially harmful” to
provide Keohane hormone therapy while denying her the ability to
socially transition, and (3) [f]orcing one to live in conformity with
a gender with which she doesn’t identity “would likely” cause her
to engage in self-harm.225

On the other hand, the prison’s medical officials who granted
Keohane’s hormone therapy disagreed with Keohane’s expert at trial, stating
that Keohane’s social transition was not medically necessary due to her current
regimen, which was sufficient to treat her gender dysphoria at the time.226
Prison officials claimed that Keohane’s treatment plan of mental health
counseling, the use of female pronouns, safer housing accommodations,
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private shower facilities, and hormone therapy should have been enough to
treat her condition.227 The Florida Department of Corrections seemed to
overlook the fact that an individual assessment of transgender inmates with
gender dysphoria is essential to build a treatment plan, and because every
transgender inmate suffering from gender dysphoria is different, all available
treatment options should be considered.228 The State contended that the
treatment plan in place was sufficient, and permitting social distancing would
pose high-security risks.229 This contention held no merit due to prisons
requiring high-security functions regardless of whether a transgender inmate
is receiving treatment or not.230 The nature of prison itself can be a violent and
threatening place for an ordinary person, such as a corrections officer or
security guard, to spend countless hours providing safety measures for those
housed in a prison.231 Independent of housing a post-operative inmate, a
prison will have to provide exclusive safety measures for any inmate, so
utilizing security concerns as a justification for denying adequate inmate care
is unacceptable.232 Still, the Eleventh Circuit Court refers to deliberate
indifference only as an official acknowledgment of an inmate’s serious
“[m]edical need with what amounts to a shoulder-shrugging refusal even to
consider whether a particular course of treatment is appropriate . . . .”233
Alongside the Florida Department of Corrections, the court seemed to
misunderstand the standards of care relevant to transgender health.234 The
WPATH rightfully mentioned that stigma attached to gender nonconformity
can lead to prejudice and discrimination; it is uncommon to live in a world
where individuals are uncomfortable with their bodies while attempting to
rectify them.235 Society has not entirely accepted that some individuals do not
conform to their gender roles, spurring tension in our county’s militaries,
school systems, employment contexts, prisons systems, and most importantly,
the criminal justice system—designed to safeguard our rights.236 New
developments are researched, discovered, and experimented with each day,
providing further information about the up-keep of transgender health and
providing a stable life for transgender people, whether diagnosed with gender
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dysphoria or not.237 Unfortunately, over the past two years, Keohane was
compelled to fight for adequate medical care and unprejudiced consideration
of the disparities between the needs of transgender inmates and the inflexible
policies affecting them.238 The balancing act that takes place, with regard to
providing exemplary care to inmates versus the prison’s legitimate security
concerns, is often used as a shield to avoid addressing the bigger issue.239 The
more significant problem is the failure of prisons to adopt acceptable forms of
treatment capable of sufficiently treating inmates with gender dysphoria.240
Unfortunately, Florida prisons are slower than other states’ prisons because
sex reassignment surgery is not even a topic addressed for the approximately
three-hundred transgender inmates currently jailed in Florida’s prisons.241
Instead, social-transitioning is a contested treatment option despite being a
standard treatment option in other states.242
The Eleventh Circuit held that the subjective prong of the deliberate
indifference standard, which requires knowledge of a substantial risk of harm
and the action of disregarding said risk, had not risen past mere negligence
when the Florida Department of Corrections denied Keohane’s socialtransitioning requests.243 Similar to Edmo, the court grappled with the medical
opinions of both sides’ experts, who were divided on whether a sex reassignment surgery was needed in order to treat Keohane’s gender dysphoria
after looking at the totality of the circumstances.244 Mere disagreements about
an inmate’s course of treatment between medical experts do not rise to the
level of deliberate indifference, and the court is in no position to force prisons
to adopt one treatment option over the other, if both options provide relief.245
The court explained that for the prison to violate the Eighth Amendment, the
treatment it provides must be "so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or
excessive as to shock the conscience or to be tolerable to fundamental
fairness," and that was not the case here.246 It seems the court and Florida
prisons collectively have not progressed as much as the rest of the nation in
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lieu of its recent decision in what constitutes adequate care for transgender
inmates suffering from gender dysphoria.247
The attempt to address the needs of transgender inmates by Florida
Prison’s are not adequate enough to actually treat the inmates’ gender
dysphoria.248 For instance, a male-to-female transgender inmate at Dade
Correctional Institution was found hanged in her cell after prison officials
refused to legally change the inmate’s name to a female name.249
Unfortunately, the horrors of Florida prisons for the transgender community
do not end at social-transitioning requests or sex reassignment surgery.250 It
goes as far as a simple name change, which depicts how difficult it is for
transgender inmates to receive an ounce of protection for their rights to
identify and live wholeheartedly as the gender they believe themselves to
be.251 Florida prisons have some work to do when it comes to understanding
the mental health of its transgender inmates, and empathically reflect on the
true necessity of basic standards of care for transgender health.252
Regardless of whether health professional accept the WPATH or not,
it exists to ensure those who are uneducated in transgender health, like Florida
prisons, have clear guidelines on what is appropriate to help the uneducated to
begin to grasp what is medically needed for the well-being of transgender
inmates.253
IV.

CONCLUSION

Understanding gender dysphoria is difficult for the average person, so
it is especially difficult for prison officials to know whether inmates are
suffering from gender dysphoria, as explained in various cases and periodicals
discussed throughout this Comment.254 Even qualified health professionals
grapple with suitable treatments for gender dysphoria, further complicating the
appropriate standard of care.255 However, there is something to be said about
society’s evolving standards, coupled with how far the history of the Eighth
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause has come.256 Society
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has progressed from ensuring adequate medical care for prisoners to holding
prison officials accountable for failure to provide adequate healthcare and
living conditions, to expanding the deliberate indifference standard to apply to
transgender health.257 Though the courts are not qualified to deem what is the
best course of treatment to treat gender dysphoria, it is the courts’
responsibility to apply the deliberate indifference standard accurately, and
decide each case properly on its merits.258 Hopefully, transgender inmates in
Florida prisons will be shown more significant consideration for the rights they
too are afforded by the Constitution, and though there are still hurdles to
overcome, at some point, sex reassignment surgery will become the new
standard of care.259

257.
258.
259.

See id. at 103–04.
See id. at 106.
See id. at 109 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

When an individual is arrested and charged with a crime in the United
States, that arrest creates a mark on the individual’s criminal record, regardless
of whether the charge is later dropped, dismissed, or otherwise resolved in the
arrestee’s favor.1 There will, of course, be no conviction on that individual’s
criminal record; however, it is not as though the arrest never happened.2 “The
[United States’] criminal records system is based on arrests,” meaning that
even “arrests that [do] not result in a conviction are included in [an
individual’s] criminal record . . . .”3 Therefore, records of arrest can be just as
consequential as convictions.4 In fact, there is a common public belief that if
an individual is arrested or charged with a crime, that individual must be guilty
of violating some law.5 When an arrestee’s interaction with the criminal
justice system does not result in a conviction, many people assume that the
arrestee “beat the system.”6 A presumption of guilt flows from arrests that do

1.
See Kenny Lo, Expunging and Sealing Criminal Records: How
Jurisdictions Can Expand Access to Second Chances, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2020/04/23094720/04-23_Expunging-andSealing.pdf?_ga=2.170378210.396687133.1633282993-1341886711.1633282993
(last
updated Apr. 23, 2020).
2.
Criminal Records Do Not Go Away on Their Own, ERIC J. DIRGA, P.A.
(Dec. 8, 2018), http://ejdirga.com/2018/12/08/criminal-records-public-records/; Gary Fields &
John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences Can Last a
Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrestrecords-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402 (“There is a myth
that if you are arrested and cleared that it has no impact . . . it’s not like the arrest never
happened.”).
3.
James B. Jacobs & Dimitra Blitsa, Sharing Criminal Records: The United
States, the European Union, and Interpol Compared, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV.
125, 130 (2008); Lo, supra note 1.
4.
Karen Lantz & Lisa Minutola, Why the American Dream is Out of Reach,
37 DEL. LAW., Summer 2019, at 12, 12 (“[Arrest records] can be [just] as devastating as
conviction[s].”); see Matthew D. Callanan, Note, Protecting the Unconvicted: Limiting Iowa’s
Rights to Public Access in Search of Greater Protection for Criminal Defendants Whose
Charges Do Not End in Convictions, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1275, 1278 (2013).
5.
Callanan, supra note 4, at 1278.
6.
Id. at 1279.
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not result in conviction, thus, causing innocent individuals to face collateral
consequences that may last a lifetime.7
To help decrease the aforementioned collateral consequences,
policymakers developed legal processes to make an individual’s criminal
record “invisible” to the public through expungement or sealing.8 Prior to the
advent of the digital age, expungement worked well because once the official
documents of an individual’s criminal record were destroyed by government
agencies, the existence of a criminal record could only live on through public
memory and printed newspapers.9 The destruction of official government
records is worthless for individuals whose criminal history information is
widely available on the internet because expungement orders rarely pertain to
criminal history information maintained by unofficial sources.10 Thus, the
complex legal process of expungement is inevitably unrewarding in the digital
age because constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom of
the press, prevent “granting individuals [the] right to compel private
companies to expunge their records . . . .”11 Being that the United States’
criminal justice system operates under the principle “innocent until proven

7.
Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987, 997–98 (2019)
[hereinafter Arrests as Guilt].

The legal consequences of arrest that appear to rely on an assumption of guilt . . . include a
permanent record that is accessible to the police and to others, violations of probation and parole,
occupational license suspension, civil asset forfeiture, bars on public benefits, and threats to
child custody. An arrest on one’s record can make one ineligible for jury service. It can also
make one ineligible for legal relief, as exemplified by a New York case in which a judge
dismissed misdemeanor charges in the interests of justice for those defendants who had no arrest
record but declined to dismiss for those who had such a record. Referring to the arrest records
as “record[s] of prior unlawful activity,” the judge explained his dichotomous decision:
dismissal was appropriate where the defendants had previously led “a law abiding life,” but in
cases “where a defendant previously has had or exercised that opportunity, but has thereafter
again disregarded the law, a different matter is presented. Defendants whose criminal records
or records of prior unlawful activity thereby present a history of disregard of the law, will not be
permitted to benefit” from dismissal.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
8.
See Eldar Haber, Digital Expungement, 77 MD. L. REV. 337, 347–48
(2018).
9.
Id. at 338.
10.
Id.; Brian M. Murray, Newspaper Expungement, 116 NW. U. L. REV.
ONLINE
68,
70
(2021),
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1311&context=nu
lr_online. Unofficial sources include background screening companies, newspapers, media
outlets, social media, and other internet websites. Id.
11.
Haber, supra note 8, at 338.
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guilty,” the system demands a solution that enables the non-convicted to retain
their innocence.12
Part II of this Comment provides background on criminal records and
addresses how the public can access criminal history records in the United
States.13 Additionally, Part II addresses the collateral consequences faced by
individuals with an arrest record.14 Part III of this Comment discusses how
individuals can get arrests wiped from their record through the process of
expungement and addresses the difference between expungement and
sealing.15 Furthermore, Part III focuses on Florida’s expungement laws and
provides suggestions to make the Florida’s expungement process less complex
for innocent arrestees.16 Part III also discusses the ineffectiveness of
expungement in the digital age.17 Part IV compares the United States’ criminal
record system to that of the European Union’s (“EU”) and explores possible
solutions for the United States to improve the effectiveness of expungement.18
After Part IV—which addresses that most solutions to improve the
effectiveness of expungement conflict with constitutional guarantees—Part V
proposes limiting the collateral consequences of arrests by modeling aspects
of the United States criminal record system after the EU’s criminal record
system—mainly, a system based on convictions, rather than arrests.19
II.

CRIMINAL RECORDS IN THE UNITED STATES

A criminal record is a list of an individual’s criminal history, including
arrests and convictions, maintained by the criminal justice system.20 When an
individual is arrested, his or her criminal history should list the date of the
arrest, the charges, and the final disposition.21 When an individual is
12.

Id.

See Callanan, supra note 4, at 1278.

The presumption of innocence should last in perpetuity for the
unconvicted criminal defendant, and the criminal defendant who was not convicted
at trial or via a plea bargain — regardless of the reason for the court’s inability to
convict — should not suffer consequences outside of court due to society’s
skepticism in the legal outcome.

13.
See discussion infra Section II.A.
14.
See discussion infra Sections II.B–C.
15.
See discussion infra Part III.
16.
See discussion infra Section III.A.
17.
See discussion infra Section III.B.
18.
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
19.
See discussion infra Sections IV.A.2–V.
20.
Lo, supra note 1, at 1; Information About Criminal Records, LEGAL AID
WORK, http://legalaidatwork.org/factsheet/records/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2022).
21.
Information About Criminal Records, supra note 20.
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convicted, his or her criminal history should include “the date of . . .
conviction, the charges, the sentence, and [indicate] whether the crime
[constitutes] a felony or misdemeanor.”22
In Florida, a criminal history record is created when an individual is
arrested and fingerprinted and should include the outcome of the charges
stemming from the arrest.23 Generally, Florida’s criminal history records
include personal information about the arrested individual, including his or her
full name, alias, gender, date of birth, nationality, ethnicity, unique physical
attributes, mugshot, full set of fingerprints, misdemeanor and felony offenses,
arrest history, indictments, convictions, and pending dispositions.24
A.

Access to Criminal Records

Police, prosecutors, courts, and members of the general public can
search for, and obtain access, to an individual’s criminal history records.25
Criminal justice agencies and members of the public can obtain access to an
individual’s criminal history information in a variety of ways, including
through: Court records, law enforcement, and corrections agency records,
registries, watch lists, state criminal record repositories, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”) Interstate Identification Index.26
Courthouses typically maintain comprehensive criminal records,
which include information regarding “criminal charges, . . . convictions, . . .
arraignments, trials, pleas, and other dispositions.”27 Depending on the
jurisdiction, county courthouses may require records to be retrieved on-site,
but some courthouses make records available online.28 In Florida, courthouse
records can be accessed online by the general public.29 Law enforcement and
corrections agencies maintain “records of complaints, investigations, arrests,
22.
Id.
23.
Seal
and
Expunge
FAQ,
FLA.
DEP’T
L.
ENF’T,
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Seal-and-Expunge-Process/Frequently-Asked-Questions
(last
visited Jan. 10, 2022).
24.
Florida
Criminal
Records,
STATERECORDS.ORG,
http://florida.staterecords.org/criminal.php (last visited Jan. 10, 2022).
25.
Lo, supra note 1, at 1.
26.
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER
TITLE
VII
OF
THE
CIVIL
RIGHTS
ACT
OF
1964
4–5
(2012),
http://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default/files/migrated_files/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.pdf
[hereinafter ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE].
27.
Id. at 4.
28.
Id.
29.
Florida
Public
Records,
STATERECORDS.ORG,
http://florida.staterecords.org/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2022).
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indictments, . . . incarceration[s], probation[s], and parole[s].”30 Depending
on the agency, these records may be available on-site or online.31
“Most states maintain . . . [a] centralized repository of criminal
records” submitted by the criminal justice agencies and courthouses within the
state, including Florida.32 “The FBI maintains the most comprehensive
collection of criminal records . . . [as it] compiles records from each of the
states’ [own] repositories” in a centralized system known as the ‘Interstate
Identification Index’ (“III”).33 The FBI maintains criminal history information
created for criminal justice agency use; however, the FBI’s III database is now
accessible to non-government agencies for non-criminal justice purposes.34
Currently, “access to FBI-maintained criminal history information is governed
by . . . state and federal statutes.”35 The primary means of gaining access to
the FBI-maintained databases for non-criminal justice purposes has been
through state statutes passed pursuant to Public Law 92-544, a federal law that
“allow[s] sharing of FBI-maintained criminal history records” with state and
local government agencies for use in certain licensing and employment
decisions.36 Background checks run pursuant to these state statutes are
“processed through state record repositories.”37 They include a check of state
records, and the results of these checks are supplied to public agencies.38 Put
simply, the FBI’s III database can be accessed for non-criminal justice
purposes by employers in certain state-regulated industries, “such as
individuals employed as civil servants, daycare [workers], school [staff],
nursing home workers, taxi drivers, [and] private security guards . . . .39
Access to FBI-maintained records has also been authorized by federal statutes,
which allows employers in certain industries “to go directly to the FBI for . . .
employment, licensing, [and] volunteer check[s] without . . . going through
state [repositories] and . . . checking state records.”40 These federal statutes
30.
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 4.
31.
See id.
32.
Id.; see also Criminal Justice Information Services, FLA. DEP’T L. ENF’T,
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/CJIS/CJIS-Home.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2022).
33.
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 4–5.
34.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL
HISTORY
BACKGROUND
CHECKS
3
(2006),
http://bjs.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh236/files/media/document/ag_bgchecks_report.pdf
[hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT].
35.
Id. at 4.
36.
Id.; Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 92-544, 86 Stat. 1109, 1115 (1973).
37.
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 34, at 4.
38.
Id.
39.
See id. at 4–5.
40.
Id. at 4.
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seek to promote national security and public safety by authorizing access to
FBI-maintained criminal history information for employers in industries
regulated by the federal government, including banking, securities, private
security guard industries, and transportation workers.41
Florida’s Public Records Act provides information on public records,
including general information on accessing the records.42 Pursuant to the Act,
“which presumes that all government information and records are available to
the public,” online sites—such as the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement’s (“FDLE”) website—provide tools for members of the general
public to access and obtain public records.43 Anyone can access another
individual’s public records through the FDLE’s website for only twenty-five
dollars.44
Criminal records have long been available to the public—since 1849
in the State of Florida45—although technological advancements have made
accessing criminal records much easier.46 With wide accessibility to criminal
records through a quick, informal internet search or paying a fee to private
companies, “everyday citizens, employers, and landlords [can] now routinely
consult criminal databases” to conduct background checks.47 Thus, with a
criminal record system based on arrests, “even [arrestees who were] never
charged with a crime . . . bear the mark of a criminal record.”48
B.

Arrests Generally

There is a common misconception about when a criminal record
starts.49 A criminal record is an arrest record, as criminal records are created
at the moment of arrest.50 From the moment of arrest and onward, everything
that occurs in relation to the arrest is documented on the arrestee’s criminal
record and made public.51 Thus, as previously mentioned, both arrests and
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 4–5.
FLA. STAT. § 119.01(1) (2021).
Id. § 119.01(2)(f); Florida Public Records, supra note 29; see also FDLE’s
Criminal
History
Search
Overview,
FLA.
DEP’T
L.
ENF’T,
http://cchinet.fdle.state.fl.us/search/app/default?3 (last visited Jan. 10, 2022) [hereinafter Fees].
44.
Fees, supra note 43.
45.
See Florida Public Records, supra note 29.
46.
Christopher Uggen et al., The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental Audit of
the Effects of Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 627, 628 (2014).
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Criminal Records Do Not Go Away on Their Own, supra note 2.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
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convictions make up an individual’s criminal record.52 Arrests and
convictions, however, are very different things.53 Convictions are typically
sufficient proof that an individual engaged in criminal conduct.54
On the other hand, arrests do not establish that criminal conduct
occurred and do not serve as proof that an individual engaged in criminal
conduct.55 “Florida arrest records are officially recorded documents” that
detail information about a person and his or her suspected crimes.56 Florida
arrest records typically include the arrestee’s full name, date of birth, gender,
place, and date of arrest, details of the alleged criminal activity, name of the
arresting officer, law enforcement agency, name of the holding facility, and
the status of the arrestee’s case.57 Conviction records contain similar details
along with the sentence received, the nature of the crime, and any prosecutorial
information.58
Another common misconception about criminal records is that after a
criminal case is dropped, dismissed, or otherwise resolved in the individual’s
favor, the record goes away or never existed.59 In reality, an arrestee’s record
remains with the arrestee regardless of the outcome.60 Thus, individuals
arrested for a crime but never charged or convicted face the ill effects of having
a criminal record, regardless of the fact that arrests alone are not sufficient
proof that criminal conduct occurred.61
1.

Arrests by the Numbers

Someone is arrested every three seconds in the United States; this
accounts for nearly 10.5 million arrests every year.62 To put the vast number
of individuals with an arrest record in the United States into perspective:

52.
See id.; Lo, supra note 1.
53.
See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 12–14 (distinguishing
between arrests and convictions).
54.
See id. at 13.
55.
Id. at 12.
56.
Florida Criminal Records, supra note 24.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
Criminal Records Do Not Go Away on Their Own, supra note 2.
60.
Id.
61.
See Uggen et al., supra note 46, at 628; ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra
note 26, at 12.
62.
Emerging Findings, VERA, http://www.vera.org/publications/arrest-trendsevery-three-seconds-landing/arrest-trends-every-three-seconds/findings (last visited Jan. 10,
2022).
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If all arrested Americans were a nation, they would be
the world’s [eighteenth] largest. Larger than Canada. Larger than
France. More than three times the size of Australia. The number
of Americans with criminal records today is larger than the entire
U.S. population in 1900. Holding hands, Americans with arrest
records could circle the earth three times.63

2.

Arrests Are Not Always Carried Out in Response to Crime
Commission

Alarmingly, “non-serious, low-level offenses, such as ‘drug abuse
violations’ and ‘disorderly conduct,’ make up over [eighty] percent of [these]
arrests . . . .”64 This results from the criminal justice system being relied upon
for social problems unrelated to public safety issues.65 For instance, “law
enforcement is called upon to respond punitively to medical and economic
problems unrelated to public safety issues.”66 Thus, people who need medical
care and social services are often arrested and booked when they should not
have come into police contact in the first place.67
It is estimated that a minimum of 4.9 million people were arrested in
2017, and “at least one in [four] of those individuals” were arrested multiple
times.68 Recidivism rates are related to race, poverty, mental illness, and
substance use disorders.69 “In many cities, arrests are used in predominantly
black and Latino neighborhoods as a means of intimidation and social control.
‘Move along,’ the police say, and those who [do not] are brought in for
loitering or disorderly conduct.”70 Cities that saw large protests against police
violence in 2020 also saw a large number of arrests, with over ten thousand

63.
Matthew Friedman, Just Facts: As Many Americans Have Criminal
Records as College Diplomas, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 17, 2015),
http://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/just-facts-many-americans-havecriminal-records-college-diplomas.
64.
Emerging Findings, supra note 62.
65.
Alexi Jones & Wendy Sawyer, Arrest, Release, Repeat: How Police and
Jails are Misused to Respond to Social Problems, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 26, 2019),
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/repeatarrests.html.
66.
Id.
67.
See id.
68.
Id.
69.
See id.
70.
Tina Rosenberg, Have You Ever Been Arrested? Check Here, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/opinion/have-you-ever-been-arrested-check-here.html
(last updated May 25, 2016).
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arrests as early as June 4th, 2020.71 Many individuals arrested during protests
were arrested for low-level offenses such as curfew violations and failure to
disperse.72 Most individuals arrested at protests will not be charged, but their
arrest will leave them with a criminal record.73
Most arrests generally do not result in charges, and even when they
result in charges, many do not result in a conviction.74 A significant number
of individuals arrested are legally innocent and arguably should not have come
in contact with the police in the first place, yet they will forever suffer the
collateral consequences that flow from their unfortunate interaction with the
criminal justice system.75
C.

Invisible Punishments for Innocent Arrestees

Even a minor, isolated interaction with the juvenile or adult criminal
justice system can create a lifetime of barriers.76 The National Inventory of
Collateral Consequences of Conviction—a database created by the Criminal
Justice Section of the American Bar Association—catalogs over 1000 explicit
legal consequences that can arise from a conviction in the state of Florida, and
over 1950 explicit legal consequences that arise when federal statutes are
accounted for.77 “And that is only a tally of explicit barriers—it does not
attempt to catalog the continuing stigma around a criminal record that makes
. . . applicant[s] with a record, less likely to be successful than one without.”78
Arrest records can be just as consequential as convictions.79 Any
individual with an arrest record faces adversity as a result of the collateral
consequences that stem from having a criminal record.80 The state may impose
71.
Margaret Love & David Schlussel, Protesting Should Not Result in a
Lifelong Criminal Record, WASH. POST (June 15, 2020, 8:00 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/15/protesters-should-not-get-lifelongcriminal-record/.
72.
Id.
73.
See id.
74.
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 12.
75.
See Rosenberg, supra note 70.
76.
Id.; Lantz & Minutola, supra note 4, at 12.
77.
See Collateral Consequences Inventory, NAT’L INVENTORY COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION, http://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/consequences
(choose “Florida” from “Jurisdiction” dropdown) (last visited Jan. 10, 2022); Lantz & Minutola,
supra note 4, at 12.
78.
Lantz & Minutola, supra note 4, at 12.
79.
Id.
80.
Haber, supra note 8, at 342 (“Sometimes referred to as ‘invisible
punishment[s],’ collateral consequences generally refer to any additional penalties outside the
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such collateral consequences. including the inability to obtain a professional
license and restrictions on obtaining state-based services.81 On the other hand,
society may deny employment, housing, or admission to educational
institutions and impose social stigmas.82
Employers, understandably, want to employ individuals they can
trust.83 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that applicants without a criminal
record would fare better in the employment arena than applicants with, even
if an applicant’s record consists of a mere arrest with no resulting charges or
convictions.84 In 2019, there were around 10.5 million arrests in the United
States.85 Many of those arrests did not lead to charges being filed, and millions
of innocent individuals never convicted of a crime now have a criminal
record.86 With so many individuals holding a criminal record, it stands to
reason that employers pass over many valuable, competent employees for less
competent employees that do not have a criminal record.87 Also, applicants
with arrest records may gravitate toward less selective occupations that do not
match their skill set and often pay less.88 A study conducted in 2014 found
that even a single arrest for disorderly conduct that did not result in a
conviction, depressed job offers.89 The study found that individuals with a
sole arrest for disorderly conduct, with no resulting charge or conviction, were
four percentage points less likely to receive an initial call back from
employers.90 Notably, a single disorderly conduct arrest should be one of the
most minimally stigmatizing records because disorderly conduct is a low-level
offense, yet even the most minimally stigmatizing record still reduced
employer callbacks to legally innocent applicants.91 This study demonstrated
that arrests—at least low-level ones—do not universally disqualify applicants
from employment; however, mere arrests do limit applicants’ ability to acquire

criminal law realm that individuals with criminal history, and perhaps even their families,
incur.”) (footnotes omitted).
81.
Id. at 344.
82.
Id.
83.
Friedman, supra note 63.
84.
See id.
85.
See Emerging Findings, supra note 62.
86.
See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 12. (“Many arrests do not
result in criminal charges, or the charges are dismissed.”) (footnotes omitted).
87.
Friedman, supra note 63.
88.
Id.
89.
See Uggen et al., supra note 46, at 627.
90.
Id. at 649.
91.
See id. at 632.
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positions that may best match their skill sets.92 Ultimately, employers often
discredit arrestees by equating a criminal record with low work productivity.93
There are many reasons why individuals who have been arrested but
never convicted are still affected by their arrest record.94 One reason is a lack
of knowledge by end-users (i.e., individuals inspecting another’s criminal
record) of criminal history information.95 For example, an individual
searching a criminal record may not understand the legal jargon used to
describe the final disposition, such as the term nolle prosequi, which means
that the prosecutor was unwilling to pursue the case against the arrested
individual.96 Many employers, landlords, and everyday persons may be
unfamiliar with legal jargon and may not understand that a particular charge
did not result in a conviction.97 Another reason is that end-users may give
greater weight to the arrest itself than to the end result by assuming that an
individual arrested for a crime must be guilty of violating some law.98 Further,
arrest records reduce employability; employers want to prevent losses due to
theft and protect themselves against negligent hiring lawsuits.99
The digital age has only exacerbated the negative effects felt by
individuals with an arrest record.100 The development of electronic databases
has made arrest histories much more accessible and highly visible.101
“[A]rrestees can no longer ‘pass’ as normal, and this stigma colors their
92.
Freidman, supra note 63; see Uggen et al., supra note 46, at 627, 637.
93.
Uggen et al., supra note 46, at 630.
94.
See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 6 (“[Employers use
criminal history information to] combat theft and fraud, as well as heightened concerns about
workplace violence and potential liability for negligent hiring. Employers also cite federal laws
as well as state and local laws as reasons for using criminal background checks.”); Rosenberg,
supra note 70 (stating that a brief interaction with the criminal justice system can create
permanent barriers to obtaining a job, housing, education, and an occupational license).
95.
See Rosenberg, supra note 70.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
See id.; Callanan, supra note 4, at 1293 (“When the average American hears
that someone has been arrested or charged with a crime, there is a general feeling that the person
has done something wrong and is guilty of violating some law.”) (citing Andrew D. Leipold,
The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1297, 1305–07 (2000));
James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 UNIV. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 387, 390 (2006) (“Employers often associate a criminal record with unreliability,
untrustworthiness, and dangerousness.”).
99.
Employers Are Looking at Your Florida Criminal Background Check: How
Your
Background
Check
Affects
Your
Job,
SEALMYRECORD.COM,
http://sealmyrecord.com/blog/employers-are-looking-your-florida-criminal-background-check
(last visited Jan. 10, 2022) [hereinafter Florida Criminal Background Check].
100.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 338; Uggen et al., supra note 46, at 630.
101.
Uggen et al., supra note 46, at 630.
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interactions with employers and others.”102 With widespread access to
criminal records, around nine in ten employers, four in five landlords, and
three in five colleges conduct criminal background checks on applicants.103
Currently, legislation does not regulate employers or other end-users when
they access criminal history records on the internet.104 However, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued an Enforcement
Guidance on how employers should approach the use of arrest records in their
hiring process.105 The EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance makes it clear that an
employer cannot impose a blanket ban on all applicants with an arrest record
but may rely on the conduct underlying the arrest to deny applicants from
employment.106 This requires employers to conduct a fact-based analysis of
the underlying conduct to justify an adverse employment reaction.107
However, the Enforcement Guidance still warns that employers should not
rely on arrest records in their exclusionary practices because arrest records
may not report the final disposition of an arrest or may include inaccuracies.108
Regardless of the EEOC’s cautions against employers using arrest records in
their exclusionary practices, the pervasiveness and easy accessibility of
criminal history records in the United States make employers’ use of criminal
records nearly obligatory.109 More than half of employers admitted that their
reason for searching an applicant’s criminal background “was to [avoid
potential] legal liability rather than to ensure a safe work environment . . . .”110

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Lo, supra note 1.
Haber, supra note 8, at 357.
See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 3.
Id. at 12.
See id.
Id. at 13.
See id. at 12; Michael Klazema, Are Background Checks Required?,
BACKGROUNDCHECKS.COM (Apr. 11, 2018), http://www.backgroundchecks.com/blog/arebackground-checks-required.
While most employers technically have the right to skip the background check step
when hiring new workers, doing so is always a risk. Employers have an obligation
to provide their employees with a safe place to work. They also have an obligation
to make sure their company operations—and, by extension, the people they hire—do
not pose a risk to customers, clients, or the public. Because of these obligations, a
pre-employment background check is usually viewed as due diligence even if the
employer is not technically required to run the check.

Klazema, supra.
110.
Friedman, supra note 63 (“According to the Society of Human Resource
Management survey, more than half of employers (52 percent) said their primary reason for
checking candidates’ backgrounds was to reduce legal liability rather than to ensure a safe work
environment (49 percent) or to assess trustworthiness (17 percent).”).
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Altogether, arrest records decrease an individual’s employment
prospects and erect socioeconomic barriers that expand across generations
because a parent’s criminal record places barriers on their child’s long-term
well-being.111 So how can individuals wrapped up in the criminal justice
system but never found guilty of anything, keep their criminal records from
“poisoning” their future?112 One way is by “destroying” their record through
expungement.113
III.

EXPUNGEMENT & SEALING

Expungement in the United States was initially limited and created for
individuals whose arrest did not result in a conviction, making an innocent
arrestee’s criminal history invisible to the public.114 Expungement is the
process by which an individual’s criminal record is “eras[ed].”115 Generally,
expungement may be ordered by a judge or court and requires removing a
particular incident from an individual’s criminal record.116 Congress has not
provided a statute governing the application of expungement at the federal
level.117
Most expungement proceedings occur in state courts, and the states
create their own laws regarding the application of expungement, including
who may have their record expunged, the process for expungement, and which
offenses are eligible for expungement.118
Expunging a record and sealing a record is not the same thing;
however, both aim to restrict public access to an individual’s criminal
record.119 Sealing does not destroy a criminal record as expungement does;
111.
Lo, supra note 1, at 1.
112.
See Rosenberg, supra note 70.
113.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 337 (“[E]xpungement: a legal process by which
criminal history records are later vacated, reversed, sealed, purged, or destroyed by the state.”)
(footnote omitted).
114.
See id. at 346–47.
115.
See Clay Calvert & Jerry Bruno, When Cleansing Criminal History Clashes
with the First Amendment and Online Journalism: Are Expungement Statutes Irrelevant in the
Digital Age?, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 123, 128 (2010); What Is “Expungement?”, AM. B.
ASS’N
(Nov.
20,
2018),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/teaching-legal-docs/whatis-_expungement-/.
116.
Lo, supra note 1, at 1–2.
117.
What Is “Expungement?”, supra note 115; James W. Diehm, Federal
Expungement: A Concept in Need of a Definition, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 73, 80 (1992).
118.
What Is “Expungement?”, supra note 115.
119.
See Lo, supra note 1, at 1–2 (explaining differences between sealing and
expunging).
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however, sealing a record makes the record accessible only through a court
order.120 Expungement varies from state to state; therefore, this comment
focuses on the State of Florida’s expungement process.121
A.

Expungement & Sealing in the State of Florida

In Florida, an individual may have his or her criminal record expunged
under certain conditions.122 An individual who has not been convicted of a
crime is eligible to have his or her criminal record expunged if he or she has
not had a criminal record sealed or expunged in the past.123 An individual can
only have his or her criminal record expunged one time, making expungement
a limited remedy for clearing a criminal record.124 In Florida, “‘expunction of
a criminal history record’” is expressly defined as:
[T]he court-ordered physical destruction or obliteration of a record
or portion of a record by any criminal justice agency having custody
thereof, or as prescribed by the court issuing the order, except that
criminal history records in the custody of the department must be
retained in all cases for purposes of evaluating subsequent requests
by the subject of the record for sealing or expunction, or for purposes
of recreating the record in the event an order to expunge is vacated
by a court of competent jurisdiction.125

In contrast, the “sealing of a criminal history record [is] the
preservation of a record under such circumstances that it is secure and
inaccessible to any person not having a legal right of access to the record or
the information contained and preserved therein.”126
For a Florida court to consider an individual’s petition for
expungement, the individual must fill out an application to receive a
Certification of Eligibility (“COE”) from the FDLE.127 After filling out the
application and obtaining supporting documentation, the individual must
submit the application and supporting documents to FDLE.128 If the individual

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
What Is “Expungement?”, supra note 115.
See FLA. STAT. § 943.0585(1)(a)–(h) (2021).
Id. §§ 943.0585(1)(g), 943.059(1)(e).
See id. §§ 943.0585(1)(g), 943.059(1)(e).
Id. § 943.045(16).
Id. § 943.045(19).
FLA. STAT. § 943.0585(2).
Id.
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qualifies for expungement, FDLE will respond with a COE.129 To qualify for
expunction of an arrest record in Florida, the charges against the individual
seeking expungement must have been dropped, dismissed, or the individual
must have been acquitted of the charges by a judge or jury.130 Further, the
individual seeking expungement must have never been convicted of a criminal
offense in Florida and never have sealed or expunged another arrest record in
Florida.131 To qualify for sealing an arrest record in Florida, the individual
must have entered a guilty or no contest plea, or the court must have withheld
the adjudication of guilt.132 Further, the individual seeking to seal their arrest
record must never have been convicted of a criminal offense in Florida and
never have sealed or expunged another arrest record in Florida.133 Finally, the
individual must petition the court, and the COE issued by the FDLE must
accompany the petition.134
Florida law provides that “any request for [expungement] of a criminal
history record may be denied at the sole discretion of the court.”135 Florida
courts, however, have consistently found that the discretion is not completely
unconstrained, meaning that a court may not use its sole discretion to
arbitrarily deny petitions for expungement.136
The courts may not deny a petition for expungement based solely on
the nature of the crime and must look to all the facts and circumstances.137
Thus, to properly exercise its discretion, a court must provide a reason for
denying a petition for expungement.138
129.
Id. § 943.0585(2)(a).
130.
Id. § 943.0585(1)(a)–(b).
131.
Id. §§ 943.0585(1)(c)–(d), (1)(g).
132.
FLA. STAT. § 943.059(1)(b).
133.
Id. §§ 943.059(1)(b), (1)(e).
134.
Id. § 943.0585(3)(a).
135.
Id. § 943.0585(4)(e).
136.
E.g., Anderson v. State, 692 So. 2d 250, 253 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(“Obviously, the words ‘sole discretion’ as used in section 943.058, Florida Statutes (1989), do
not permit arbitrary, capricious or whimsical denial of expunction. Instead, this court must
decide whether the trial judge used reasonable discretion in denying expunction.”) (citation
omitted).
137.
Baker v. State, 53 So. 3d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per
curiam) (“The court’s discretion must be exercised based on the Sectionicular facts and
circumstances surrounding the records at issue, and not solely on the nature of the charge.”);
Harman v. State, 12 So. 3d 898, 899 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (“A trial court has the
discretion to deny a petition ‘if there is a good reason for denial based on the facts and
circumstances of the individual case.’”) (quoting Anderson, 692 So. 2d at 252); Godoy v. State,
845 So. 2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing the trial court’s denial of petition
based solely on the nature of the charge).
138.
VFD v. State, 19 So. 3d 1172, 1175 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (finding
the trial court must articulate an evidence-based reason for denying expungement).
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Many states are taking steps to make record expungement more
accessible by adopting laws that streamline the process for expungement in
certain situations and by “making more . . . records eligible for expungement
[or] sealing . . . .”139 Florida adopted legislation providing for automatic
sealing in cases where charges were either not filed, dropped, or dismissed
prior to trial, and in cases where the trial resulted in an acquittal or a verdict
of not guilty.140 Florida’s administrative sealing does not require an individual
to take any action in sealing his or her record.141 The clerk is supposed to
forward all records eligible for administrative sealing to FDLE to be processed
for a seal.142 However, Florida’s automatic sealing process only seals criminal
history information maintained by FDLE—it does not seal records at the local
level.143 This process may benefit some individuals; however, some may still
have to go through the expungement process to destroy their entire criminal
record, including mugshots and other information on the sheriff’s office
website.144
Florida also offers administrative expungements, exclusively for
mistaken arrests and non-judicial records.145 Administrative expungements do
not require destruction of records by the arresting agency and do not seal court
records.146 Further, the arresting agency must apply to FDLE to have an arrest
administratively expunged, or the individual who was mistakenly arrested can
apply for an administrative expungement if “the application is supported by
the endorsement of the head of the arresting agency or his or her designee or
the state attorney of the judicial circuit in which the arrest occurred or his or
her designee.”147 Getting the arresting agency to file the application for an

139.
Lo, supra note 1.
140.
FLA. STAT. § 943.0595(a)(1)–(4).
141.
Auto-Seal
Under
Section
943.0595,
SAMMIS
L.
FIRM,
http://criminaldefenseattorneytampa.com/seal-and-expunge-criminal-record/auto-seal/
(last
updated Apr. 7, 2020); see also FLA. STAT. § 943.0595(3)(b).
142.
Auto-Seal Under Section 943.0595, supra note 141; FLA. STAT. §
943.0595(3)(a).
143.
See FLA. STAT. § 943.0595(3)(b).
144.
See Auto-Seal Under Section 943.0595, supra note 141 (further explaining
automatic sealing under Florida law).
145.
Administrative
Expungements,
ERIC
J.
DIRGA,
P.A.,
http://ejdirga.com/florida-expungement/expungement-options/administrative_expungements/
(last visited Jan. 10, 2022) (“Administrative expungements: Are only for mistaken arrests.
They do not replace the standard adult expungement. They do not provide the same benefits as
standard adult expungement.”).
146.
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 943.0581(1) (stating that administrative expungements
apply to nonjudicial records of arrest).
147.
FLA. STAT. § 943.0581(2)–(3).
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administrative expungement as a result of a mistaken or unlawful arrest can be
difficult and often requires court involvement.148
For example, on a Tuesday afternoon in April 2016, a sixty-year-old
Florida resident (“Plaintiff”) was riding his bike on Meridian Avenue in Miami
Beach when he approached a Florida Power and Light construction area.149
The area was closed to motor vehicle traffic but remained open to pedestrian
traffic.150 Pedestrians were walking in the street, as well as on the sidewalks.151
Plaintiff rode his bike another block and then exited the construction area by
lifting up the single piece of yellow tape that strung across the roadway, as
other pedestrians in front of Plaintiff had just done.152 As Plaintiff walked his
bike out of the construction area, he passed a Miami Beach police car parked
outside the construction site.153 The Miami Beach police officer (“OfficerDefendant”) did not ask any other passing pedestrians questions, but got out
of his police car to ask Plaintiff one question, “[w]here are you coming
from?”154 Plaintiff responded, “[f]rom up the road,” then rode his bike away
after the Officer-Defendant took no further action to speak with Plaintiff.155
For reasons unknown, Officer-Defendant got back into his police car and
began following Plaintiff without using sirens or the PA system to alert
Plaintiff, who was completely unaware that Officer-Defendant was following
him.156
Plaintiff turned onto a narrow road which, under Florida law, was “too
narrow for a bicycle and another vehicle to [ride] safely side by side . . . .”157
Despite this law, Officer-Defendant drove his vehicle alongside Plaintiff, then
proceeded to intentionally turn his vehicle into Plaintiff, placing Plaintiff in
“significant danger of serious physical injury and even death.”158 As a result
of the Officer-Defendant striking Plaintiff with the police car, Plaintiff “lost
control of his bicycle and crashed into a steel picket fence enclosure, . . .”
which caused Plaintiff to hit his head and suffer wounds above and below his
left eye.159 The crash also broke Plaintiff’s sunglasses, which left small

2021).

148.
149.

Administrative Expungements, supra note 145.
Halmu v. Beck, No. 20-21410, 2021 WL 980912, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15,

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Halmu, 2021 WL 980912, at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Halmu, 2021 WL 980912, at *3.
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wounds with glass fragments embedded into Plaintiff’s face.160 OfficerDefendant proceeded to demand Plaintiff’s I.D., and Plaintiff complied with
no resistance.161
Despite having no reason to arrest Plaintiff, Officer-Defendant
handcuffed Plaintiff and placed him under arrest.162 Officer-Defendant made
no report about his “use of excessive force to stop [Plaintiff] . . .”, and did not
issue Plaintiff any civil citations or a notice to appear for violating any statute
or ordinance.163 Instead, Officer-Defendant informed Plaintiff, he was “being
arrested for resisting . . . commands.”164 A Fort Lauderdale officer then arrived
at the scene and was ordered to transport Plaintiff to jail, rather than the Miami
Beach Police Department (“MBPD”).165 Plaintiff was transferred from MBPD
to Miami-Dade County Jail around 9:30 PM, and despite posting bail at 1:30
AM, was not released until 11:30 AM the next morning.166 Plaintiff was
charged with two criminal misdemeanors, including: (1) “[r]esisting an officer
without violence . . . ”, and (2) “willful failure or refusal to comply with any
lawful order or direction of any law enforcement officer . . . .”167 A nolle
prosse was filed as to the first charge, and the second charge was dismissed.168
As a result of Plaintiff’s overnight jail stay, Plaintiff became ill with a severe
case of pneumonia.169 Plaintiff also suffered from “severe psychological and
emotional trauma, including insomnia and nightmares,” “[a]s a direct
consequence of the unlawful arrest [and] excessive force” used against him.170
Plaintiff brought claims against Officer-Defendant—for false arrest,
excessive force, and malicious prosecution—and sought injunctive relief for
the expungement of his arrest records.171 Officer-Defendant moved to strike
or dismiss Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, and Plaintiff’s responded
that the court had the authority to order the Miami Beach Police Department
to apply for an administrative expungement upon the court’s entry of a final
order that Plaintiff’s arrest was made contrary to law.172 The court explained
that an administrative expungement did not apply to Plaintiff’s arrest records
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Halmu, 2021 WL 980912, at *3.
See id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Halmu, 2021 WL 980912, at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5; FLA. STAT. § 943.0581(2) (2021).
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because Plaintiff failed to allege that a law enforcement agency or a court had
determined the arrest was made contrary to law.173 Further, Plaintiff’s
complaint sought injunctive relief against the Officer-Defendant to expunge
records in his individual capacity, rather than the Miami Beach Police
Department, for which there was no precedent.174 The court granted OfficerDefendant’s motion to strike and directed Plaintiff to amend his complaint.175
As this incident illustrates, administrative expungements are difficult to obtain
and do not replace the standard adult expungement.176
1.

A Proposed Solution to Improve the Expungement Process in Florida

Florida has recently enacted legislation making more individuals
eligible for expungement, however it should follow Delaware’s new
legislation providing expungement for all charges and arrests that do not result
in conviction through the submission of an application to the State Bureau of
Identification.177 In Florida, this would mean that eligible individuals are
automatically granted an expungement after they apply for and receive a COE
from the FDLE without petitioning the courts.178
On the other hand, even with easier access, expungement in the digital
age does not ensure that the arrested and accused will be restored their
“innocent” status.179
B.

Pitfalls of Expungement in the Digital Age

Individuals that successfully get their criminal record expunged obtain
certain benefits, such as the ability to deny the existence of that record.180
Giving an innocent person the ability to deny that their arrest ever occurred
can have a positive impact; however, the positive impact of expungement
173.
Halmu, 2021 WL 980912, at *5–6; FLA. STAT. § 943.0581(2).
174.
Halmu, 2021 WL 980912, at *6.
175.
Id.
176.
See Administrative Expungements, supra note 145.
177.
See FLA. STAT. § 943.0585; Lantz & Minutola, supra note 4, at 14.
178.
See Lantz & Minutola, supra note 4, at 14 (stating that cutting out the
process of petitioning the courts for individuals whose charges or arrests did not terminate in
conviction would minimize the difficulties faced by the innocent in Florida’s expungement
process); Calvert & Bruno, supra note 115, at 142 (describing the difficulties that even
individuals with dismissed charges face when seeking expungement in Florida).
179.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 338 (Prior to the digital age, “if one’s records
were expunged, one would have largely been treated by the public as if one never had a record
in the first place.”).
180.
See FLA. STAT. § 943.0585(6)(b).
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statutes is severely limited in the digital age.181 Expungement orders do not
pertain to news reports, social media posts, blogs, or other internet sites with
user-generated content.182 While consumer reporting agencies (“CRA”) are
required to update their criminal record databases (i.e., exclude expunged
records in their reports) under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), this
“requirement” is not often enforced.183 Thus, even after expungement, an
individual’s arrest information can still be visible to employers, landlords, and
educational institutions.184 As a result, even those entitled to deny their arrest
might refrain from doing so, so as not to appear untruthful to an employer,
landlord, or educational institution.185
The digitization of public records has greatly changed the nature of
expungement.186 With the advent of electronic databases and digital
technology, information regarding an individual’s interactions with the
criminal justice system has become widely available online and, thus, the
internet poses a great threat to the effectiveness of expungement.187 When
records were held solely in paper form within a courthouse or law enforcement
agency, it took a great effort to obtain criminal history information because
individuals had to take a trip to the courthouse or arresting agency to obtain

181.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 338.
182.
Id.; Murray, supra note 10, at 70.
183.
Alessandro Corda, More Justice and Less Harm: Reinventing Access to
Criminal History Records, 60 HOW. L.J. 1, 25 (2016) (“[N]either the Federal Trade Commission
nor courts considering lawsuits for willful and negligent noncompliance with the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) have historically been willing to relentlessly control or sanction
disclosure of inaccurate conviction data.”); see also Logan Danielle Wayne, Comment, The
Data-Broker Threat: Proposing Federal Legislation to Protect Post-Expungement Privacy,
102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 253, 270 (2013) (“[C]ourts have interpreted the responsibilities
of data brokers under the FCRA’s accuracy provisions to be so minimal that plaintiffs rarely
prevail in such suits.”).
184.
Haber, supra note 8, at 338.
185.
Id. at 353 n.108 (stating that denying an arrest that an employer can simply
search for, and find, on Google may be detrimental for applicants with expunged records):

Id.

Some employers might not even mind the criminal record, but rather the
fact that a candidate was untruthful. That could occur when candidates have denied
having a criminal record, as the record was sealed or expunged and therefore they
are entitled to say they do not have a criminal record, and are perceived as lying to
the employer.

186.
See id. at 338, 356.
187.
Alessandro Corda, Beyond Totem and Taboo: Toward a Narrowing of
American Criminal Record Exceptionalism, 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 241, 241–43 (2018)
[hereinafter Beyond Totem and Taboo].
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criminal records.188 When criminal records were only kept physically within
these buildings, the records could easily be destroyed, making expungement
much more effective.189
Today, records are also kept on electronic databases available to the
general public via the internet.190 Thus, criminal records must not only be
physically destroyed but they must be electronically destroyed as well.191
However, deleting a criminal record from an agency’s database does not undo
the fact that the information was “widely available [on the internet] for several
years.”192 Destroying an individual’s criminal record from an electronic
database does not completely erase all evidence of the arrest because “[i]n the
age of Google and social media, there is no way to eliminate all traces of the
underlying event . . . .”193 “The fact that the internet is capable of remembering
everything makes expungement statutes ineffective in the digital era.”194
1.

Criminal History Information on the Internet

Criminal history information makes its way onto the internet in
several ways, including governmental databases, courthouse online records,
data brokers’ online databases, news stories, social media posts, blogs, forprofit mugshot websites, and police blotter sites to name a few.195 Thus, in the
digital age, accessing criminal history information on the internet is easy.196
a.

Consumer Reporting Agencies/Data Brokers

Before the digital age, even non-expunged records were hard to
access.197 Instead of going to the courthouse or governmental agencies,
employers, landlords, and educational institutions often relied on third-party
188.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 338; Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap
Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 321, 328 (2015) (discussing that prior to the
digital age, “employer[s]”, “landlord[s]”, [and] “neighbor[s]” interested in an individual’s
“criminal [history] record had to go to the . . . courthouse to view the physical file . . . .”).
189.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 348–49.
190.
See id. at 349–50.
191.
See Corda, supra note 183, at 22.
192.
Id. at 25.
193.
Joshua D. Carter, A Practitioner’s Guide to Expunging and Sealing
Criminal Records in Illinois, 100 ILL. B.J. 642, 644 (2012).
194.
Haber, supra note 8, at 338.
195.
See id. at 351, 356–57.
196.
Corda, supra note 183, at 3.
197.
See Roberts, supra note 188, at 328; James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The
Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
177, 183 (2008).
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background screening businesses, such as data brokers, to prepare a criminal
history report on an individual.198 Data brokers are individuals or companies
that collect personal data from public records and sell that information to third
parties such as employers, landlords, and educational institutions.199 To
prepare a report, the background screening companies would send a runner to
the courthouse and other governmental agencies to compile criminal history
information on an individual.200 Expunged records would not show up in an
individual’s criminal history because the state and federal agencies had
destroyed the record, and the record was not accessible on the internet.201 As
the governmental agencies began using digital technology, these background
screening companies were able to buy criminal records in bulk from
government agencies and create their own criminal record databases.202 Thus,
obtaining vast amounts of criminal records, including criminal records that
would later be expunged.203 These data collection companies conducting
background checks and selling criminal history information as consumer
reports to third parties are considered CRAs under the FCRA.204
CRAs do not only make criminal history information more accessible
but they also make expunged criminal records more accessible.205 With
infrequent updates, data brokers’ databases contain inaccurate records that
include expunged records.206
To remedy issues caused by the outdated records maintained by
CRAs, the FCRA imposed obligations on CRAs to adopt reasonable measures
to obtain maximum possible accuracy of criminal history information.207 The
obligations imposed on CRAs by the FCRA, however, are insufficient because
the FCRA does not impose affirmative duties on CRAs to update their
records.208 Instead, the FCRA places the duty of ensuring CRA compliance
with the FCRA on individuals by granting a private right of action to
individuals who must demonstrate that, due to the CRAs’ practices, they

198.
Haber, supra note 8, at 352; Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 197, at 185.
199.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 352 (describing work of data brokers).
200.
Id.
201.
See id.
202.
Id.
203.
See id. at 352–53.
204.
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 5.
205.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 353.
206.
See id.
207.
15 U.S.C. § 1681e.
208.
Wayne, supra note 183, at 268 (“[T]he FCRA does not impose any
affirmative duties on data brokers to update their records, and its enforcement provisions still
put the onus of ensuring compliance on individual persons.”).
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suffered an injury in fact.209 Plaintiffs rarely win in such suits.210 Further,
CRAs have a few incentives to not update their criminal history databases.211
First, frequent updates of these massive databases would be costly and time
consuming.212 Second, there is a demand for un-updated records because
employers, landlords, and educational institutions want to know an applicant’s
complete criminal history, including expunged records.213 Further, the FCRA
also imposed regulations on employers, including the obligation to inform and
obtain consent from applicants before the employer obtains an applicant’s
criminal history report from a CRA.214 These FCRA regulations are also
insufficient because employers can simply conduct an informal background
check using other internet sources, rather than requesting a report from a CRA,
because current legislation does not regulate employers’ access to criminal
history records through the internet.215
b.

For-Profit Websites, Social Media Posts, and Online News Stories

Internet sources that encumber the effectiveness of expungement in
the digital age include “for-profit mugshot websites, police blotter websites,
social media posts, and online news stories.”216 For-profit mugshot websites
collect mugshots and arrest information from police departments to later
charge a remove fee for such content.217 These sites sometimes charge
hundreds of dollars for mugshot removals, placing another economic barrier
upon individuals who successfully expunged their records.218 Mugshots and
arrest information typically remain on these for-profit websites even after an
individual is granted expungement unless a payment is made for its removal.219
Police blotter websites often retain information regarding arrests and
suspected criminal activity, regardless of whether an arrest is expunged.220
209.
Id. at 268, 270; Haber, supra note 8, at 355.
210.
Wayne, supra note 183, at 270.
211.
Haber, supra note 8, at 362.
212.
Id. at 353–54, 362.
213.
Id. at 354, 361–62.
214.
Id. at 355.
215.
Id. at 355, 357.
216.
Elizabeth Westrope, Comment, Employment Discrimination on the Basis of
Criminal History: Why an Anti-Discrimination Statute is a Necessary Remedy, 108 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 367, 373–74 (2018).
217.
Id. at 374.
218.
Id. (“Fees to remove mug shots or other information pertaining to an arrest
can be as much as $400.”).
219.
Haber, supra note 8, at 356.
220.
Westrope, supra note 216, at 374.
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Therefore, employers, landlords, and educational institutions may still have
easy access to expunged arrests through mugshot websites and police blotter
sites.221
Social media posts may also contain information about expunged
arrests, and court expungement orders certainly do not require individuals to
delete old posts that reveal information about an individual’s expunged
arrest.222
Finally, another serious limitation on expungement in the digital age
is news stories published by journalists.223 Local media reports may provide
information about individuals and their alleged criminal activity, which may
remain available online after the expungement is granted.224 The First
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press and freedom of speech
ensures the public’s right to publish stories regarding criminal events,
including arrests.225 Thus, journalists are not legally obligated to edit their
articles containing alleged criminal conduct and arrest information after a
court issues an expungement order.226 Therefore, an individual’s arrest
information may remain indefinitely in articles on the internet, traceable with
just a few keystrokes via an internet search engine.227
States like Florida have begun to take step in the right direction to
limit online exposure of arrest information for individuals whose arrests
resulted in no charges being filed or the charges being dropped.228 In 2019,
the FDLE’s criminal history database stopped showing results for “arrests that
result[ed] in no charges being filed or . . . charges being dropped.”229 This
information, however, can still be obtained from private background checking
companies and may posted online by nongovernmental sources.230 Further,
Florida made it illegal for websites to require payment for removing
221.
See id.; Haber, supra note 8, at 357.
222.
See Westrope, supra note 216, at 374–75.
223.
See id. at 375.
224.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 356–57.
225.
See Westrope, supra note 216, at 375.
226.
See id.; Calvert & Bruno, supra note 115, at 137 (“[N]ewspapers . . . cannot
be in the business of erasing the past. Corrections, yes. Obliterations, no.”).
227.
See Westrope, supra note 216, at 375.
228.
See Florida Expungement Qualification, ERIC J. DIRGA, P.A.,
http://ejdirga.com/florida-expungement/expungement-qualification/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2021)
(“As of October 1, 2019, FDLE’s criminal history will not show arrest information on arrests
that result in no charges being filed or all charges being dropped.”).
229.
Id.
230.
See id. (stating that individuals whose arrest resulted in no charges being
filed or charges being dropped must obtain their arrest information from private background
checking companies, rather than the FDLE, as of October 1, 2019).
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mugshots.231 Due to the market demand for this information, however,
operators of for-profit websites found legal ways to make a profit.232 Instead
of requiring payment for the removal of mugshots, these companies switched
to an ad-based operation model.233 After these for-profit websites found a
loophole in the Florida law by switching to an ad-based model of operation,
Florida’s Governor signed a new piece of legislation that extends to “[f]orprofit website[s] generating ad revenue for the sole purpose of embarrassing
people.”234 The Florida law took effect on October 1, 2021, and allows
individuals to make a written request, sent via registered mail, to the for-profit
website to have their mugshot removed from the site.235 The for-profit site
will then have ten days to respond to the request, and failure to respond will
result in a $1,000 fine per day.236 Merely restricting the practice of charging
a fee for mugshot removals does not mean that these companies cannot publish
mugshots and arrest information; it just means they cannot profit from
publishing that information.237 Therefore, the Florida bill is a step in the right
direction, but it will not eliminate the mugshot industry.238 Eliminating the
ability of mugshot websites to publish this information altogether would likely
invoke constitutional concerns because such a restriction may violate the First
Amendment’s protection of free speech and freedom of the press.239
Therefore, regulating the initial dissemination of mugshots, such as preventing
the Sheriff’s office from posting mugshots online, may be the only way to
eliminate the mugshot industry.240 On the other hand, the public places a high

231.
Mike Vasilinda, Mugshot Websites Under New Scrutiny After Florida Law
Signed, NEWS4JAX, http://www.news4jax.com/news/local/2021/06/22/florida-mugshotwebsites-under-new-scrutiny-after-law-signed/ (last updated June 22, 2021, 6:30 PM).
232.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 370.

Id.

[E]ven upon regulating direct profits of these websites, it is rather intuitive
that as long as there will be a market demand for this information, their
operators will find a legal way to still make profits. Subsequently, these
restrictions could perhaps lead to the formation of grey or black markets
for this type of information.

233.
Vasilinda, supra note 231.
234.
Id.
235.
See id.
236.
Id.
237.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 369–70.
238.
Vasilinda, supra note 231.
239.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 370 (“[P]roscribing this practice altogether
might be difficult, if not almost constitutionally impermissible as such restrictions could raise
First Amendment concerns . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
240.
See Vasilinda, supra note 231.
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value on their right to be informed, even when it comes to alleged criminal
activity.241
Ultimately, innocent individuals who successfully go through the
complex and costly process of expungement will likely continue to face the
stigma and barriers associated with a criminal record because the digital age
has made expungement more of a symbolic gesture rather than a solution to
eliminating the barriers faced by the arrested and accused.242 Under Florida
law, once a record is expunged or sealed, state and federal agencies generally
cannot disclose the record to the public.243 However, once the information is
public (i.e., on the internet), there are generally no laws that prohibit disclosure
and circulation of that information.244 Thus, expungement statutes do not
provide a sufficient solution to innocent individuals arrested for offenses they
did not commit.245 These innocent individuals deserve a proper solution that
emulates one of the core principles of the United States criminal justice
system: the presumption of innocence.246
IV.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF EXPUNGEMENT
IN THE DIGITAL AGE

A.
Comparing the European Union and United States Criminal Record
Systems
The EU views criminal history information as private, personal
information.247 The EU’s criminal record system is based on convictions
rather than arrests.248 Each EU country maintains its own registers that are
generally not accessible to the public.249 Judicial authorities—and sometimes
police and other public authorities—may be able to access an individual’s
criminal record, which only includes convictions, but private individuals, such
as employers, generally cannot obtain another individual’s criminal conviction

241.
See Corda, supra note 183, at 5.
242.
Id. at 25.
243.
FLA. STAT. § 943.0585(6)(a) (2021).
244.
See FLA. STAT. § 943.0585(6)(d); Haber, supra note 8, at 355, 357.
245.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 384.
246.
See Callanan, supra note 4, at 1308 (“The U.S. criminal justice system was
founded on the principle of ‘innocent until proven guilty,’ and the only way to properly respect
that sentiment is to create additional safeguards to protect criminal defendants from the
collateral consequences of a criminal charge lacking a conviction.”).
247.
Haber, supra note 8, at 359.
248.
Jacobs & Blitsa, supra note 3, at 136.
249.
Id. at 136, 142–43.
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record.250 EU nationals can also obtain access to their criminal history records,
and some EU countries do not require individuals to specify their reason for
requesting their criminal record.251 Thus, employers may bypass the strict
privacy laws by indirectly obtaining criminal records through applicants
themselves.252 Still, applicants’ criminal conviction records do not contain
information about arrests, and the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation
(“GDPR”) prevents data-processing companies from processing personal data
regarding criminal convictions; thus, strict regulations and the EU criminal
record system itself make it difficult for employers to bypass restrictive
privacy laws in the EU.253 In the EU, information regarding arrests and
suspects taken into custody is maintained by the police.254 The information
kept by police is not included in criminal conviction records and is not
disseminated to the public,255 which altogether allows innocent individuals to
avoid collateral consequences stemming from their interaction with the
criminal justice system.256 In compliance with Article 6 of the Convention of
Human Rights, which requires that individuals receive a fair and public
hearing, EU court records are public, but restrictions are placed on press
reports regarding cases and court records, sometimes providing anonymity to
defendants.257
In contrast, the United States views criminal history information as a
public record,258 and the United States criminal record system is based on
arrests.259 The United States generally does not have restrictive privacy laws
that prevent arrest records from being published on the internet because
250.
Id. at 142–43.
251.
Id. at 143; James B. Jacobs & Elena Larrauri, European Employment
Discrimination Based on Criminal Record II – Discretionary Bars, COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (Jan. 13, 2015), http://ccresourcecenter.org/2015/01/13/europeandiscretionary-employment-discrimination-based-criminal-record/.
252.
Jacobs & Larrauri, supra note 251.
253.
See Aaron Schildhaus, EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR):
Key Provisions and Best Practices, 46 INT’L L. NEWS, Winter 2018, at 11, 11 (explaining
background on GDPR); Jacobs & Blitsa, supra note 3, at 142–43.
254.
Jacobs & Blitsa, supra note 3, at 137.
255.
See id. (explaining that EU police keep their own intelligence information,
which is not integrated with the judicial system’s conviction information).
256.
See Sarah E. Lageson et al., Privatizing Criminal Stigma: Experience,
Intergroup Contact, and Public Views About Publicizing Arrest Records, 21 PUNISHMENT &
SOC’Y 315, 318 (2019) (explaining that negative consequences stemming from even minor
interactions with the criminal justice system are exacerbated when criminal history information
is publishable online).
257.
Haber, supra note 8, at 359.
258.
Id. at 351; Jacobs & Blitsa, supra note 3, at 142 (“In the United States,
criminal records are effectively public, either by law or in practice.”).
259.
Jacobs & Blitsa, supra note 3, at 130.
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criminal records are considered public records.260 Thus, even if an individual
is granted an expungement order, that order only pertains to the destruction of
official government documents, not arrest information published by journalists
or other internet users.261 The United States does not have restrictions that
prevent employers and other internet users from conducting an informal
background check by searching an applicant’s name on Google.262 Once
official government documents are destroyed following an expungement
order, “‘digital memory . . . prevents society from moving beyond the past
because it cannot forget the past.’”263 Proposed solutions to the digital
memory problem include the right to be forgotten.264
1.

Recognizing the Right to be Forgotten

The EU recognizes the “‘right to be forgotten,’” which grants
individuals the right to control their personal data by deleting information on
the internet that meets certain criteria.265 Thus, while it is less likely for
sensitive information, such as criminal history records, to surface on the
internet in the EU because of Europe’s restrictive privacy laws, the recognition
of the right to be forgotten ensures that EU citizens and residents can remove
sensitive personal information that does end up on the internet.266 Recent case
decisions in Europe made it clear that data authorities in Europe can compel
data controllers, such as Google, to remove offending material for users
located in Europe.267 While France’s data authority, the Commission
Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (“CNIL”), could not compel
Google to remove links to the offending material worldwide, CNIL could

260.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 373 (addressing that regulations restricting the
use and dissemination of public records, such as criminal records, would be considered
unconstitutional).
261.
See id. at 371; Murray, supra note 10, at 70.
262.
See Murray, supra note 10, at 70.
263.
See Edward J. George, Note, The Pursuit of Happiness in the Digital Age:
Using Bankruptcy and Copyright Law as a Blueprint for Implementing the Right to Be
Forgotten in the U.S., 106 GEO. L.J. 905, 908 (2018) (quoting MEG LETA JONES, CTRL+Z: THE
RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 11 (2016)); Murray, supra note 10, at 70.
264.
Id.
265.
See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) (“The
data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data
concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase
personal data without undue delay . . . .”).
266.
Haber, supra note 8, at 338–39, 359–60.
267.
See Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Comm’n nationale de l’informatique et
des libertés, ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, ¶73 (Sept. 24, 2019).
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certainly control accessibility to the material within Europe.268 Further, the
court did not rule out the possibility for future worldwide injunction orders
compelling data collectors, like Google, to remove listings globally.269
Currently, the United States does not guarantee a right to be forgotten
that allows individuals to request the delisting of internet search results
concerning their private life, such as information pertaining to expunged
arrests.270 Many Americans view the right to be forgotten as a form of
censorship that would chill speech and conflict with democratic values.271
Further, many Americans believe that the right to be informed outweighs the
right to privacy, at least in the context of the right to be forgotten.272
While the United States does not guarantee a right to be forgotten,
some scholars have asserted that the right to be forgotten has judicial
precedence in American law.273 For instance, in a 1931 case, California’s
Fourth District Court of Appeals held in favor of a woman, formerly named
Gabrielle Darley, who claimed that a movie connecting her to her previous
interactions with the criminal justice system violated her privacy rights.274
Darley was previously a prostitute who was tried, but acquitted of murder.275
Following her trial, Darley abandoned her life as a prostitute and got married,
took her spouse’s name, and lived an honorable life with friends who did not
know the details of her past life, until the film connected Darley’s married
name to her maiden name.276 The court found that Darley “should have been
permitted to continue [the] course without having her reputation and social
268.
See id.
269.
See id. at ¶72; Andrew Keane Woods, Three Things to Remember from
Europe’s ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Decisions, LAWFARE (Oct. 1, 2019, 10:11 AM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/three-things-remember-europes-right-be-forgotten-decisions#.
While the court said that EU law does not give France express authority
to compel Google to remove listings worldwide, ‘it also does not prohibit such a
practice.’ The Court of Justice suggested that, even absent any new statutory
authority from the EU, regulators—though it is unclear which ones—might
nonetheless have good reason to order a global injunction, as long as they balance
privacy with freedom of information.

Woods, supra.
270.
See Woods, supra note 269; George, supra note 263, at 907.
271.
George, supra note 263, at 909–10.
272.
David Zax, Will There Ever Be an “Internet Erase Button”?, MIT TECH.
REV. (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/2011/04/27/259428/will-there-everbe-an-internet-erase-button/ (“Sometimes the right to information ought to outweigh the right
to privacy. What incentive will there ever be for a journalist to rake muck if the information
can simply be taken down upon request?”).
273.
George, supra note 263, at 913.
274.
See Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 91, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
275.
Id. at 91.
276.
Id.
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standing destroyed by the publication . . . .”277 The court in the Melvin case
set the precedent to be the first instance of the right to be forgotten in the
United States, even though the court did not actually allow Darley a right to
be forgotten.278 The court included in its opinion that if the film only depicted
the events that were on the public record from Darley’s trial, there would have
been no violation of a right of privacy.279 Thus, Darley’s privacy rights would
not have been violated had the film only portrayed details available to the
public in Darley’s trial records.280 The court does not suggest that individuals
like Darley have a right to compel the media to erase criminal history
information about them.281
Today, courts in the United States overwhelmingly agree that the
publication of true information concerning an individual’s criminal history is
unlikely to constitute a violation of privacy, even if the record is later
expunged.282 Thus, it is unlikely that the United States would recognize a right
to be forgotten that requires journalists, along with other members of the
public, to delete information about expunged arrests because such a
requirement is likely to infringe upon constitutional guarantees, such as
freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of expression.283
277.
278.
279.

Id.

Id. at 93.
Id.; George, supra note 263, at 913.
Melvin, 297 P. at 93.

Had respondents, in the story of ‘The Red Kimono,’ stopped with the use
of those incidents from the life of appellant which were spread upon the record of her
trial, no right of action would have accrued. They went further, and in the formation
of the plot used the true maiden name of appellant. If any right of action exists, it
arises from the use of this true name in connection with the true incidents from her
life together with their advertisements in which they stated that the story of the
picture was taken from true incidents in the life of Gabrielle Darley, who was
Gabrielle Darley Melvin.

280.
Id.
281.
Id. Darley could not have compelled the filmmakers to refrain from using
the information contained in Darley’s trial record in the plot. Id. A right of privacy is different
from right to be forgotten, as a right of privacy is the “‘right to live one’s life in seclusion,
without being subjected to unwarranted and undesired publicity.’” Melvin, 297 P. at 92 (citation
omitted). While a right to be forgotten gives the data subject the “right . . . to obtain from the
operator the deletion of the personal data regarding him or her.” Eugen Chelaru & Marius
Chelaru, Right to Be Forgotten, 16 ANNALES UNIVERSITATIS APULENSIS SERIES JURISPRUDENTIA
26, 31 (2013).
282.
Haber, supra note 8, at 366–67.
283.
See Spanish Claim “Right to be Forgotten” on Web, CBS NEWS (Apr. 20,
2011, 12:34 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/spanish-claim-right-to-be-forgotten-on-web/
(“‘In the United States we have a very strong tradition of free speech freedom of expression.
We would strongly caution against any interpretation of the right to be forgotten that infringes
upon that . . . .’”). The constitutional guarantees that would likely be infringed upon would be
the freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of expression. Id.
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Exploring Narrowly Tailored Solutions for the United States

A right to be forgotten that allows Americans to request the removal
of internet search results concerning information about their private lives that
is inadequate, irrelevant, or no longer relevant may be too broad to conform
with existing American values.284 However, a narrower approach, such as
allowing exonerated arrestees to request that search results concerning their
arrest be delisted from search engines, may be more plausible.285 One scholar
suggested narrowly tailoring a right to be forgotten that allows only
individuals with expunged criminal history records the right to compel online
providers to remove the expunged information from their site, making the
information inaccessible to the public.286 Nevertheless, the scholar explained
that even this narrowly tailored solution might be an unconstitutional
infringement on the First Amendment because requiring online sites to erase
information from their site may constitute censorship of speech and censorship
of the press.287
It has also been suggested that state legislators and governors could
further limit state and local agencies’ initial dissemination of data.288 To
accomplish this, the government could stop selling criminal history
information in bulk and, instead, return to a case-by-case request paradigm by
selling each record separately.289 Thus, the effectiveness of expungement
would improve because records expunged before a record request is made will
not appear in the criminal history information that is sold to data brokers by
the government.290
However, this solution would not increase the
effectiveness of expungement for individuals whose arrest information was
already sold to data collection companies before they were expunged.291 It has
also been argued that because the open approach to criminal records can be
overcome by showing that “closure is essential to preserve higher values and
is narrowly tailored to serve those values,” making only expunged criminal
284.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 371.
285.
See id. at 372 (“If Congress were to impose restrictions based on the content
of criminal history, those restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a state interest of the
highest order and be the least restrictive means available to further the articulated interest.”)
(footnote omitted).
286.
Id. at 370.
287.
Id. at 371.
288.
Id. at 368.
289.
Haber, supra note 8, at 364.
290.
See id. at 352 (discussing that these reports would exclude expunged
records as long as the database of the public office was updated).
291.
Id. at 364.
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records private could be a narrowly tailored solution.292 This solution would
greatly decrease the public’s ability to disseminate expunged arrest
information because once the information is deemed private, publishing the
information may be considered an invasion of privacy.293 However, this
approach only affects the dissemination of arrest information after it is
expunged, which could take years.294 Thus, until the record is expunged, the
information contained in the record can still be legally disseminated and
published on the internet.295
Once the information is on the internet, it is difficult to erase all traces
of it.296 Further, erasing all traces of the expunged information by requiring
nongovernmental sources, such as news outlets, journalists, or other members
of the public, to erase or alter internet publications containing expunged
information likely conflicts with constitutional guarantees.297
Thus, not only is expungement completely ineffective, but most
solutions to improve the effectiveness of expungement are legally impractical
solutions in the United States.298 Therefore, alternative solutions for
decreasing the collateral consequences of an arrest record for innocent
individuals must be explored.299

292.
Id. at 381 (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., Riverside Cnty.,
464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).
293.
See id. at 377–78 (stating if criminal records were considered private
information, that information would not be of public concern); Haber, supra note 8, at 377. The
media can be held liable for publishing true information if that information is not of concern to
the public. See George, supra note 263, at 916.
294.
See Brian M. Murray, Retributive Expungement, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 665,
695 (2021) (stating that some states have begun decreasing waiting periods, Sectionicularly for
non-conviction records correlating to different types of public criminal records); How Long
Does a Florida Expungement Take, ERIC J. DIRGA, P.A., http://ejdirga.com/2018/11/06/floridaexpungement-how-long/ (last updated Aug. 2020) [hereinafter Length of FL Expungement]
(explaining the Florida expungement process will take around seven to ten months once the
application process begins, if no delays occur).
295.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 357 (discussing that publishing criminal records
online is lawful even if a record is expunged because criminal records are considered public
information).
296.
See Nunez v. Pachman, 578 F.3d 228, 229 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that
expunged information is “never truly private” because the criminal record is publicly available
prior to expungement).
297.
Haber, supra note 8, at 338 (“It might be technically impossible to
effectively expunge information in the digital age, and expungement is legally challenging, as
granting individuals a right to compel private companies to expunge their records is a constraint
on freedom of speech, freedom of information, and the freedom of the press.”).
298.
Id.
299.
See Callanan, supra note 4, at 1278.
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A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO LIMIT THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF ARRESTS

Ultimately, it is difficult to retract or eliminate information once it is
disseminated to the public via the internet because (1) the internet remembers
everything300 and (2) requiring the press to retract or remove information
would likely infringe upon First Amendment rights.301 Thus, solutions for
limiting the collateral consequences faced by arrested individuals—later found
to be innocent—must focus on the initial dissemination of arrest records, rather
than eliminating traces of the information after it circulates on the web.302
Therefore, the best solution would be to model the United States’
criminal record system after the EU’s criminal record system by basing the
United States’ criminal record system on convictions rather than arrests.303
Doing so would help decrease the collateral consequences faced by innocent
individuals arrested for crimes that they did not commit and will bolster the
American value of the presumption of innocence.304
In the United States, individuals accused of a crime are supposed to
be innocent until proven guilty.305 Yet, plenty of innocent individuals have a
criminal record.306 Having a criminal record for a mere arrest imposes a
punishment upon innocent individuals by erecting obstacles they must face for
the rest of their lives.307 By making arrest information available only to
government agencies, it will cease to be disseminated to the public, which will
advance protections for innocent arrestees and uphold the presumption of

300.
Haber, supra note 8, at 338.
301.
Id. at 338, 371.
302.
See id. at 380–81 (mentioning that there is precedent in the United States
for limiting initial disclosure of criminal history information as a few states regulate the initial
dissemination of criminal history records).
303.
See Jacobs & Blitsa, supra note 3, at 136–37 (explaining the European
Union’s criminal record system).
304.
See Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 2 (explaining that lingering arrest
records can ruin chances for securing employment, loans, and housing for people who have
never even faced charges or conviction); Uggen et al., supra note 46, at 627 (explaining that the
presumption of innocence has been at the foundation of Anglo-American criminal law since the
eighteenth century, yet criminal records can haunt the accused).
305.
Uggen et al., supra note 46, at 627.
306.
See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1334
(2012) (discussing police tactics that generate arrests of innocent people thus leaving innocent
people with a criminal record); Callanan, supra note 4, at 1278.
307.
See Arrests as Guilt, supra note 7, at 997–98 (explaining that there are
numerous legal consequences from arrests that rely on an assumption of guilt).
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innocence by putting an end to arrests being considered an indication of
guilt.308
A.

Public Safety

Criminal records should be based on criminal convictions rather than
arrests because arrests are not always carried out in response to the
commission of a crime.309 Police are relied on to deal with social and medical
issues causing many individuals—who in some cases should have received an
alternative form of help—to end up in the criminal justice system.310 Further,
individuals are arrested at very high rates in the United States for reasons other
than guilt or dangerousness.311 For example, police may face pressures to
increase their volume of arrests to meet quotas312 or police may also need to
rely on arrests to obtain control of a situation.313 Since many arrests do not
result in criminal charges, basing criminal records on convictions is necessary
to adequately protect innocent arrestees from a lifetime of adversity, resulting
from the presumption that individuals arrested for a crime must be guilty of
something.314 Potential opposition to basing criminal records on convictions,
rather than arrests, may involve public safety concerns.315 The public should
be aware of all criminal activity including alleged criminal activity, regardless
of the outcome.316 However, the government and local police typically do not

fused.”).

Id.

308.

See id. at 997 (“[T]he concepts of arrest and guilt often appear to be

309.

Natapoff, supra note 306, at 1331.

A growing literature indicates that urban police routinely arrest people for reasons
other than probable cause, that high-volume arrest policies such as zero tolerance and
order maintenance create a substantial risk of evidentiarily weak arrests, that
mechanisms for checking whether arrests are based on probable cause are sporadic,
and finally that, if those mechanisms do kick in, police sometimes lie about whether
there was sufficient evidence for an arrest.

310.
Jones & Sawyer, supra note 65.
311.
See Friedman, supra note 63 (“Regardless of race or gender, researchers
estimate that by age [twenty-three] nearly one in three Americans will have been arrested.”).
312.
Natapoff, supra note 306, at 1332; see Arrests as Guilt, supra note 7, at 992
(“[F]actors other than a belief in guilt incentivize police officers to arrest. Law enforcement
officers may experience pressure—external and/or internal—to increase the volume of their
arrests for job advancement (or job preservation).”) (footnotes omitted).
313.
Arrests as Guilt, supra note 7, at 992–93.
314.
Callanan, supra note 4, at 1277–78.
315.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 377.
316.
See id. (“Criminal activity is perceived as a legitimate concern to the public.
Such legitimate concerns extend to any public records and documents. Even alleged criminal
activity falls within this public safety argument . . . .”).
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name those accused of crimes until after they have been arrested, at which
point the public safety concerns have been satisfied with the arrest itself.317
Thus, the public can still be informed about local criminal activity because
police departments can still send out alerts warning the public about criminal
activity in their area.318 Once the individuals are taken into custody, police
departments can still update the public that an individual has been taken into
custody without specifying who the individual is.319 For example, the Boca
Raton Police Department maintains a Twitter account that sends out alerts to
residents such as, “DIXIE HWY temporarily closed in both directions between
Camino Real & SW 18th St due to @bocapolice activity in the immediate
area.”320 The Boca Raton Police Department later follows alerts with updates
such as, “@BocaPolice were assisting @browardsheriff with an arrest warrant.
The suspect barricaded himself in an apartment along the 100 blk of SW 15th
St. Our crisis negotiators responded & the suspect . . . walked out unarmed
and was taken into custody.”321 This shows it is possible to keep the public
safe by informing them about criminal activity in the area without releasing
the name of the arrestee.322
To minimize problems that arise from affording all suspects and
arrestees anonymity, exceptions can be made to account for the fact that
naming a suspect may lead to more victims coming forward or to the discovery
of more evidence.323 Thus, in the interest of justice, a judge could allow
identification of arrestees or suspects in cases where their identification may:
(1) “lead to additional [victims or] complaint[s] coming forward,” (2) “lead to
information that assists [in] the investigation of the offence,” or (3) “lead to
information that assists [in] the arrested [individual’s defense].”324

317.
Sadiq Reza, Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or Suspect: In Search of a
Right, in Need of a Rule, 64 MD. L. REV. 755, 802 (2005).
318.
See id. (discussing that the accused is typically not named until after his or
her arrest, but, if the accused is named before his or her arrest, it is rarely “because the suspect
is dangerous and at large . . . .”).
319.
See id. (explaining that once an arrest has been made, the public safety
concern has been satisfied with the arrest itself, thus naming the individual after arrest does not
advance public safety).
320.
Boca Raton Police (@BocaPolice), TWITTER (July 12, 2021, 6:30 AM),
http://twitter.com/bocapolice/status/1414532640061992962?s=21 [hereinafter Boca PD Alert].
321.
Boca Raton Police (@BocaPolice), TWITTER (July 12, 2021, 9:55 AM),
http://twitter.com/BocaPolice/status/1414584275572297731 [hereinafter Boca PD Update].
322.
See id.
323.
David Malone, At the Cliff Edge...Should Defendants Remain Anonymous
Pre-Charge?, LAW. MONTHLY, http://www.lawyer-monthly.com/2018/08/at-the-cliff-edgeshould-defendants-remain-anonymous-pre-charge/ (last updated Sept. 3, 2018).
324.
Id.
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Also, employers, landlords, and other members of the public should
be warned about potential offenders before employing them, leasing to them,
or befriending them.325 However, an arrest is not a clear indicator that an
individual engaged in criminal conduct or is a potential offender.326 Nonconviction records are “irrelevant” to the public because arrests do not
establish that criminal conduct occurred and are not proof of guilt.327 Further,
many arrests that lead to criminal charges result in the charges being dropped,
dismissed, or otherwise resolved in the defendant’s favor.328 Ultimately, the
public does have a legitimate concern regarding actual criminal activity, but
access to arrest information that did not involve an adjudication of guilt does
not make the public safer since the subject of the information was legally
innocent.329 Further, more than half of employers admitted that their reason
for searching an applicant’s criminal background is to avoid potential “legal
liability rather than to ensure a safe work environment.”330 With the wide
availability of arrest and conviction records, employers that fail to do a
criminal history screening on applicants open themselves up to negligent
hiring lawsuits for failing to perform their due diligence before hiring an
applicant.331 As long as employers have access to criminal history
information, they will seek it to avoid legal liability.332 Once employers obtain
criminal history information, the mere knowledge of a criminal past, even a
mere arrest, plays a role in an employer’s decision-making process.333 Thus,
basing the United States’ criminal record system on convictions rather than
arrests will limit end-users’ exposure to outdated, incorrect, and expunged
325.
Haber, supra note 8, at 377 (discussing that this public safety argument
illustrates the stigmatizing effects of an arrest by indicating that employers, landlords, and
members of the public classify non-convicted arrestees as potential offenders).
326.
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 12; see also Natapoff, supra
note 306, at 1331 (“[P]olice arrest people for a variety of reasons that may or may not involve
probable cause.”).
327.
Haber, supra note 8, at 377.
328.
See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 12.
329.
Haber, supra note 8, at 377.
330.
Friedman, supra note 63 (“According to the Society of Human Resource
Management survey, more than half of employers, [fifty-two] percent, said their primary reason
for checking candidates’ backgrounds was to reduce legal liability rather than to ensure a safe
work environment, [forty-nine] percent, or to assess trustworthiness, [seventeen] percent.”).
331.
Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 197, at 178 (“Private information service
companies warn employers, landlords, hotels, and other businesses that failure to conduct
criminal background checks could result in significant tort liabilities. Consequently, the market
for criminal background checks has increased dramatically.”).
332.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 344 n.44, 351–52, 361.
333.
See id. at 369 (explaining that “mere knowledge of [a] criminal history
[record] could . . . play an important role in the employer’s [hiring process],” as the employer
may “fear potential tort liability for negligent hiring”).
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arrest records and limit employers’ ability to make employment decisions
based on that exposure.334
B.

Public Oversight of the Judiciary

Basing criminal records on convictions, rather than arrests, promotes
the presumption of innocence by ensuring that only guilty individuals obtain
a criminal record.335 Innocent individuals should not have a criminal record
or suffer negative effects in their personal and professional lives for a crime
they did not commit.336
Potential opposition to basing criminal records on convictions, rather
than arrests or non-convictions, may involve governmental transparency
concerns.337 “[A]ny government records deemed public are accessible [to the
public through] the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).”338 If criminal
records were based on convictions, not arrests, then arrests would not be
considered public information, which some fear could lead to a lack of public
oversight allowing for corruption and more unlawful arrests.339 However,
there would still be public oversight and transparency for a few reasons.340
First, there would still be governmental transparency through the court system
because, just like in the EU, court records in the United States would still be
open to the public.341 In the EU, even though both arrest history and conviction
information is private information, court records are still public to allow for
“fair and public trials.”342 While the United States government likely could
not restrict press reporting regarding these public trials like the EU,343
334.
See id. at 368 (discussing that policymakers can limit end-users’, such as
employers’, exposure to expunged records).
335.
See Callanan, supra note 4, at 1278, 1292–93 (discussing that the
presumption of innocence should be permanent for the non-convicted criminal defendant).
336.
See id. at 1292–93 (“Society views a criminal charge as an indication of . .
. guilt regardless of the . . . outcome of the case.”).
337.
Haber, supra note 8, at 378.
338.
Id. at 376; see also Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 522.
339.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 378 (explaining that public oversight helps
ensure that governmental agencies do not abuse their power).
340.
Id. at 379.
341.
See id. at 359 (“[EU] court records must generally be ‘fair and public’ and
. . . judgements must be . . . publicly [announced] . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (explaining that
to be in accordance with the Sixth Amendment, trials in the United States must remain public
because criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to a public trial).
342.
Haber, supra note 8, at 359.
343.
Id.; Calvert & Bruno, supra note 115, at 126 (“[T]he freedom of the press
provided by the First Amendment to journalists allows the news media to freely and truthfully
report on all varieties of criminal matters as watchdogs on government . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
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defendants in the U.S. can be provided anonymity until the conclusion of their
case.344 Individuals found to be innocent after trial will maintain their
anonymity, while individuals convicted after trial will lose their anonymity
and will acquire a public criminal conviction record.345 Public oversight to
maintain the integrity of the court system can still be accomplished while
affording defendants anonymity because: (1) lawyers are typically involved in
the legal process until adjudication, (2) the true names of the lawyers,
prosecutors, and judges will still be available in court proceedings, and (3) the
defendants have the right to appeal their final decisions for appellate court
review.346 Removing identifying information about a criminal defendant from
case records still enables public oversight of the judiciary to ensure proper
decisions are being handed down.347
Currently, basing the criminal record system on arrests does not
necessarily provide the public with any more public oversight or governmental
“transparency” than if arrest records were not considered public criminal
history information because the underlying events of an arrest are accounted
for from the officer’s perspective.348 Arrest information does not necessarily
ensure governmental “transparency” and public oversight of law enforcement
because police reports do not necessarily relay the underlying events of an
arrest with complete accuracy.349
Overall, basing criminal records on convictions will promote the
presumption of innocence while still allowing for public oversight of the
judiciary to ensure that proper decisions are being handed down.350
344.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 380 (“There are a few exceptions to the
American approach towards the publication of criminal records, as court proceedings are not
always open, and the dissemination of personal information is not always permissible.”).
(footnote omitted).
345.
Callanan, supra note 4, at 1305 (discussing that courts could remove
identifying information about defendants when courts find defendants not guilty or dismiss the
case, which protects privacy rights and maintains public access to courts).
346.
Haber, supra note 8, at 379.
347.
Callanan, supra note 4, at 1305.
348.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 378–79; Robert M. Entman & Kimberly A.
Gross, Race to Judgment: Stereotyping Media and Criminal Defendants, L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 2008, at 93, 95–96 (“In covering crime stories, journalists typically rely on
law-enforcement officials’ views, downplaying the defense perspective while minimally
acknowledging the innocence presumption. Thus, news of crime generally exhibits a proprosecution bias, rooted most importantly in this dependence of reporters on official and,
therefore, purportedly credible sources.”) (footnotes omitted).
349.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 378; Arrests as Guilt, supra note 7, at 1019 (“If
a police account is seen as the truth, and if acts are commonly assumed to equal crimes, then
the police account of an alleged act, which can suffice for the purposes of an arrest, may also
be taken as sufficient to establish guilt.”) (footnotes omitted).
350.
See Callanan, supra note 4, at 1305.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, criminal records that consist of mere arrests without a
conviction still erect barriers that may last a lifetime for legally innocent
individuals.351 In a system that values the presumption of innocence, records
of arrests should not be as damaging as records of convictions.352 Yet, arrests
can be just as consequential as convictions in a system that bases its criminal
records on arrests rather than convictions.353 Expungement used to be able to
restore arrestees’ innocent status by effectively making criminal history
records invisible to the public.354 The digital age, however, has gutted the
effectiveness of expungement.355 There are solutions proposed to make
expungement more effective and thus, limit the collateral consequences faced
by innocent individuals with an arrest record.356 Most proposed solutions,
however, have focused on retracting public exposure to arrest information
after that information was already disseminated to CRAs or was already made
public by news reports, social media posts, or mugshot websites.357 Once
information is legally disseminated and published on the internet, later
requiring its removal conflicts with constitutional guarantees like the freedom
of the press and the freedom of speech.358 Thus, proposed solutions like
recognizing a right to be forgotten or implementing laws that make criminal
history information private only after expungement are bound to conflict with
constitutional rights, since these solutions require the erasure of information
that was already lawfully published.359 Ultimately, expungement in the digital
age is merely a symbolic gesture from the government because any attempt to
extend expungement requirements to nongovernmental sources—to make
expungement more effective in the digital age—will likely be deemed a form
of censorship.360
Consequently, the original goal behind expungement statutes—to
make innocent arrestees’ criminal history invisible to the public—must be
satisfied by other means.361 The United States should follow the EU by basing
its criminal record system on convictions rather than arrests to make an
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

See Arrests as Guilt, supra note 7, at 997–98.
See Callanan, supra note 45, at 1308.
Lantz & Minutola, supra note 4, at 12.
Haber, supra note 8, at 348.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 368, 370.
Id. at 370–71.
Westrope, supra note 216, at 375; Calvert & Bruno, supra note 115, at 138.
Haber, supra note 8, at 371.
Corda, supra note 183, at 25.
See Haber, supra note 8, at 347.
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innocent arrestee’s arrest information invisible to the public and to preserve
the presumption of innocence.362 Basing the criminal record system on arrests
has led to a common belief that when an individual is arrested or charged with
a crime, that individual must be guilty of something.363 In reality, arrests are
carried out for many reasons other than as a response to criminal conduct.364
Basing the United States’ criminal record system on convictions rather than
arrests will limit public exposure to innocent individuals’ interactions with the
criminal justice system, which will help preserve their innocence without
compromising public safety or governmental transparency.365
The answer to the age-old question, “if they [were] innocent, why did
they run from the police?”, is quite clear in a country where mere arrests paint
innocent individuals as criminals.366 There are many reasons why innocent
individuals may attempt to evade arrest, including the fact that innocent
individuals want to retain their innocence in a society where arrests can be just
as socially and professionally stigmatizing as convictions.367 In the Land of
the Free, criminal records should be based on guilt rather than accusation.368

362.
Jacobs & Blitsa, supra note 3, at 136–37.
363.
Callanan, supra note 4, at 1278.
364.
Natapoff, supra note 306, at 1331–32.
365.
See Reza, supra note 317, at 803 (footnote omitted); Callanan, supra note
4, at 1305.
366.
See Why Innocent People Fear and Run from the Police,
LEARNABOUTGUNS.COM (Sept. 2, 2020), http://www.learnaboutguns.com/2020/09/02/whyinnocent-people-run-from-the-police/.
367.
See id. (explaining reasons why innocent individuals may run from the
police).
368.
Callanan, supra note 4, at 1278 (discussing that the non-convicted should
not suffer consequences outside of court due to society’s skepticism in the legal outcome).
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INTRODUCTION

“The death penalty is modern lynching; they took me to the tree six times.”
Derrick Jamison2
On October 15, 2021, Nova Southeastern University (“NSU”) Law
Center hosted a virtual symposium titled The Death Penalty in Florida: The
Case Against Death.3 The one-day event presented the case against the use of
the death penalty in Florida and nationwide. The symposium’s panelists
presented information to challenge the continued use of the death penalty. The
event featured nationally recognized activists, advocates, scholars, and
exonerees to discuss the legal and racial issues, in addition to the social, moral,
and financial costs, to highlight the clear dangers of maintaining the death
penalty.
1.
Associate Dean for Diversity, Inclusion, & Public Impact, Director of the
Caribbean Law Program, and Professor of Law.
2.
Race and the Death Penalty in Florida, FLORIDIANS FOR ALTS. TO DEATH
PENALTY, http://www.fadp.org/race-fact-sheet/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2022) (“[Derrick Jamison
is] a Black Florida resident who spent twenty years on Ohio’s death row for a crime someone
else committed. He survived six execution dates before being exonerated and freed.”);
Alexandra
Gross,
Derrick
Jamison,
NAT’L
REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3323
(last
updated July 23, 2020) (“[Derrick Jamison] once came within 90 minutes of execution.”).
3.
The Death Penalty in Florida: The Case Against Death, NSU FLA.
SHEPARD BROAD COLL. L. (Oct. 15, 2021), http://www.law.nova.edu/alumni/2021deathpenalty-symposium.html.

Id.

[This program was] a collaboration of Nova Southeastern University
Shepard Broad College of Law; Members’ Advisory Committee of the Lifelong
Learning Institute from Nova Southeastern University Dr. Kiran C. Patel College of
Osteopathic Medicine; Barry University’s Department of Sociology & Criminology
and Anti-Racism and Equity; Amnesty International USA; Witness to Innocence;
and Floridians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty.
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Florida is one of twenty-four states that has not abolished the death
penalty and has the highest number of exonerees. Dr. Laura Finley, Professor
of Sociology & Criminology at Barry University, presented this information
to lay a foundation for the discussion of the work of Floridians for Alternative
to the Death Penalty (“FADP”). Dr. Finley also discussed the research work
of the Death Penalty Information Center (“DPIC”) to catalogue the methods
of executions still in use in the United States, especially the controversial use
of lethal injections. To close remarks, Dr. Finley noted that sixty two percent
of Floridians favor life imprisonment without parole over the use of the death
penalty.
Mr. Mark Elliott, Executive Director of FADP, noted that the shift in
public opposition to the death penalty is accompanied by an increasing
awareness of the issues attendant to the death sentence, particularly, its
continued inhumane and costly use in Florida and elsewhere. Mr. Elliott noted
that Floridians spend over $50 million per year to maintain the death penalty.
Mr. Elliot discussed the exoneration of Derrick Jamison after Mr. Jamison
survived six execution dates and the youngest people executed by electric
chair in Florida were only sixteen years old, and all four were Black.4
Describing the exoneration of thirty people in Florida as a miracle, Mr. Elliott
urged the event’s attendees to visit FADP’s website and to become involved
in anti-death advocacy groups in Florida.5
A.

Legal Issues Panel Summary

Four speakers on the legal issues panel explored how the laws and
legal system regrettably preserved the death penalty in Florida. Ms. Linda
Harris, an NSU Law alumnus, noted the origins of the death penalty began
with the Code of Hammurabi in the eighteenth century, B.C., and the long
practice of capital punishment in Florida started in 1827 with the execution of
Benjamin Donica. Ms. Harris discussed the evolution in the methods of
execution, which started with hanging individuals, to the electric chair, and
finally to lethal injection. In addition, Ms. Harris chronicled the constitutional
challenges to Florida’s death penalty from Furman v. Georgia,6 through Hurst
v. Florida,7 as well as the 2017 Florida death penalty sentencing statute, §
921.141(2) of the Florida Statutes.8 Further, she pointed out three key issues
4.
Death Row, FLA. DEP’T CORR., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/deathrow.html
(last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
5.
Race and the Death Penalty in Florida, supra note 2.
6.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7.
136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
8.
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (2021).
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with the death penalty: (1) the rate of error; (2) the cost; and (3) racial
disparities. With regard to racial disparities, Ms. Harris stated that in Florida,
prosecutors are three times more likely to seek the death penalty when the
victim is White than when the victim is Black. Furthermore, she emphatically
remarked that never in the history of Florida has a White person been executed
for the killing of a Black person.9
The next speaker on the legal issues panel, Mr. Jonathan Perez, a thirdyear law student at NSU Law, Goodwin Alumni Editor, and Articles Editor
for the Nova Law Review, discussed the death penalty’s lack of deterrent
effect. Mr. Perez addressed this topic in 2020 through his Note published in
the Nova Law Review titled Barbaric Retributivism: New Hampshire and
Washington Are Two of the Latest States to Abolish the Death Penalty. Here
Is Why Florida Should Follow Suit.10 Mr. Perez’s Note provides data showing
that the abolition of the death penalty directly correlates with a decrease in
murder rates in jurisdictions where it had since been abolished.11 In his Note,
Mr. Perez analyzed a 2018 study that compared eleven different countries that
abolished the death penalty.12 The results of the study concluded that there
was an average decline of nearly six murders per 100,000 per year amongst
the eleven countries that participated in the study.13 Similarly, in the United
States since 1999, death penalty states have experienced a twenty-eight
percent higher average murder rate as compared to non-death penalty states.
Therefore, using the results from both this data and the 2008 survey discussed
above, one could reasonably conclude that the death penalty does not deter
people from murder.
Brian Stull, Senior Staff Attorney for the American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”) Capital Punishment Project and the third speaker on this
panel, posited a new beginning in the battle for justice within the criminal
9.
There is some dispute over this assertion. See JAMES M. DENHAM, A
ROGUE’S PARADISE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ANTEBELLUM FLORIDA, 1821–1861, 139 (2005)
(stating that Ferdinand McCaskill was executed for killing a Black man in 1857); David Moye,
Florida Executes White Man for Killing Black Victim For the First Time Ever, HUFFPOST (Aug.
24,
2017,
4:52
PM),
http://www.huffpost.com/entry/mark-asay-executedflorida_n_599f2403e4b05710aa5ad65b (reporting the execution of Mark Asay by lethal
injection on August 24, 2017 for “two racially motivated, premeditated murders . . . .”).
10.
Jonathan Perez, Note, Barbaric Retributivism: New Hampshire and
Washington Are Two of the Latest States to Abolish the Death Penalty. Here Is Why Florida
Should Follow Suit, 45 NOVA L. REV. 115 (2020).
11.
Id. at 133.
12.
Id.; see ABDORRAHMAN BOROUMAND CTR., WHAT HAPPENS TO MURDER
RATES WHEN THE DEATH PENALTY IS SCRAPPED? A LOOK AT ELEVEN COUNTRIES MIGHT
SURPRISE YOU (2018), http://www.iranrights.org/library/document/3501.
13.
Perez, supra note 10, at 133; see ABDORRAHMAN BOROUMAND CTR., supra
note 12.
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punishment system. Recalling the right to a jury as postulated by Sir William
Blackstone in his commentaries, Mr. Stull evoked the lofty promise of the right
to a unanimous jury in death penalty cases. Mr. Stull noted the United States
Supreme Court’s rejection in 2020 of state statutes that permitted nonunanimous jury verdicts in death penalty cases.14 Mr. Stull explained that for
forty years, Florida allowed non-unanimous jury verdicts for death sentences,
and these verdicts resulted in ninety-two executions. The Florida Supreme
Court struck down this practice in 2016,15 and in 2017 the Florida Legislature
amended § 921.141(2) of the Florida Statutes to require unanimous jury
decisions for the death sentence.16 Mr. Stull made note that this statutory
amendment did not grant relief to all 290 people currently sitting on death row
following a non-unanimous jury verdict. Of those individuals, only 157
received relief under the new statutes because their cases were not final until
after June 2002.
The final issue that Mr. Stull raised was the disqualification of jurors
who oppose the death penalty. This disqualification excludes twice as many
Black jurors as White jurors. As a result, he concluded that death qualification
is not race neutral, and therefore perpetuates racism in the criminal justice
system.
The final speaker on the legal issues panel, Melissa Minsk Donoho,
Chief Assistant and Managing Attorney for the Florida Regional Conflicts
Counsel Office, shared her experiences working on death penalty cases in
Broward County, Florida. Ms. Donoho stated that her office is working on ten
death penalty cases and five Hurst resentencing cases. Based on her practice,
Ms. Donoho opined that the change of Broward State Attorney has not yielded
the progressive changes once anticipated, and that she is not optimistic those
changes will occur. For example, a newly created Death Review Panel has
denied all four of her offices’ requests to avoid seeking the death sentence.
While remarking that these results were disheartening, Ms. Donoho noted the
legislature has not yet amended the requirement of a unanimous jury in Florida
Statute § 921.141, even though the Florida Supreme Court backtracked on this
requirement in 2020.17 Ms. Donoho ended the discussion stating “[t]he death
penalty is certainly not the way [that] we as a society should treat people.”

14.
Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 44 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam).
15.
Id.
16.
S.B. 280, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017).
17.
State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 503–04 (Fla. 2020) (per curiam) (holding
that § 921.141(3)(b) does not require “a finding of fact, but a moral judgment” and thus is not
subject to the Hurst v. State requirement of a unanimous jury recommendation).
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Keynote Address by Sister Helen Prejean

In the keynote address, Sister Helen Prejean, Founder of the Ministry
Against the Death Penalty, shared her experiences recounted in Dead Man
Walking: An Eyewitness Account of the Death Penalty in the United States.18
Sister Prejean recounted her experiences corresponding with, counseling, and
witnessing the execution of Robert Lee Willie, and stated that the experience
changed her life’s work. She reflected, “[t]he journey in Dead Man Walking
is the journey into the deep moral ambivalence that most of us feel about the
death penalty.”
Sister Prejean noted that although her observation of Robert Lee
Willie’s execution was overwhelming, this experience led her to study and
read about death penalty issues as well as interacting with anti-death penalty
and human rights activists. Thereafter, she came to realize that the American
public needs to deal morally with the death penalty, but unfortunately most
Americans have not thought about it. Initially her book was going to deal with
the facts showing how racism and poverty put people on death row. Instead,
with the urging of her editor, the book details her emotional and spiritual
journey.
Sister Prejean noted that while there is power in storytelling, it is
important to talk to people to convey the journey more fully “from the outrage
of the crime and the suffering of the victims’ families into the horror of the
execution chamber.” In her story, she also acknowledges her own mistake of
not initially talking to the victims’ families. In her contact with the victims’
parents, Sister Prejean learned that victims’ families can be angry and remain
in that state or can transform so that they can forgive. By sharing her journey,
Sister Prejean hoped to awaken the public to the death penalty, the nature of
mercy, and the path of forgiveness.
Sister Prejean then discussed what happens when political rhetoric
demonizes murderers who commit atrocious crimes and noted that this
political rhetoric has found its way into United States Supreme Court cases
like Gregg v. Georgia.19 She remarked that even in those cases, prosecutors
still do not need to seek the death penalty, and in fact, if they did not, this
change alone would end the use of the death penalty.
Sister Prejean stated, “all human beings have the potential to change.”
From a faith perspective, “that is the divine spark within us”; from a human

OF THE

1993).

18.
SISTER HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: THE EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT
DEATH PENALTY THAT SPARKED A NATIONAL DEBATE (Random House, Inc., N.Y.,
19.

428 U.S. 153 (1976).

132

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

rights perspective, “that is the inalienable right to life.” A discussion on the
evolution of consciousness on the death penalty within the Catholic Church
and the global community followed. In 1948, when the United Nations
proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, few nations had
abolished the death penalty.20 Today, 108 out of 195 nations no longer have
the death penalty.21 Following this humanitarian trend, Pope Francis revised
the Catechism of the Roman Catholic Church in 2018 to proclaim, “the death
penalty is inadmissible because it is an attack on the inviolability and dignity
of the person.”22
Despite this global status, nearly half of the United States retains the
death penalty.23 Changing this trend requires education, especially for district
attorneys and jurors. Sister Prejean noted that public pressure was key to
convincing a district attorney not to pursue the death penalty for a mentally ill
person who killed two priests in Pueblo, Colorado. Similarly, Sister Prejean
noted the importance of educating jurors on their rights and how they do not
have to be pressured into voting for a death sentence
The discussion emphasized that jurors need to be aware that the death
penalty is broken because, among other things, there are currently 185 people
who were wrongfully convicted, sent to death row, and later exonerated.24
Innocent defendants assume they will not be convicted, but the prosecutors
possess the evidence. More than ninety percent of wrongful death penalty
convictions result from prosecutorial misconduct.
It is important to recognize the deep racism in the criminal justice
system. Sister Prejean said, “[t]here is a direct line between slavery, lynching,
mass incarceration, and the death penalty.” Currently in the United States,
nearly fifty-eight percent of death row prisoners are People of Color while
20.
Limiting the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/history-of-the-death-penalty/limiting-the-deathpenalty (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
21.
Death Penalty, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnesty.org/en/what-wedo/death-penalty/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
22.
Letter from the Off. of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith to the
Bishops
(Aug.
2,
2018),
http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2018/08/02/180802b.pdf.
23.
States with the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Bans, and Death Penalty
Moratoriums, BRITANNICA PROCON.ORG, http://deathpenalty.procon.org/states-with-the-deathpenalty-and-states-with-death-penalty-bans/ (last updated Mar. 24, 2021) (noting that twentyfour states retain the death penalty, three states have death penalty moratoria, and twenty-three
states and the District of Columbia have abolished the death penalty).
24.
Innocence, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policyissues/innocence (last visited Mar. 25, 2022) (“Since 1973, at least 186 people who had been
wrongly convicted and sentenced to death in the U.S. have been exonerated.”).
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forty-two percent are White.25 Moreover, Sister Prejean emphasized that of
the people executed since 1977, “eight out of ten of them were put to death
because they killed a White person.”26
Next, Sister Prejean commented on the impact of the defense
counsel’s competence. Sister Prejean recounted the example of Dobie Gillis
Williams, a Black man who was convicted of the murder of a White woman.27
Defense counsel in that case failed to raise an objection to the seating of an
all-White jury and thus failed to preserve the issue for appeal.28 Sister Prejean
recognized that poor people cannot choose their lawyers; rather, they “have to
take any lawyer they are given.” Rich defendants, on the other hand, do not
go to death row because the district attorney will not want to fight that battle
against a wealthy defendant who can mount a formidable defense. In those
cases, the district attorneys will offer a plea bargain to avoid losing on
numerous pretrial motions. Still, Sister Prejean heralded public defenders as
heroes, especially those who represent defendants out of principle and who
fight against the death penalty.
Near the end of her talk, Sister Prejean stated that while we are
working toward shutting down the death penalty in this country, there have
been many setbacks, particularly during the Trump Administration.29 From
2020 to 2021, there were thirteen federal executions after a seventeen-year
hiatus.30 Sister Prejean noted that these thirteen executed prisoners did not just
die; they were killed. The execution of Lisa Montgomery, on January 13,
2021, was particularly tragic.31 Ms. Montgomery was a mentally ill woman

25.
NGOZI NDULUE, ENDURING INJUSTICE: THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN THE U.S. DEATH PENALTY 28–29 (Robert Dunham ed., 2020),
http://documents.deathpenaltyinfo.org/pdf/Enduring-Injustice-Race-and-the-Death-Penalty2020.pdf.
26.
See id. at 29–30 (stating that two-hundred and ninety-five Black prisoners
were executed for the murder of White victims, compared to twenty-one White prisoners
executed for the murders of Black victims).
27.
SISTER HELEN PREJEAN, THE DEATH OF INNOCENTS: ANY EYEWITNESS
ACCOUNT OF WRONGFUL EXECUTIONS 18–19 (Canterbury Press 2005).
28.
Id. at 20.
29.
‘This is Not Justice’ — Federal Execution Spree Ends with Planned
Execution of African-American on Martin Luther King Jr’s Birthday, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR. (Jan. 18, 2021), http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/this-is-not-justice-federal-executionspree-ends-with-planned-execution-of-african-american-on-martin-luther-king-jr-s-birthday.
30.
Id.; Chaos Surrounds Attempts to Resume Federal Executions, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR. (July 13, 2020), http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/chaos-surroundsattempts-to-resume-federal-executions.
31.
‘This is Not Justice’ — Federal Execution Spree Ends with Planned
Execution of African-American on Martin Luther King Jr’s Birthday, supra note 29.
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whose execution was pushed back from December 2020 to just a week before
President Biden took office on January 20, 2021.32
Sister Prejean exclaimed “we, as a nation, are waking up” due to
education about racism and the testimony of death row exonerees. On March
24, 2021, Virginia was the twenty-third state—and the first southern state—to
abolish the death penalty.33 This change in consciousness arose out of the
efforts of Virginians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, George Floyd’s
murder, Black Lives Matter, and the moving of Confederate monuments.34
Prior to this abolition, Sister Prejean stated, Virginia, the largest and longestlasting slave state, carried out more executions than any state in the history of
our nation.35
Sister Prejean claims the seeds that were sowed in Virginia to
eliminate the death penalty are now being sown in Florida. It is important to
educate Floridians about how broken the death penalty system is and to raise
the moral and economic issues. Hopefully, through these efforts, the death
penalty will soon end in Florida.
C.

Racial Issues Panel Summary

Ngozi Ndulue, Director of Research and Special Projects, Death
Penalty Information Center, started the racial issues discussion by introducing
a September 2020 Death Penalty Information Center Report titled, Enduring
Injustice: The Persistence of Racial Discrimination in the U.S. Death
Penalty.36 Ms. Ndulue notes that the report examines the racial history of the
death penalty and explores the role that race continues to play in the death
penalty.37 As shown in the report, the victim’s race is a key factor that
determines whether a person convicted of murder receives the death penalty.38
Ms. Ndulue points out that the roots of this phenomena arose from the colonial

32.
33.

Id.
Virginia Becomes 23rd State and the First in the South to Abolish the Death
Penalty,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.
(Mar.
24,
2021),
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/virginia-becomes-23rd-state-and-the-first-in-the-south-toabolish-the-death-penalty.
34.
Madeleine Carlisle, Why It’s So Significant Virginia Just Abolished the
Death Penalty, TIME (Mar. 24, 2021, 3:24 PM), http://time.com/5937804/virginia-deathpenalty-abolished/.
35.
See id.
36.
See NDULUE, supra note 25, at 1.
37.
Id.
38.
Id. at 3.
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South where “very specific and specified differential crimes . . . would result
in the death penalty.”39
Although the death penalty and lynching have had a disproportionate
effect on Black people, it also affected other ethnic groups such as Native
Americans and Mexican Americans. In the United States–Dakota war, thirtyeight men were executed on December 26, 1862, the largest mass execution in
United States history.40 Similarly, the westward expansion of the United
States resulted in “hundreds of lynchings and episodes of mob violence that
occurred in the Southwest between 1848 and 1928.”41 Ms. Ndulue emphasized
that there is a “connection between legal executions, lynchings, and mob
violence.” Thus, lynchings were treated as an alternative to legal executions.42
This connection is illustrated in the story of the Groveland Four that
is depicted in Devil in the Grove: Thurgood Marshall, the Groveland Boys,
and the Dawn of a New America.43 The book discusses the intersection
between mob violence and the death penalty.44 It also shows the duplicity of
law enforcement’s alternate roles in preventing, allowing, and even
participating in mob violence.45 Ms. Ndulue noted, “[t]hese multiple roles
played by law enforcement were sometimes the only hope for some type of
protection and safety, not actually being that for the Black community at that
time, until today.”
As shown in the Devil in the Grove, the work of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense Fund
(“NAACP LDF”) initially started to advocate for the civil rights of Black men
who were being punished for alleged rapes or sexual improprieties to White
women.46 For example, a Virginia study showed that between 1930 and 1969,
eighty-percent of the executed prisoners were Black men and that only Black
men were executed for rape or attempted rape.47 Accordingly, the NAACP
LDF broadened its focus from getting legal representation for Black men
facing executions to challenging the entire death penalty system.48

39.
See id.
40.
Id. at 23.
41.
NDULUE, supra note 25, at 25.
42.
See id. at 26.
43.
GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE: THURGOOD MARSHALL, THE
GROVELAND BOYS, AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA 1 (2012).
44.
Id. at 10.
45.
Id. at 149.
46.
Id. at 10.
47.
Id. at 19; see also Note, Capital Punishment in Virginia, 58 VA. L. REV. 97,
114 (1972).
48.
KING, supra note 43, at 12.
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These challenges to the death penalty led to United States Supreme
Court cases that included a tacit recognition of the role of race in the
application of the death penalty and how that phenomenon relates to
extrajudicial killings.49 Historically, those southern counties with the largest
number of lynchings have the highest number of legal executions.
This connection is also evident in the race of the victim and execution.
Ms. Ndulue reported that in “about [seventy five percent] of the cases in which
there has been an execution, the victim in the case was White” even though
about half of the homicide victims were White.50 Thus, the punishment for
murder differs based on the race of the person killed.
Ms. Ndulue highlighted the fact that the complexion of the defendant
is relevant when the victim is White. A study in Philadelphia showed that
defendants with “more traditionally stereotypically African American traits”
such as a darker complexion, broader lips, and kinkier hair, were more likely
to get the death penalty than defendants with lighter skin and other less
stereotypically African American features.51 Ms. Ndulue concluded that not
just race but racial stereotypes play a role in the criminal justice system.
Finally, Ms. Ndulue explained that race plays a clear role at trial.
First, death qualification ensures the selection of jurors “with more anti-Black
racial bias” and excludes jurors of color. Second, a less diverse jury is more
likely to convict a defendant of color and is less receptive to mitigating
evidence. As a result, Ms. Ndulue noted “a majority of folks who are having
their cases . . . reversed based on intellectual disability are People of Color.”
Finally, it takes more time for the exoneration of Black defendants convicted
of murder and there is more jail time for Black exonerees after being
wrongfully convicted.52
The second speaker on the racial issues panel, Dr. Matthew Barry
Johnson, Associate Professor of Psychology at John Jay College of Criminal
Justice, started by discussing his anti-death penalty work in New Jersey
starting in the early 2000s.53 Dr. Johnson worked on a campaign that led to
the abolition of the death penalty in New Jersey in 2007.54 Through this work,
Dr. Barry noticed convergences between anti-death penalty movements and
49.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242, 310 (1972) (per curiam); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168 (1976).
50.
NDULUE, supra note 25, at 29.
51.
Id. at 46.
52.
Id. at 48.
53.
Matthew B. Johnson, Member, Nat’l Ass’n of Black Psych., New Jersey
Resolution to Abolish the Death Penalty (July 2022), in 46 PSYCH DISCOURSE, Fall 2012.
54.
New Jersey Abolishes the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Dec.
11, 2007), http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/new-jersey-abolishes-the-death-penalty.
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movements against mass incarceration and police brutality.55 All of these
efforts, including working for victims’ rights, are part of the fight for criminal
justice reform.
After New Jersey’s abolition of the death penalty, Dr. Johnson
focused his research on wrongful conviction and published a book in 2021
titled Wrongful Conviction in Sexual Assault: Stranger Rape, Acquaintance
Rape, and Intra-familial Child Sexual Assaults.56 His book focused on the fact
that the primary reason for exoneration is the wrongful conviction for sexual
assault.57 In this book Dr. Johnson links this phenomenon to “the history of
lynching and discrimination against African American defendants.”
Next, Dr. Johnson recognized three African-American freedom
fighters who were anti-death penalty activists—Frederick Douglass, Thurgood
Marshall, and Coretta Scott King. Frederick Douglass, a well-known slavery
abolitionist, was also an anti-death penalty advocate. At the same time that
Mr. Douglas was working against slavery, he also campaigned against state
executions. In particular, Dr. Johnson recited and discussed a resolution made
by Frederick Douglass at an Anti-Capital Punishment Meeting in Rochester,
New York, in 1858.
Similarly, Thurgood Marshall fought life and death battles to argue
against the death penalty in the United States Supreme Court. Dr. Johnson
also focused on a famous passage from Justice Marshall’s dissent in Gregg v.
Georgia.58 Dr. Johnson surmised that Justice Marshall’s statement about the
death penalty in that case reflected the Justice’s awareness of “racial bias and
hostility” and “the selfish ambitions of prosecutors and politicians.” Dr.
Johnson also believed that this statement reflected the Justice’s understanding
that the death penalty was “arbitrarily applied” and thus “inherently cruel.”
Finally, Dr. Johnson discussed Coretta Scott King’s anti-death penalty
advocacy. In 1981, Mrs. King opposed the death penalty and provided three
reasons. First, Mrs. King stated that the death penalty makes it impossible to
reverse miscarriages of justice. Second, capital punishment assumes there is
no redemption for the murder. Third, Mrs. King noted the racial inequities in
the imposition of the death penalty. Dr. Johnson concluded by stating that
although he drew inspiration from the three persons mentioned, the work of
many others could have also been highlighted.

55.
STRANGER RAPE,
(2021).
56.
57.
58.

MATTHEW BARRY JOHNSON, WRONGFUL CONVICTION IN SEXUAL ASSAULT:
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE, AND INTRA-FAMILIAL CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULTS 77
Id.
Id. at xi.
428 U.S. 153, 231–241 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The final speaker, Kristina Roth, Senior Advocate for the Criminal
Justice Program of Amnesty International USA, discussed the forty-year effort
of her organization to abolish the death penalty globally and the fact that the
United States is the “only active executioner in the Americas.” Like the earlier
speakers, Ms. Roth noted racism in the death penalty’s roots and the criminal
justice system. Ms. Roth explained that racism impacts the trials of Black
defendants, results in bias in the jury, and supports the arbitrary application of
the death penalty.
Ms. Roth then discussed the importance of studies that show
disparities in the capital punishment system. Ms. Roth noted a study from
1976 to 2021 that showed that Black people were thirty-four percent of those
executed and that today, fifty-eight percent of the inmates on death row are
People of Color.59 All-White juries sentenced some of the Black men
convicted, and many of those on federal death row were sentenced after the
1994 wide-reaching expansion of the Federal Death Penalty Act.
Also, in 1994, Congress considered the Racial Justice Act,60 which
would have allowed challenges to a death sentence based on evidence of racial
discrimination in its administration. These acts have been enacted in various
states, including Kentucky, North Carolina, and California, except that North
Carolina repealed its statute.61 In 2021, advocates sought to make such
legislation retroactive, but Ms. Roth noted that such efforts have been
unsuccessful.
Ms. Roth reported that although some cases and legislation have been
fruitful, the death penalty in the United States is still racially biased. This bias
violates the “right to freedom from discrimination and the right to equal
protection of the law.” Moreover, under the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the United States has an obligation to
“respect, protect, and fulfill these rights.”62 Thus, racial bias is one of many
reasons that Amnesty International opposes the death penalty in the United
States.
59.
Executions by Race and Race of Victim, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/executions-overview/executions-by-race-and-race-ofvictim (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
60.
Racial Justice Act, H.R. 4017, 103d Cong. (1994).
61.
Kentucky Racial Justice Act, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.300–532.309;
North Carolina Racial Justice Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2010 (2009), repealed by Act of June
19, 2013, ch. 154, § 5(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 368, 372; California Racial Justice Act, CAL.
PEN. CODE § 745 (West 2021).
62.
See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 5, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
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D.
Closing Comments: Florida’s Regrettable History with the Death
Penalty
Florida’s long history with the death penalty is laced with racism and
subjugation. From 1608 to 2002, almost sixty-three percent of those executed
in Florida were Black, and thirty-five percent were White.63 In addition, for
executions between 1976 and 2014, seventy-two percent were for crimes
involving White homicide victims even though only fifty-six percent of all
homicide victims during that period were White.64 Moreover, “[h]omicides
involving White female victims are six and a half times more likely to result
in an execution than homicides involving Black male victims.”65 This
information supported the conclusion that “the race and the gender of the
victim is a determining factor in deciding who faces execution in Florida,” and
on that basis, “Florida’s death penalty system is arbitrary.”66
The intersections of race and the death penalty are tragically apparent
in the case of Celia, a biracial woman who murdered a White master on
December 10, 1847.67 According to historical accounts, Jacob Bryan was her
master and father.68 There was also speculation that Mr. Bryan was the father
of Celia’s four children.69 Celia, who had no last name on record, killed Jacob
Bryan five years after freeing Celia and the rest of his slaves.70
Purportedly, the incident took place after Mr. Bryan attempted to
discipline Celia.71 Mr. Bryan tried to punish Celia, who at the time was
making a hoe-handle with an instrument called a drawing knife.72 Celia tried
to resist with the hoe-handle and later struck Mr. Bryan in the head with the
drawing knife, killing him instantly.73

63.
The ESPY List: US Executions 1608–2002, BRITANNICA PROCON.ORG,
http://deathpenalty.procon.org/us-executions/ (last updated Aug. 19, 2021).
64.
Frank R. Baumgartner, The Impact of Race, Gender, and Geography on
Florida
Executions,
UNIV.
N.C.
CHAPEL
HILL
(Jan.
14,
2016),
http://fbaum.unc.edu/articles/Baumgartner-Florida-executions-Jan2016.pdf.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 6.
67.
H. Franklin Robbins, Jr. & Steven G. Mason, Florida’s Forgotten
Execution: The Strange Case of Celia, FLA. SUP. CT. HIST. REV., Spring/Summer 2014 at 9, 9–
10; In re Estate of Jacob Bryan, No. 47-99B (Fla. Duval County Probate Ct. 1847).
68.
Robbins & Mason, supra note 67, at 9.
69.
Id.
70.
Id. (“On November 25, 1842 . . . Jacob Bryan executed a ‘deed of
manumission’ whereby he freed all the slaves who comprised his family.”).
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
Robbins & Mason, supra note 67, at 9.
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Judge Thomas Douglas, the first judge of Florida’s Eastern Circuit
Court, presided over Celia’s trial in the spring of 1848.74 The jury found her
guilty of manslaughter but made a recommendation of clemency.75 Despite
the jury’s recommendation, Judge Douglas sentenced Celia to death on May
26, 1848.76 Judge Douglas may have felt legally compelled to pronounce a
death sentence based on the 1840 territorial slave code.77 After Celia’s
sentencing, appeals were made to Florida’s Governor, William D. Moseley, to
exercise clemency before Celia’s scheduled hanging on August 11, 1848.78
Even though the Governor delayed Celia’s execution until September 22,
1848, no action was taken to set aside Celia’s death sentence. Celia was
hanged at noon on the execution date.79
Like many of the death penalty cases discussed during this
symposium, Celia’s implicitly racist and tragic case elicits a sense of dread
based on Celia’s life circumstances and the arbitrariness of the death
sentence.80 As similarly shown in modern statistics, Celia was sentenced
because she was a Black woman who killed a White person.81 Although Celia
may have received adequate representation, that assistance did not save her.82
Indeed, according to newspaper accounts, there was concern that granting
Celia clemency could embolden other enslaved Blacks to do the same to their
White masters.83
The abolition of Florida’s death penalty is long overdue. Based on
statistics, it is clear that the death penalty punishes African American
defendants more frequently for killing White victims. This phenomenon has
a lineage that rests in racism, slavery, slave codes, and lynchings. The death
penalty uses unjust and arbitrary punishment in a criminal justice system that
imposes disproportionate sentences on Black defendants, excludes people of
color from juries, and nullifies exculpatory and mitigating circumstances.
74.
Id. at 10; In re Estate of Jacob Bryan, No. 47-99B (Fla. Duval County
Probate Ct. 1847).
75.
Robbins & Mason, supra note 67, at 9.
76.
Id.
77.
Id. (“[I]f any slave, free Negro or mulatto, shall be guilty of man-slaughter
of any white person . . . they shall suffer death.” (alteration and omission in original)) (citing
An Act Relating to Crimes and Misdemeanors Committed by Slaves, Free Negroes and
Mulattoes, § 38, 1828 Fla. Laws 174).
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
See Robbins & Mason, supra note 67, at 12.
81.
Id. at 9; see also Racial Demographics, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/overview/demographics (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
82.
Robbins, Jr. & Mason, supra note 67, at 9.
83.
See id.
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This one-day conference featured nationally recognized activists, advocates,
and scholars to make this case against death. The evidence is in, and the case
is closed. At last, it is time to render the final verdict against the death penalty
in Florida and elsewhere.
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INTRODUCTION

DR. PHYLLIS SCOTT: Good morning. I am honored to have the
opportunity to welcome each of you to this important event. Those attending
this event, thank you for taking the time to join in the conversation and
contributing to a dialogue on a subject that has, over the years, aroused heated
debates; taken the lives of innocents; cost taxpayers millions of dollars [in]
funds that could have been used in other progressive ways; deepened
discriminatory practices; and in many states, including Florida, violated the
Constitution.
The rule issued by our courts [is] that the death penalty does not
invariably violate the Constitution if administered in a manner designed to
guard against arbitrariness and discrimination. Many states agreed, including
Florida. This statement, rendered in a society where institutionalized racism
is entrenched throughout the halls of justice—and in a society that has held
little regard for the poor—was painfully laughable. That one statement gave
way for minority groups and the poor to be further victimized; yet the debate
actually continues. That one statement needs to be reexamined, and I am so
glad you are all gathered here to have that conversation.
Despite all of the debates, what cannot be debated is that this form of
punishment does not deter crime. What cannot be debated is [that] the
economic inequalities and inequities [are] to the disadvantage of the poor.
What cannot be debated is that there is a disproportionate number of persons
from minorit[y] groups sitting on death row, who have, in the past, also been
executed. What cannot be debated is the cost of such penalties. It is
extraordinary to our society. We are better than this. Thus, what can be
debated is whether, as a society, are we striving to cultivate a fair and just
society. What can be debated is [the] price are we willing to pay for change.
On behalf of the Barry University Anti-Racism and Equity Coalition,
I welcome you to this forum and hope you walk away enlightened, inspired,
and with a stronger commitment to stand up for justice. Thank you.
DR. LAURA FINLEY: I just wanted to give us an introductory sense
of where we are at with the death penalty in the United States. [The death
penalty] is a centuries old practice. It has been found in many historic societies
and came to the [pre-United States] colonies through practices the colonists
were accustomed to in England and other places. However, there has always
been opposition to the death penalty, and in fact, I am quite proud to say that
my home state of Michigan was the first state in the United States to abolish
the death penalty in 1846. Since then, there have been surges, or waves, in
abolition of the death penalty.
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There are a variety of methods of execution, and as Dr. Scott
mentioned briefly, there are a lot of issues with the death penalty, some of
which we are going to touch on and some we probably would not give as much
attention to, not because they are not important, but simply because you can
only do so much in a six-hour window on an issue that is super complex. As
Dr. Scott mentioned, there are cost-related issues, issues of arbitrariness—
these may come up a little bit, but [are] not always the focus of our efforts but
they are important.
One of the controversial issues now is the methods that we use to
execute people. This [information] is from the Death Penalty Information
Center—a wonderful resource about everything death penalty. [Of] the
primary methods of execution most commonly used in the United States, it is
most often lethal injection.14 Several states still authorize use of electrocution,
lethal gas, hanging, and firing squads; those are used far less frequently, but
may be still authorized in those states.15
[The use of lethal injection as a method of execution] is controversial
in many ways, but one of those is that the protocols involve use of three
different chemicals, one of which is very hard to acquire right now. One of the
reasons it is hard to acquire because it is primarily produced in places that now
oppose the death penalty. A lot of this particular chemical comes from the
European Union. The European Union has outlawed the death penalty and
said we do not want to send those chemicals to the United States for use of
execution. Several pharmaceutical companies in the United States that
produce these kinds of chemicals have also said we no longer want to
participate in this. That is leading to a shortage of the chemicals being used
for lethal injection, which would seemingly be a good thing, because it might
tell states, hey maybe just do not do it, maybe do not execute people. Instead,
[those states are] using dubious methods of acquiring some of these chemicals
and/or turning back to some of these older methods, like firing squad. In some
cases, lethal gas like cyanide is being proposed to be used more, for instance
in Arizona. That is harkening back to things that happened during the
Holocaust. It is a very disturbing trend. This is where we are today in terms
of states that retain the death penalty and methods that are being used.
One thing that is important is that in Florida, most people do not
support the death penalty, or they support life in prison without parole as
opposed to a death sentence [for] crimes that would make someone eligible
for a death sentence. [According to Floridians for Alternatives to the Death
14.
Authorized Methods by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/methods-of-execution/authorized-methods-by-state
(last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
15.
Id.
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Penalty (FADP),] sixty two percent of Floridians now favor life without parole
as opposed to an execution. If public opinion is what we want to base our
policy on, [then our policy in not following public opinion] in the state of
Florida.
MARK ELLIOTT:
Public opinion has shifted and there is a
growing awareness. We have known for some time that the end of the death
penalty in Florida is inevitable. What is now becoming clear is it is going to
happen sooner, rather than later. I have been working on this probably twenty
years now and I have seen an acceleration recently that is just mind blowing
as far as the people and the organizations coming together, and [the]
networking and planning on this. Underlying it all is—there is a saying I heard
once—the more you know about the death penalty, the less you like it. That
was true for me; that has been true for almost anyone that find[s] out more
about the death penalty.
That is why this event today is so exciting. You are going to hear from
people with a variety of perspectives, a lot of them with direct experiences, on
the death penalty. This event provides the chance to learn more and to really
find out how this affects people in all walks of life. Criminal legal reform or
criminal justice reform is a hot issue today.
The death penalty is the linchpin that sits on top of criminal justice
reform efforts. The death penalty is totally about punishment; it is not about
redemption, reform, rehabilitation, or restoration. Bryan Stevenson, the
Director of the Equal Justice Initiative in Montgomery, Alabama, said it well:
“Only in a state where the government is intoxicated with the power to kill,
would a sentence of life in prison without parole seem like leniency.” That is
the reality for things below this to get new looks, new energy, and new
reforms; the death penalty has to come off the top of it. This is what holds it
all back.
To find out more about Florida’s death penalty, please visit the
http://www.fadp.org website. There are actions you can take—there is a lot
going on right now—we have fact sheets available; we have sign on letters for
murders of family members, law enforcement, a variety of different groups
and perspectives. Speaking of groups, we have a page we just put up: a
preliminary list of groups that support ending the death penalty in Florida. If
you belong to a group who supports ending the death penalty (or would),
please get in touch with us. Our email address is at the bottom of every page
on our site. Let us know. We will send you a form. We will get you added
to that list.
One of the issues going to be raised today that strikes me is, if I
supported the death penalty, and I found out that one innocent person was on
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death row, that would be it for me. I could never support a government
program that would kill innocent people and a lot of times arbitrarily. In
Florida, we have thirty innocent people who have been released from death
row, most of them with a lot of opposition to from the state. It was a miracle,
and a lot of times, it was just luck, a lot of work and pro bono attorneys and so
forth, and people writing notes with the little teeny pencils they have in the
cell to try to get some attention to their predicament of being on death row for
a crime that someone else committed. It happens a lot and it happens more in
Florida than any other state.
You are going to hear from some of those folks today. They are
extraordinary and their stories are powerful. This is the reality. That is what
people do not always know and understand is the reality of it: this system does
not work the way most people think it does; it is the worst of the worst. It just
does not work that way. The main thing people on death row have in common
is they could not afford a lawyer at the time of their arrest. It is just a mess. It
is not what like people think it is or in theory is supposed to be. It just does
[not] work that way. I could spend the hour and a half talking about that, but
I am not going to do it. I am going to let some of the other folks really deliver
the information that can help you answer questions about the death penalty. If
someone asks well, why do you think this or why do you think that, you are
going to get those answers today. Some extraordinary people are on this
program.
I have a friend who was on death row for twenty years in Ohio. He
had six execution dates. The last one, he came within just a few hours being
executed. His name is Derrick Jamison. He had his last meal, wrote his last
words, and then they stayed the execution. He was exonerated and released,
but not before he saw—I do not how many—a dozen or two dozen of his
friends who he got to know on death row marched out and executed. He told
me, “The death penalty is modern day lynching. They took me to the tree six
times.” That was his direct experience. That is the way he saw it and that has
a lot to do with what it really is. You are going to hear about the legacy of
lynching and how that simply just transformed into today’s death penalty.
Even though it is also about due process and legalities, it is still just a remnant
from lynching.
If you go on the Florida Department of Corrections website for death
row, they have a list of the four youngest people ever executed in Florida.16
All four were killed in the electric chair. All four were sixteen years old. And
this happened not that long ago. What they do not have on their website is that
16.
Death Row, FLA. DEP’T CORR., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/deathrow.html
(last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
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all four children were Black. Two of them were thirteen years old when they
were tried and convicted. One of them—Fortune Ferguson, Jr.—was thirteen
years old when he was brought into court. He was arrested, tried, and
convicted within twenty-four hours. Maybe it was due process, maybe it was
legal, but it is essentially legalized lynching. That is the reality of it. Maybe
it takes a little longer with more legal steps, but this is the roots of it. This is
where it came from. That is how it is still applied. The same people are
subjected to it by the same people; it just has the trappings of legality. I looked
for years to find some redeeming value or virtue of having the death penalty
and I have never found one. There is nothing that stands the light of truth and
inspection; the death penalty is totally unnecessary.
We, Floridians, spend over $50 million a year just to have the death
penalty, and that is over and above the cost of sentencing those same people
to life in prison. How could that money to be used? We have got 14,000
unsolved homicides that could be solved; we could help murder victims’
families in real and immediate ways instead of telling them, one day you are
going to feel better. Years from now you [are] going to get justice. We are
going to kill this person and you get to come and watch. That is just so crazy.
This event is all about people learning more about the death penalty
and what to do about it. That is important. On our website you will see ways
you can end the death penalty for people with serious mental illness. Almost
everyone thinks that it is already illegal to execute and get the death penalty
for someone who is seriously mentally ill, but that is not the case in Florida.
It is not supposed to be happening nationally, but Florida has found loopholes
and ways to work around that, so we are sentencing people who committed a
crime while they were seriously mentally ill. They are going to death row, and
some of them, unfortunately, have been executed. So please take action. Get
involved. Take a look at the petition. If you want to sign it, sign it. If you
want to contact us about the group you belong to and they will join the list of
organizations in Florida that want to end the death penalty, that will be a big
help. That is power. That is what it looks like; all of you and all the groups
working together to end the death penalty. That is how it is going to take
place. It is a new day in Florida. Thank you all. Let us move forward together
and get across the finish line and end this madness once and for all.
DR. LAURA FINLEY: There is so many complex issues with the
death penalty that will come up through the day. Just to be clear, those of us
who seek to abolish the death penalty do not necessarily believe our prisons
are amazing places either. We are also about prison reform, criminal justice
reform, [and] we recognize there are certainly some deep issues within our
criminal justice systems. But the ultimate sanction—the death penalty—is
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something we believe no longer should exist for some of the reason[s] that you
have already heard and more that you will hear throughout the day.
Next, we will turn the event over to experts on legal issues. Exploring
what are the legal issues related to, why we have the death penalty, and why
do prosecutors seek it in certain cases and not in others.
II.

LEGAL ISSUES PANEL

OLYMPIA DUHART: 17
It is truly past time to make the case
against death. The law can be used as a tool for oppression or an instrument
of justice and change. In today’s symposium, we are going to explore the
many different arguments advanced by these amazing social justice warriors
who pursue justice through legal reform and beyond, in an effort to confront
the persistent threat of the death penalty. As we put the death penalty on trial
[today], we are going to hear from different distinguished experts, including
some of NSU’s best advocates, students and alum—some seasoned and some
new to the death penalty abolition movement—acclaimed scholars, national
advocates, and importantly people who survived being on death row despite
their actual innocence.
Our work today is consistent with NSU’s core value of community.
We take a special pride in exchanging with the community through
professional and intellectual support that complements our educational
mission. Today’s symposium is a prime example of this effort. Really this
event represents the best of community collaboration, impact collaboration.
JANE CROSS: 18 I am going to introduce the legal issues panel. We
have four amazing people. I am going to give their names in the order that
they are going to speak and then I am going to turn it over to them. The first
panelist is Linda Harris. She is an NSU Law alumnus, and she is also the
former treasurer of NSU [Black Law Students Association]. Ms. Harris is
going to talk about the history of the death penalty in Florida. Following Ms.
Harris will be Jonathan Perez, who is an NSU law student and Articles Editor
[as well as the Goodwin Alumni Editor] for [the] Nova Law Review. Mr. Perez
is going to talk about data on deterrence and the death penalty. Next, we are
going to have Brian Stull who is a staff attorney for the ACLU Capital
Punishment Project. Mr. Stull is going talk about Florida specific legal
practices in death penalty cases. Then we have Melissa Minsk Donoho, who

panel.

17.
18.

Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor of Law.
Acting as an NSU Shepard Broad College of Law representative for this
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is Chief Assistant and Managing Attorney for the Florida Regional Conflicts
Counsel Office. She is going to talk about current trends in Florida death
penalty practice.
I want to just briefly tell you how I came to looking at the death
penalty. My specialty is Caribbean law and I have written about the mandatory
death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean. There is a case called Pratt
v. Attorney General for Jamaica,19 decided 1993, which basically [made] it
illegal to execute someone after they have been sentenced for more than five
years. That particular precedent was basically put into place because of the
work of the Death Penalty Project, which is a human rights organization in
Britain. Activism does work, and it does get the law changed.
LINDA HARRIS:
As mentioned before, I am going to give a
very brief history of capital punishment in Florida. I will probably be using
the terms capital punishment and the death penalty interchangeably. So
basically, I am saying the same thing. I [a]m [also] going to give a very brief
overview of the death penalty in general.
You have already heard a lot about the death penalty and where it
came from. [The death penalty] has been around since the Code of
Hammurabi. The first legislated code is going back as far back as the
eighteenth century [B.C.]. The American use of the death penalty was
essentially the remnant of the colonists from Britain bringing that over, and it
has evolved to the death penalty laws that [we] see today.
With that, I am going to start talking about the history of capital
punishment in Florida. As of 2020, Florida is one of twenty-five states in the
United States that have the death penalty. In Florida, the first known execution
was in 1827 when Benjamin Donica was hung for murder. In 1923, a bill was
placed that allowed all executions to no longer be done by hanging, and to then
be done by the electric chair. In June of 1972, the Supreme Court struck down
the death penalty nationwide in a court case called Furman v. Georgia.20
Subsequently, [Florida] reintroduced a death penalty statute. [Florida] was
actually the first state to reintroduce the death penalty after the Supreme Court
struck it down nationwide in that Furman v. Georgia case.21 Four years later,
in 1976, the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty nationwide when it
upheld a Georgia [death penalty] statute in Gregg v. Georgia.22 The pertinent
19.
[1993] UKPC 1, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, 20, 23 (appeal taken from Jam.).
20.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
21.
Florida: History of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/florida (last visited Mar. 25,
2022); Furman, 408 U.S. at 238.
22.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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Florida [case], Proffitt v. Florida,23 upheld the reintroduction of the death
penalty in Florida.
In 1979, Florida was the first state to carry out a non-voluntary
execution following the Gregg case.24 From there, [Florida had] a botched
string of executions in the 1990’s that essentially led the [Florida Supreme]
Court and not only the court, but also the Florida legislature to say, maybe we
should not be using old sparky, that is the term some people affectionately
refer to as the electric chair. I do not think it was a nice name. In 2000, the
Florida legislature decided, after those botched executions, that lethal injection
was the way to go. In the year 2020, we shifted from using the electric chair
to using lethal injection.
Florida has a very interesting history with the death penalty. [Florida
has] one of the highest rates of folks on death row, and we have also had
numerous issues and constitutional challenges to our death penalty. Now, I
am going to briefly go over some of those. In 1982, in Enmund v. Florida,25
the Court ruled that Florida violated the Eighth Amendment when it attempted
to apply the death penalty to defendants who were minor participants in a
crime that resulted in murder.26 Essentially, the Court said if these defendants
did not attempt to kill [or] intend to kill the victim [and] they were not active
participants in the victim’s murder, then it is cruel and unusual punishment to
give these particular defendants the death penalty.
In Hitchcock v. Dugger,27 a case in 1987, the Court ruled that Florida’s
death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it did not allow the advisory
jury or the sentencing judge to consider reasons the defendant offered to spare
his life unless those reasons were listed among the mitigating factors the
legislature had set out in the state’s death penalty statute.28
Then, in 2014, in Hall v. Florida,29 the Court ruled that Florida
unconstitutionally impaired the enforcement of the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against subjecting persons with intellectual disabilities to the death
penalty by applying a hard cut off of seventy—an IQ cut off—to deny death
row prisoners’ intellectual disability claims.30 And in 2016, in Hurst v.
Florida, the Court ruled that a Florida sentencing statute, at the time, violated
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it required that a judge,
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

428 U.S. 242 (1976).
Florida: History of the Death Penalty, supra note 104.
458 U.S. 782 (1982).
Id. at 801.
481 U.S. 393 (1987).
Id. at 398–99.
572 U.S. 701 (2014).
Id. at 724.
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rather than a jury, make findings of fact as to whether the prosecution had
proven that a defendant was eligible to face the death penalty.31 That is just a
brief, truncated history of some of the [cases] that have affected death penalty
cases in Florida.
Until 2016, Florida was one of only three states that permitted trial
judges to impose the death penalty based on a jury’s non-unanimous
recommendation for death.32 The Florida Supreme Court in the Hurst case
ruled th[is] particular practice violated Florida’s constitution.33 [However], in
March of 2017, the Florida legislature decided to adopt a new sentencing law
that requires a unanimous jury recommendation for death before the judge
could impose a death sentence.34 As previously mentioned, we are always
finding loopholes in the state of Florida in order to get around getting rid of
the death penalt[y]. You can see that in the history of Florida and the way that
we have handled death penalty legislation.
Lastly, I would like to talk about a few issues about the death penalty,
[which] is why we are here. Even though my main purpose was to talk about
the legal history of death penalty cases in Florida, I want to talk about some of
the impacts and the effects of the death penalty.
First, I want to talk about the rate of error. Since 1973, there have
been thirty exonerations of people from death row in the state of Florida. That
is the highest of any state in the United States of America. Essentially, what
that means: For every three people on death row, [Florida has] exonerated one
innocent person. If [even] one innocent person has the potential of being put
on death row, that should be enough to eliminate the practice. If we can[not]
make sure the people that the state wants to put to death, at a minimum, did
what [the state] said they did, the state should not have the ability to then take
the life of an innocent person if you cannot guarantee that this person did it.
Now, I personally do not support the death penalty. That is the whole purpose
of this panel. I want you to understand that the rate of error is so, so very high.
You can[not] take death back; you can[not] come back from death. Once we
kill this person, there is no coming back from that.
Secondly, I want to talk about the cost. I am not going to give you
specific figures because I went to law school, and I did not become a
mathematician for that reason. Florida taxpayers pay well over fifty-one
million dollars annually to enforce the death penalty. That number is well
above any of the costs associated with keeping somebody in prison [or]
seeking life imprisonment for a particular defendant.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016).
Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 61 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam).
Id. at 69.
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (2021).
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Lastly, I would like to discuss some of the racial issues. As previously
mentioned, the death penalty, overall, has not been distributed fairly. There
are a lot of racial disparities in the way the death penalty has been applied.
Specifically, the way it has been applied to Florida, prosecutors are over three
times more likely to seek the death penalty when a victim is White [compared
to] when the victim is an African American. Never in the history of Florida
has a White person been executed for killing an African American. Never.
Not once.
I am going to give you some specific numbers about Duval County.
Eighty percent of the people sentenced to death from Duval County were
African American from 2009 to 2011. It was 100% in the year of 2012.35 Like
I said and as previously mentioned, [the death penalty] disproportionately
affects African Americans. This is pretty much the history of the death penalty
[in Florida].
JONATHAN PEREZ:
My name is Jonathan Perez, and I am a 3L,
currently at Nova’s [Shepard Broad College of Law]. I am on law review. I
had an article published over the winter dealing with the death penalty here in
Florida. It is titled, Barbaric Retributivism: New Hampshire and Washington
Are Two of the Latest States to Abolish the Death Penalty. Here Is Why
Florida Should Follow Suit.36 I am going to talk about the lack of deterrent
effect of the death penalty. It is ironic that, in my opinion, most supporters of
the death penalty like to point to the deterrent effect—that is, effective in
deterring crime—when there is really not a lot of evidence to support that
assertion. In my [Note], I quote Cesare Beccaria, the Italian criminologist a
lot. He said: “For a punishment to be just, it must have only that degree of
intensity that suffices to deter men from crime.”37 The critical question, in my
opinion, is not whether the death penalty in-and-of-itself deters crime, because
the death penalty does not exist in a vacuum. [Rather], it is whether it is more
effective at deterring crime than life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. In my [Note], I cite to a few studies and trends that tend to say [the
death penalty] is not more effective.
The first study I point to is one conducted in Iran in 2018. The study
examined eleven countries that had abolished the death penalty at least ten
years prior to the conduction of the study. The study plotted the murder rates
35.
Corrections Offender Network: Death Row Roster, FLA. DEP’T CORR.,
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/OffenderSearch/deathrowroster.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
36.
Jonathan Perez, Note, Barbaric Retributivism: New Hampshire and
Washington Are Two of the Latest States to Abolish the Death Penalty. Here Is Why Florida
Should Follow Suit, 45 NOVA L. REV. 115 (2020).
37.
Id. at 116.
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in the eleven countries over the course of the ten years.38 The findings
demonstrated that death penalty abolition correlated, on average, with a
decline in murder rates in all eleven countries. In fact, a country in this set
which abolished the death penalty can expect an average of approximately six
less murders per 100,000 people a decade after abolition.
This trend is also present within the United States. Collectively, the
murder rate in death penalty states has been higher than the murder rates in
non-death penalty states in every single year since 1990.39 The difference is
not particularly close either. Death penalty states have had a twenty eight
percent higher murder rate on average than non-death penalty states since
1999.40 The highest difference came in 2007, when there was a forty-seven
percent difference.41 So, the trends extrapolated from the study in Iran are also
present within the United States.
Another study, conducted in 2008, examined the opinions of leading
criminology experts on the deterrent effects of the death penalty. That study
found that 88.2% of criminologists [who] were surveyed do not believe that
the death penalty deters murder. That is a level of consensus comparable to
the agreement among scientists regarding global climate change.
There is an abundance of evidence that supports the assertion that the
death penalty, for all its might, does not succeed in its endeavor to deter crime.
As I stated earlier, [the death penalty] cannot be looked at [and] does not exist
in a vacuum. The question is whether or not it is more effective at deterring
crime than life in prison without parole.
BRIAN STULL:
I am so pleased and proud to be a part of this
conference making the case to take down, and to do away with, the death
penalty. A friend of mine from the Alabama ACLU put it aptly: What we are
trying to do with the death penalty and many other parts of the criminal
punishment system is we are trying, as lawyers, to tear down the unjust system.
But at the same time, we are fighting within that unjust system—battling for
fairness for the people who are still stuck in before we get rid of the death
penalty [and] who are facing death sentences, executions, and residing on
death row.

38.
39.

Id. at 113; ABDORRAHMAN BOROUMAND CTR., supra note 12.
Murder Rate of Death Penalty States Compared to Non-Death Penalty
States, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/murderrates/murder-rate-of-death-penalty-states-compared-to-non-death-penalty-states (last visited
Mar. 25, 2022).
40.
See id.
41.
See id.
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So, I start with Tracy Chapman; yes, we need a new beginning.42 My
main goal is overall we need to get rid of the death penalty and so many
aspects—if not in the entirety—of our criminal punishment system. My
presentation today, however, is going to be about battling within that system
for fairness.
First, I want to talk about promises that were made long ago within
the system that we currently have. These are promises that we still have to
fight for today. They often have become broken promises that relate to the
whole broken criminal punishment system. I say criminal punishment system
intentionally, instead of criminal justice system. These problems and broken
promises are especially troubling with [regard to] the death penalty.
[We begin with] the first promise [of] a White guy, [Sir William
Blackstone], in a powdered wig in England, back in pre-revolution times,
talking about the right to [a] jury. It sounds pretty good: “[The right to a] jury
is the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, or wish for,
that he cannot be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but
by the UNANIMOUS CONSENT of twelve of his neighbors and equals.”43
[This understanding of the jury] was what was influencing the
Framers of the United States Constitution when they adopted the Sixth
Amendment—which provides rights during a criminal trial, including the right
to an impartial jury—as part of the Bill of Rights. When the Framers came up
with that right and put it in our Constitution, they were talking about the right
that they understood from Blackstone, the preeminent scholar and jurist in
England—whose law we were borrowing—that this is a right to a unanimous
jury. So, these are some of the promises.
The United States Supreme Court has talked about this promise as
well. They have talked about the jury and given it some of the highest praise.
In Flowers v. Mississippi,44 the Supreme Court stated: “Other than voting,
serving on a jury is the most substantial opportunity that most citizens have to
participate in the democratic process.”45 In Flowers, which was just a couple
of years ago, the Court threw out the conviction and death sentence in
Mississippi of Curtis Flowers, because the prosecutor was discriminating
against Black jurors.46 And that is just a side note. I am really talking about
the promise of the jury right now, and how it plays out in Florida.
In 2020, the court also made clear something that advocates have been
saying for many, many years and we have all known for many years. The
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

TRACY CHAPMAN, New Beginning, on NEW BEGINNING (Elektra 1995).
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *218.
139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
Id. at 2238.
Id. at 2252.
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court threw out Louisiana and Oregon statutes that allowed non-unanimous
jury verdicts. The court also recognized and made clear that these statutes
were enacted to support White supremacy. And what do I mean by that? In
the time of post-reconstruction, when the states who were wanting to join the
Union realized they had to pass laws that allowed for some semblance of equal
rights and equal treatment, these states recognized they were going to have to
allow Black people to serve on juries. But they did not want the Black people
on those juries to have a voice, so they came up with a non-unanimous jury.
[In essence], they said, it is okay, the majority of the jurors are going to be
White anyway (given the population numbers at that time); so, we [will] let
you on the jury, but you are not going to have a voice. Last year, the Supreme
Court finally threw out those statutes.
These are lofty promises about the right to a unanimous jury that even
the United States Supreme Court has endorsed, but they are not consistently
applied, and [as a result], they are leaving people in shallow graves. I will
discuss two examples. The first begins with a question: Notwithstanding this
history, notwithstanding Blackstone, notwithstanding the United States
Supreme Court’s recognition of the problems with non-unanimous jury
verdicts, what two states have historically permitted death sentences based on
non-unanimous juries? Florida is shamefully one of those states, and the other
is Alabama. [Looking at a map from] 1862 underscores that this is a practice
meant to uphold White supremacy.

Figure 2: McNally’s Map of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, 1862.47

47.

McNally’s Map of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, 1862, FLA. MEMORY,

http://www.floridamemory.com/items/show/323074 (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
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For forty years, right out of the box, as soon as states were trying to
refashion the death penalty [system], Florida was first. Florida started its
system and used this system which allowed non-unanimous jury death
sentences for forty years. Florida executed ninety-two people under this
regime, almost all of which were for killing White people. That was going on
for a very long time, until Hurst v. Florida in 2016, when the United States
Supreme Court said a jury has to make all of the decisions that are necessary
for a death sentence.48 The Court sent the case back to the Florida Supreme
Court, where many of us were arguing: because of Blackstone, because of our
legal history, that means a unanimous jury.
The Florida Supreme Court agreed. In Hurst v. State, the court
declared, when we say jury, we mean unanimous jury. We are going to put an
end to this.49 The legislature agreed as well—although, I wish they had
abolished the death penalty—but they put that protection in.50 So, are we
putting an end to this, or are we not putting an end to this? The answer is sort
of.
At the time of these rulings, there were still over 350 people on
Florida’s death row. Many of [them]—in fact, about 290 of [them]—had nonunanimous jury verdicts for their death sentence. [Consider] James Belcher,
sixty-two-year-old Black man. Mr. Belcher is a father, former basketball
standout, [and a] neighborhood coach. He was raised in tough Brooklyn
projects. He was convicted of murder and sexual assault in Duval County for
a crime that happened in 1996. When his case went to the jury—think about
those juries that are deciding this; think about those Louisiana juries where
they did [not] want everyone to have a voice—nine people said [Mr. Belcher]
should be sentenced to death, but three said no, he should be spared.51
Then we have Steven Evans whose crime was three months later in
1996. A fifty-four-year-old Black man who has three children, a history of
trauma as a child, and head injuries, [was] convicted of kidnapping and
murder. He was sentenced to die [despite] a holdout juror who says, I want
him to have life. But that juror is overridden by the majority who say he should
have a death sentence. [Mr. Evans] is sentenced to death.
Which of these two men, then—Mr. Evans or Mr. Belcher—now gets
relief, now that the Florida Supreme Court has said, this is not allowed? Which
one? Is it the one whose crime occurred first, or the one whose crime occurred
three months later?
48.
49.
50.
51.

136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016).
202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016).
See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (2021).
Belcher v. State, 851 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2003).
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The answer is Mr. Belcher.52 His crime came first—Mr. Evans’ came
second—but only Mr. Belcher is going to get the benefit of this new rule; [this
is] because of retroactivity principles that the Florida Supreme Court decided
to apply here. The Court said Mr. Belcher’s case was not final until after June
of 2002. This was a significant date because that is when the United States
Supreme Court started talking about this jury right in death penalty cases,53
and so the Florida Supreme Court should have been on notice of the problem
by then. [Therefore, Mr. Belcher] gets relief. He is not sentenced to death
anymore and he [is] going to have a new trial on whether he can be sentenced
to death. Mr. Evans, however, whose crime was months later in 1996, gets no
relief because his sentence became final before 2002.
Overall, [there are] 290 cases. Who gets first relief? A bunch [get
relief], but a bunch do not. There are 157 whose cases became final after June
2002—they do get relief—but 133 do not because their cases came too early
in the system.54 Notwithstanding what Blackstone was telling us about this,
or what we knew about this from the Sixth Amendment, these 133 cases came
too early and do not get relief. This is the height of arbitrariness that the death
penalty represents. I want to submit this as my “Exhibit A” against the death
penalty.
Then, the problem with this also is—talking about battling injustice in
the system—this has already gone to the Florida Supreme Court. It has already
gone to the United States Supreme Court. This is not going to change. It is
just going to remain as evidence that Florida’s death penalty is irrevocably
broken. It is racist and it is arbitrary.
Moving on to a more hopeful example called the problem with death
qualification. In Furman v. Georgia, the Court said that the jurors in death
penalty cases serve as the conscience of the community.55 That makes sense.
Jurors are saying, what do we want for our community?
The phrase jury of peers is another way that we have stated this
promise, and that is related to the fair cross-section requirement that says when
you [are] bringing in people for the jury, you can [not] just have all White
52.
See Belcher v. State, 228 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2017).
53.
See Ring v. Arizona, 546 U.S. 584 (2002).
54.
See Florida Prisoners Sentenced to Death After Non-Unanimous Jury
Recommendations, Whose Convictions Became Final After Ring, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/florida-prisoners-sentenced-to-death-after-non-unanimousjury-recommendations-whose-convictions-became-final-after-ring (last visited Mar. 25, 2022);
Florida Death-Penalty Appeals Decided in Light of Hurst, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/florida-death-penalty-appeals-decided-in-light-of-hurst (last
updated Jan. 23, 2020).
55.
408 U.S. 238, 299 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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people who are called for jury. You must have a diverse pool that reflects the
community [in which] the case is being tried.
However, did you know if you oppose the death penalty, you could
never serve on a capital jury? That is, when you take out all those people who
oppose the death penalty, we say, Those are not your peers, they cannot be on
your jury. This was challenged in Lockhart v. McCree56 in 1986, where the
United States Supreme Court heard—and rejected—that challenge.57 The
Court said it does not matter; these people who are against the death penalty
are not a cognizable group, so their exclusion from jury panels does not pose
a problem for the Sixth Amendment.
Since then, a lot of people have been doing a lot of studies about what
impact death qualification has. There have been studies done in South
Carolina,58 Louisiana,59 and [soon-to-be-released] studies in Florida, we are
showing consistently that death qualification excludes Black jurors by a two
to one margin over White jurors. [This means] forty percent of qualified Black
jurors that show up, ready to serve, with no other conflict and no other forcause challenge—forty percent—are excluded by death qualification. [By
comparison], only twenty percent of similarly situated White jurors are
excluded.
Is death qualification race neutral? I would submit, no. I would submit
that the numbers speak for themselves. Moreover, for people who are
proximate to the racism in our criminal punishment system—who have been
victims of that racism—of course they are going to be skeptical of that system.
Of course, they are going to say it is not fair. And the death penalty—the most
egregious and most severe exercise of that power—is not proper for our
government to undertake. Our government does not deserve to wield that
power.60 If you are Black, and that is your position about death penalty, that
is an earned distrust,61 and therefore, [death qualification] is not race neutral.

56.
476 U.S. 162 (1986).
57.
Id. at 165.
58.
Ann M. Eisenberg, Removal of Women and African-Americans in Jury
Selection in South Carolina Capital Cases, 1997-2012, 9 NE. UNIV. L. REV. 299, 333–34 (2017).
59.
Aliza Plenar Cover, The Eighth Amendment’s Lost Jurors, 92 IND. L.J. 113,
137 (2016).
60.
See BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND
REDEMPTION 313 (2015) (“[T]he death penalty is not about whether people deserve to die for
the crimes they commit. The real question of capital punishment in this country is, do we
deserve to kill?”).
61.
See, e.g., Doug Dennis, 40 Percent of Black Americans Distrust the
Criminal Justice System: Why I’m One of Them, VOX (Dec. 21, 2016, 8:00 AM),
http://www.vox.com/first-person/2016/12/21/13854666/criminal-justice-police-distrust.
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Finally (and on a more hopeful note), although we lost in Lockhart,
nevertheless, with this new data showing this disproportionate exclusion,
advocates and lawyers are still hopeful we can win this battle to show that
death qualification is wrong and can return just a little bit of fairness to the
system.62
MELISSA MINSK DONOHO:
I will share what I can with you this
morning. I practice every day at the courthouse. I work in, basically, a public
defender’s office. There are two public defender offices in Florida: The
elected public defender and then a conflict counsel. Whenever the public
defender conflicts off the case, then conflict counsel gets the case, so we do
the same thing. Currently in our office we have ten death penalty cases for
trial and five Hurst re-sentencings, which are cases where people had nonunanimous death recommendations in the past and are back for new
sentencings.
The interesting thing for me is that I do not feel optimistic as a
practitioner, but when Mark Elliott spoke about his hope, I felt maybe some
happiness. But as a practitioner, it does not feel that way. I feel like the courts
have gone back twenty years. I feel like the Florida Supreme Court has
continued to take rights away. Instead of being futuristic and progressive, we
are going backwards. Maybe I will find some more hope after today, but I
have been doing this since 1997 and [although] it felt like we were moving
forward for a while, now it just feels like we are moving backwards.
I want to speak about what is going on locally, right here in Broward
County. We recently had elections and got a new state attorney, and just so
everybody knows, we have laws in place where the prosecutor has total
discretion about when to seek the death penalty and against whom to seek the
death penalty. It is a subjective process. The person who is the state attorney
at the time gets to make that choice.
I was hopeful that we were getting a new progressive prosecutor and
that does not seem to be the case. Since [Harold Pryor] became the prosecutor
(Mike Satz was the prosecutor before) in the last six weeks, we have received
four notices of new intents to seek death penalty in Broward County. That is
just my office, not the public defender office; they probably have their own
equal [number] of cases.
So where do we start [for progressive change]? I just battle it out in
the courtroom and with individual prosecutors. If we cannot find a way to stop
the beginning of the process, we are not changing the legislature right now to
abolish it. That is, do we go prosecutor by prosecutor and vote in people who
62.
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do not want to seek [the death penalty] as often? That is something we all
have to do, but as it stands right now, I am not optimistic about it.
Now, the new prosecutor has created what he calls a Death Review
Panel, which is new, because [the prior prosecutor] Mr. Satz previously did
not do that. [The Death Review Panel] gives us an opportunity to present
mitigation on the front end—take our clients, investigate their backgrounds,
and give the state attorney a reason to dismiss it or drop seeking the death
penalty—and just move forward on a regular first-degree murder case. We
have been doing that and, accordingly, have submitted about at least four
memos requesting that the State Attorney not seek the death penalty. All of
our requests have been denied.
We have not been granted one request to waive the death penalty on
our current clients. That is disheartening as well, [especially] when we thought
there was some local change and a fresh, new look at things. From a
practitioner’s perspective, we are putting all our [cards] on the table we have
been showing our hand, in a way, for a possibility that our client[s] have a
good review [of] why the prosecutor should not be seeking the death penalty
against them. So far, we have not been very productive in that regard.
However, there are some tools we have, and maybe some new tools.
There is a good note that the legislature has not gone back on unanimity. As
my colleagues have talked about, Hurst said we need to have a unanimous jury
and the legislature has kept it that way. The Florida Supreme Court has gone
back on that and, frankly, at any point the legislature could change again and
go back to non-unanimity. We, as practitioners, worry about this all the time.
I have had plenty of clients and I just would like to say that having
been to death row and sitting in the local jails, on the phones with my clients,
traveling around, meeting their families, and working hard to fight that fight
every day—when you get to know a person, like I have gotten to know a lot
of these clients—you realize they are not their worst day. The death penalty
is certainly not the way we, as a society, should treat people.
JANE CROSS: There has been news about the [shooter] in the
Marjory Stoneman Douglas [mass school shooting] case regarding whether
the prosecutor is going to ask for the death penalty. Do you have any
information on that case or know anything about it?
MELISSA MINSK DONOHO:
Yes, they are seeking the death
penalty on [Nikolas] Cruz for sure. The Defense has offered that he will accept
life in prison without the possibility of parole, but the prosecutor’s office will
not offer that plea. Basically, he would change his plea from not guilty to
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guilty and [on the condition that he is] sentenced to life. But the prosecutor’s
office will not do that. They are continuing to seek death against him.
Victims have rights, and the prosecutor’s office takes very seriously
the victims’ request of how to proceed in a case. The families of the victims
of the Cruz case have mixed feelings about it. There are some families that do
not want them to seek death and there are some that do. [At this time], the
prosecutor’s office is continuing to seek it. Additionally, I think they feel that
if you cannot seek the death penalty in the Cruz case, when can you seek it?
The Cruz case is the pinnacle of cases; if you let that go [without
seeking death], it trickles down to everything else. In other words, you cannot
let the worst of the worst cases, in their view, go, because then, what do you
do with all the rest? There is always that backdrop of family and the victim’s
rights and the victim’s say in the case. [On the other hand], I have had victims
who did not want the death penalty and the State attorney still pursued it.
JANE CROSS: If you could see organizing to put pressure on the
Broward State Attorney, what do you think would be the most effective tactic?
MELISSA MINSK DONOHO:
I think that he is young, and he seems
like a very nice guy and very, very reachable. People can sit down with him
and talk to him. I was in a meeting a couple weeks ago about jail
overcrowding, with the Chief Judge, Prosecutor, and Public Defender. We
were talking about how to reduce jail overcrowding and at some point, I
blurted out, why are you filing a million death penalty cases? Of course, he
said, well, it is not a million and I said okay, well you know I tend to
exaggerate. He looked at me across table and said, it [is] the law. I had to
pick my jaw up off the floor. It is not the law. It is subjective. He has the
choice to make that decision. In my opinion, he needs to be educated. He
needs to be held accountable for his promises when he was campaigning as a
progressive prosecutor.
Somebody could literally call him out on that. I have got the numbers.
The Public Defender has the numbers. There is the newspaper; I am happy to
talk to somebody, but we need people to get out there, make the case, put it in
the paper, get his attention, talk to him, and call him out on what he is doing
and why he is not holding true to his campaign promises.
We should not let people [who] win on progressive platforms [get
away with], turn[ing] around and not follow[ing] through [with promises].
With that said, I do think people can sit down with him—he will give you the
time of day, and he will sit down with you—so there are ways to do that for
sure. And I hope people will.
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JANE CROSS: Just one final question I wanted to ask Brian: In terms
of the racial composition of juries, are they now predominantly White in death
penalty cases (based on your research)?
BRIAN STULL: Our research is more about who is excluded. But if
you exclude more people of color and Black people using death qualification,
you are going to have less diverse juries. That is going to be the result. [Look
at] Duval County, which has a pretty high percentage (thirty percent Black
people on the jury rolls). When you start with a relatively small number, and
then a large number for White jurors (above sixty percent), and you are
excluding at different rates, you might not see it as much in the final jury. But
the [political] right talks about the fair cross-section from which the jury is
selected, and that cross section is basically being carved out of Black jurors
and other jurors of color because they oppose the death penalty. It is because
of trust and the distrust that is earned.
III.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

DR. LAURA FINLEY: Sister Helen Prejean is known around the
world for her tireless work against the death penalty. She has been
instrumental in sparking national dialogue on capital punishment and in
shaping the Catholic Church’s vigorous opposition to all executions. Born on
April 21, 1939, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, she joined the Sisters of Saint
Joseph in 1957. After studies in the United States and Canada, she spent the
following years teaching high school and serving as the religious education
director at Saint Francis Cabrini Parish in New Orleans, as well as the
formation director for her religious community.
In 1982, she moved into the Saint Thomas housing project in New
Orleans in order to live and work with the poor. While there, Sister Helen
began corresponding with Patrick Sonnier, who had been sentenced to death
for the murder of two teenagers. Two years later, when Patrick was put to
death in the electric chair, Sister Helen was there to witness his execution.63
In the following month, she became spiritual advisor to another death
row inmate, Robert Lee Willie, who was to meet the same fate. After
witnessing these executions, Sister Helen realized that this lethal ritual would
remain unchallenged unless its secrecy was stripped away.
And so, she sat down and wrote a book, Dead Man Walking: An
Eyewitness Account of The Death Penalty in the United States. Dead Man
63.
Ramona Anne Caponegro, Sister Helen Prejean, BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/biography/Sister-Helen-Prejean (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
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Walking hit the shelves in 1993 when national support for the death penalty
was over eighty percent, and in Sister Helen’s native Louisiana, closer to
ninety percent.64 The book ignited a national debate on capital punishment
and inspired an Academy Award–winning movie, a play, and an opera. Sister
Helen also embarked on a speaking tour that continues to this day.
Sister Helen works with people of all faiths and those who follow no
established faith, but her voice has had a special resonance with her fellow
Catholics. Over the decades, Sister Helen has made personal approaches to
two Popes, John Paul II and Pope Francis, urging them to establish the
Catholic church’s position as unequivocally opposed to capital punishment
under any circumstances.
After Sister Helen’s urging, under John Paul II, the catechism was
revised to strengthen the Church’s opposition to executions, although it
allowed for a very few exceptions. Not long after meeting with Sister Helen
in August of 2018, Pope Francis announced new language of the Catholic
catechism which declares that the death penalty is inadmissible in all cases
because it is an attack on inviolability and dignity of the person.65
Today, although capital punishment is still on the books in thirty states
in the United States, it has fallen into disuse in most of those states.
Prosecutors and juries alike are turning away from death sentences, with the
death penalty becoming increasingly a geographical freak.
Sister Helen continues her work, dividing her time between educating
the public, campaigning against the death penalty, counseling individual death
row prisoners, and working with murder victims’ family members.
Sister Helen’s second book, The Death of Innocents: An Eyewitness
Account of Wrongful Executions, was published in 2004, and her third book,
River of Fire: My Spiritual Journey, in 2019.66
SISTER HELEN PREJEAN:
Here is the thing: I was totally
unprepared. It is like I got catapulted down a laundry chute. From being a
nun that taught in school and led Bible study in a Catholic Parish—down this
laundry chute (or down the rabbit hole, or whatever you want to call it)—here
I am on death row in Louisiana with Patrick Sonnier, a man I have written a
letter to.
64.
See Jessica Derr, The Nun Is in Over Her Head: A Conversation with Sister
Helen Prejean, ARCADIA UNIV. (Oct. 25, 2018), http://www.arcadia.edu/blogs/becausearcadia/post/nun-over-her-head-conversation-sister-helen-prejean; PREJEAN, supra note 18.
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And here I am again, a little over two years later in the execution
chamber. This is in 1984. I had written him a letter in 1982 thinking I was
only going to be writing letters. Hey Sister, you want to be a pen pal with
somebody on death row? Yeah, sure, I am an English major, I can write some
nice letters.
I did not know the guy was really going to be executed. When we
started writing, we had not had an execution in Louisiana since 1961. There
had been an unofficial, nationwide moratorium on the death penalty. It started
in 1967, continued throughout the 1970s, and I had not even noticed that the
Supreme Court brought the death penalty back in 1976. So here I am, writing
this guy, he is writing back, and I say yeah, I will come visit you, and I start
visiting him.
And then, right after midnight, April 5, 1984, I am in that execution
chamber with this man who is going to be electrocuted to death. I am telling
him, Look at my face. Look at my face when they do this. I will be the face of
love. I [will] be the face of Christ for you. It is the dignity. He is being treated
like disposable human waste: You are so irredeemable; you are so evil; we
can [not] even trust that we can put you in prison; we have to kill you for
society’s sake.
I am there. When you are there and present in that situation—just in
the moral exigency of it—you say, Look at me, Look at my face.
I came out of that execution chamber that night and I did not know
how thoroughly changed I was. At first, you do not know; you cannot process
all that is happening to you. Immediately in the parking lot, prison officials
bring in a prison vehicle after the execution and deposit you at the gates. First
thing I did was throw up.
I had never watched a protocol—cold, calculated, step-by-step
protocol—where a live human being who had potential in him—who was
better than the worst thing he had ever done in his life—was deliberately
killed.
When I wrote River of Fire—which was about waking up to justice
and becoming an activist, that the gospel of Jesus was going to have to be more
than simply being charitable to people around me and praying that poor people
will have a great reward one day in heaven.67 I woke up to justice, which is
what River of Fire is about.68 In the Preface, I described this scene:
They killed a man with fire one night.
Strapped him in a wooden chair and pumped electricity through his
body until he was dead.
67.
68.
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Id.
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His killing was a legal act.
No religious leaders protested the killing that night.
But I was there. I saw it with my own eyes.
And what I saw set my soul on fire—a fire that burns in me still.69

No religious leaders protested the killing that night. We had an Archbishop,
Philip M. Hannan, who supported the death penalty, so no other bishops in
Louisiana could publicly protest it.
While Tim Robbins was working on the film, Dead Man Walking, he
kept saying—and it was true—The nun is in over her head.70 I found out while
outside the prison gates that night, having witnessed the execution—that my
life had been transformed. I stopped going to meetings that did not deal with
urgent moral human rights issues, such as the deliberate killing of citizens by
the government. That is what my life had to be about.
I did not know what I was going to do; I was completely overwhelmed.
I did not know I was going to write a book. And I began doing what all of you
do. I began moving into circles of people who were working on the issue. I
began reading and I began learning. That led to my going out to the public,
going into Dennis Kalob’s sociology class at Loyola University, New Orleans.
That is where I really learned to hone-in and learn how to talk to the public.
While writing Dead Man Walking, at first, I focused only on the human rights
of the person being executed and delayed for too long talking about the horror
of the crime. But I was met with nothing but resistance when I focused solely
on the offender. You have to remember, in the 1980s everybody and their cat
was supporting the death penalty. They would say: What about the victims?
What about the victims? You do not care about the victims!
When I wrote Dead Man Walking, I had an excellent editor at Random
House. Thank you, Jason Epstein! Thank you, Jesus for giving me this good
Jewish editor to work with a Catholic nun to write a book about the death
penalty. When Jason looked at the first draft of Dead Man Walking, he said
the same thing to me that the young college students at Loyola were saying:
Helen, nobody is going to read your book. You wait far too long before you
talk about the crime. You [ha]ve got to talk about the crime and your own
outrage at the crime in the first ten pages of this book, or everybody’s going
to say, well, she’s a Catholic nun, she believes in Jesus, believes in forgiveness,
and they [wi]ll expect every religious platitude is going to come out of your
mouth in this book and they are not going to read it. Face the crime and your
own outrage.
69.
70.
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Oh, what a crime it was. Patrick Sonnier and his brother Eddie, in
cold blood, had shot a teenage couple in the back of their heads and raped the
young girl. This young couple, David LeBlanc, who was seventeen, and
Loretta Ann Bourque, who was eighteen, had gone to a homecoming football
game and were not seen alive again. Earlier that night, David’s mother had
said to him, (because it was early November in Louisiana which can be chilly):
Here son, I got this new blue shirt for you, it is going to help keep you warm
tonight. And later his daddy said, Yeah, but it could not keep him alive.
The killing of two teenage kids who were just beginning to bud in their
lives—with their bodies found in this sugar cane field, just lying there. That
was the crime that this man—the man I am connected with on death row—that
is what he and his brother had done.
My journey began. The journey in Dead Man Walking is the journey
into the deep moral ambivalence that most of us feel about the death penalty.
The starting point with an un-awakened public cannot be to simply
give them statistics. This is what I have learned over thirty-five years of
crisscrossing this nation and talking to people: Most people have not thought
about the death penalty. With the busy lives we have, who is thinking deeply
about murderers on death row, and whether we ought to kill them? If anything,
you know that the usual wisdom is: they deserve it. Instead, people think, let
us turn attention to at-risk kids, to education; let us deal with the other urgent
issues of our day.
The journey is going to have to take people deeply and in an
imaginative way into the moral crux of this life and death issue. Facts are
important but, believe me, you never would have heard of Dead Man Walking
if I had not had that good editor, Jason Epstein, who taught me how to tell the
story, and how to take people with you on your whole journey, and having to
learn everything as you go. You have got to make the statistics real.
In the first draft of Dead Man Walking, I put all the facts in the
footnotes about racism and about how only poor people are on death row, and
why rich people are never sentenced to death. And Jason taught me that the
secret of good writing is that people are going to read for the story. When
people start reading DMW, they wonder if the person is going to be executed.
And I tried to weave facts into the storytelling so that by the end of
the book, most people will know the most important truths about how the death
penalty operates. And scholars will dig into the footnotes. But you have got
to weave in fact with story, as every good journalist knows.
I had no idea about the potential power of a book. I am a Louisiana
Cajun. We talk to each other, like I am talking to you now. There is real
power in talking to each other: It is live, so you can adjust as you go, you can
feel the crowd. And you do not notice, but I really have a feel for you, even

2021]

DEATH PENALTY IN FLORIDA

169

through this cyber space stuff, because I know who you are. I know why you
have gathered, and I know what else you are doing on this day. I have got a
feel for live audiences; Talking with people through live communication is the
best. By comparison, I always thought books were kind of passive.
But oh man, I am going to tell you: call it the power of the universe
or call it the power of God, but something took Dead Man Walking and
propelled it into spaces I never thought it would go and it was Jason who
helped me chart the journey for the ordinary reader.71 To take them from the
outrage of the crime and the suffering of the victims’ families into the horror
of the execution chamber.
Plus, I was making a huge mistake by initially staying away from the
victims’ families, and it was Jason who spotted this. I did not know what to
do with the families. They lost their kids and I was the spiritual advisor to the
two men who killed them, and I figured, I am the last person in the world they
want to see. I did not want to get into a big ole argument with them about the
death penalty. I have never done anything like this before and I am staying
away. And Jason looked down at that first draft, and he said, Helen, you [a]re
letting yourself off too easy by simply saying you had never done this before.
It was cowardice, wasn’t it? You were scared, were [not] you?
Yeah.
When you write your book, do n[o]t just take people with you on the
peaks of the waves where you do everything with perfection. Take them in the
troughs where you make mistakes.
It is probably one of the biggest mistakes of my life that I was avoiding
talking about the murders and the families of those two precious kids. And
then, at the pardon board, when I did meet the families just days before the
scheduled execution, it was the worst possible time to meet them. Things
could not have been more polarized.
Is Patrick Sonnier going to live or die? You sign the blooming book
when you go into a pardon board hearing in Louisiana. Maybe it is the same
here in Florida. Are you for life, you want him to live? Or you want him to
die? It is a life-or-death thing, and you sign a book stating which side you are
on. Well, all the signatures are on the side of, Yeah, we want to see him
executed. And that is when I met the victims’ families.
The Bourque family was there; their daughter had been killed. They
were furious with me. They were the ones who got up and said, Yeah, we want
the execution to proceed. Mr. Bourque, the father, had been to the press
saying, I want to see the person who killed my child, [die].

71.
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Who does not understand that? We all can understand the rage after
you have lost your child to a senseless and brutal murder. Ask somebody,
What would you like to see happen to the person who killed your child? Of
course, they are going to say what Mr. Bourque said, unless they are some
kind of saint, and they have a reservoir in their soul where they have already
been to some deep places and know that is not going to bring them peace. But
vengeance is the starting place for most victims’ families. I get it.
I have got to say though, in the African American community, often
vengeance is not the starting point. First of all, they know not [to] expect
justice from the government, especially from district attorneys. I have to make
that little addendum right there. But most people are like Mr. Bourque.
So, I stayed away. And when does the nun show up? Oh, to save the
poor murderer’s life to hold his hand but she was [not] there for us.
But human beings can always surprise us. That is what David’s father,
Lloyd, did. I met David while we were walking outside while the pardon board
was voting. Sister, where you been? All this time I had nobody to talk to. My
wife and I would even go to different Catholic churches on Sunday hoping
some priests would say the death penalty is wrong. In my gut, I know it is
wrong, but I have not had anybody to talk to. Where you been? You [ha]ve
just been with those two brothers.
I realized I made a terrible mistake. Eventually David and I would go
pray together in this little chapel. David is really the one who taught me the
journey that is possible in a human heart, where you start with this anger and
outrage and all you want to do is kill the person who killed your loved one,
then you can never move on. And to move to a place where you realize that if
you keep that anger all the time, you will lose who you are. And that is what
was happening with Lloyd. He was so angry all the time that he was losing
who he truly was. He said, I [ha]ve always been a kind person who loved to
help people, yet I am snapping at my wife, I [a]m making her cry, I [a]m angry
all the time. Then at one point he put up his hand: STOP, and said, nuh-uh,
they killed my boy, but I am not going to let them kill me.
David then made his way on the road to forgiveness—forgive—which
means “to give before”—to not let what happened to you take over your soul,
so that now you are an angry, vengeful creature yourself and all you can do is
feed on that and thus lose your life. It is the great wisdom in all the spiritual
traditions: Buddhist, Christian, and I do not know the Quran as well, but I
know this—every chapter of the Quran, with the exception of chapter one,
which is introductory, begins with the mercy of God. The nature of mercy is
to know: I realize this evil has happened to me, but there is more to life than
seeking endless retaliation. To have a depth of soul that can take [in] that evil
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and not be overcome by it. Lloyd LeBlanc taught me the meaning of
forgiveness.
Dead Man Walking is about a journey.72 It is for people who have not
thought about the death penalty. When I give public talks, many people who
are for the death penalty, [show up]. [People who] read Dead Man Walking,
at the start, are for the death penalty.73 All they know is what they have been
told. They know the political rhetoric of why we have to do this, how these
people deserve to die, the demonizing of people that have done murders, and
make them into this evil irredeemable person. You have to absolutize evil in
order to have ordinary citizens say it is okay, kill them. We do it with terrorists.
Consider everybody sitting in Guantanamo right now: it is because of that
demonizing effect, if we call you a terrorist against our nation, there is no good
in you and we have to rid ourselves from you in order to be safe.
That was the political rhetoric; that was what people were hearing,
especially after the death penalty was reinstated in 1970’s. In the eighties, we
were executing people left and right in Louisiana and I know Florida has killed
a lot of people because my friend Mike Radelet was very involved with the
people on death row. He went through last visits with fifty inmates on the
nights before their execution before moving from the University of Florida to
the University of Colorado in 2001. He is a great sociologist and a great writer.
You attorneys want him if you ever have a death penalty trial to just talk to the
jury about this whole pattern of how this thing works or does not work. And
to say that you are going to go after the worst of the worst is an impossible
criterion which, from the beginning, has never been able to have clarity about
what we mean by “the worst of the worst.” The Supreme Court, in Gregg,
said we are going to seek death for only “the worst of the worst”.74 It was a
cruel joke.
I mean, you do [not] go for the death penalty for ordinary murders;
not your garden variety murders; only the worst of the worst. If somebody
kills my mother—oh, but it did [not] happen during a felony, it did [not] have
these aggravating circumstances. Whenever a unique, irreplaceable human
being has been ripped from the universe, and is irreplaceable, that is always
the worst of the worst. Oh, someone killed my mother, but the murderer was
not the worst of the worst. What?
Just like on our poor suffering planet right now, every twenty minutes,
a new species is lost that can never be replaced. It is the worst of the worst
when something—or someone—is irreplaceable.
72.
73.
74.
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And then, the other thing that I have come to realize more clearly after
seeing the executions of thirteen people by Donald Trump and former
Attorney General William Barr in their last six months in office, is how
completely arbitrary and capricious the death penalty can be.75 The faults in
Gregg are the extremely vague criterion—death only for the worst of the
worst—coupled with complete discretionary power of the prosecutors to seek
death or not and of government officials to decide who on death row will be
killed.76 I am sure you can point out counties in Florida where you have
prosecutors that cut notches on their belts because they are determined to go
for the death penalty from square one in a trial.
Prosecutors never need to seek death. And the fact is, if you do not
have a prosecutor seeking death, you will not have the death penalty. And that
is what smart lawyers, like so many of you, are figuring out: do not let it come
to trial. Get to district attorney, go duck hunting with that district attorney as
the late Georgia Defender Millard Farmer used to do. Have a relationship with
the client and find mitigation in his or her life so that when the whole story is
told to the jury, they can see there is more to this person than this one single
act. It is a great fallacy when we try to make the identification of the essence
of a person in one act.
One time, one of the wardens at the Louisiana State Prison, where I
have been going for a number of years, said to me Sister Helen, you know
which guys make our best trustees, like what crime they come in here for? I
said no. He said, Murder. Most people in this prison for murder did not know
when they got up in the morning that they were going to murder somebody.
Here they are in a bar, they get in a fight, they are mad, they are drinking, they
got a gun—BANG! They murder somebody and here they are. And then, in
the discipline of the prison—as imperfect as it is—over time, they learn to read
(many of them), they reflect, and they become good guys. We can trust them
to be trustees; they do not need a guard with them.
All human beings have the potential to grow and change for the better.
From the point of view of faith: that is a divine spark in us. From the point of
view of human rights, that is the inalienable right to life that everyone has,
simply because we are human beings.
It took 1,500 years of dialogue within the Catholic Church to align its
teaching on the death penalty with the principles of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. The Declaration in Article 3 states that everyone, simply
75.
See Michael Tarm & Michael Kunzelman, Trump Administration Carries
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76.
But see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.

2021]

DEATH PENALTY IN FLORIDA

173

by virtue of being a person, has an inalienable right to life—inalienable—
which means life cannot be alienated or taken away.77 Governments,
therefore, have no authority to bestow these rights on people based for good
behavior, nor take those rights from people for bad behavior.
And so, within my Catholic Church, there has been a lot of dialogue.
How does dialogue happen? Just like here, just like in our society. There is a
great Biblical psalm, Truth Springs Up from the Ground—as societies evolve,
people evolve in consciousness and conscious. Look at the rapid evolution we
have had in this society over the space of twenty-something years to recognize
that gay and transgender people have human rights. How did that happen? It
is because ordinary people relate to each other and share with each other and
learn from other.
The evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a mature
society—we are always going to be on our way, and that is what happened
with the Catholic Church. And it was not just because of the action of the
Popes; it is because consciousness builds in a society through dialogue. Truth
springs from the ground of the people.
The truth had been rising for a number of years. A big worldwide
influence has been the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, enacted in
1948.78 Forty years ago, there was a handful of countries that did not have the
death penalty. Today, roughly 108 to 195 nations in the world do not have the
death penalty.
What happens? So, with the Catholic Church, they kept holding onto
the traditional teaching that was in the catechism, which acknowledged the
state’s right to take life. Once you have that as a principle—that governments
have that right to take the lives of their own citizens—then you can leave it up
to them to set the criteria, the procedures, and set up the rules for the legal
system.
We can never give governments that right. That is finally the point
that was reached in August 2018 when Pope Francis—after all these dialogues,
always happening—reached the point of saying, no matter how terrible or
grave the crime, we can never give over to governments the right to execute
their citizens. It is principle. And for the first time, Catholic teaching on the
death penalty coincided with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Many of you are defense lawyers and people in the legal community
doing your best to save lives. You are the M*A*S*H unit out there, where it
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really makes a difference in a case of whether a human being is going to live
or die.
Over the years I have learned a few things about the art of persuasion.
When I am communicating with people in the system like district attorney, I
try to appeal to the angels of their better nature and have an honest
conversation with them about why they wish to go for the death penalty. Once,
in Pueblo, Colorado, two priests had been killed by a mentally ill person, and
the whole community wrote and called that district attorney urging him not to
seek the death penalty. Their public action as a community persuaded the
district attorney to not seek the death penalty. It was persuasive. We persuade
others by writing letters to the editor and by getting the stories out there. Any
defense lawyer knows that when attorneys stand before a jury, the one who
tells the whole story wins the case.
That defense lawyer, standing there with her or his hand on the
shoulder of the person who is being considered disposable human waste,
educates the jury about his life, and shows there is more to him than this
horrible act that he has done—acknowledging the horror of what he has done,
but showing there is more to this human being.
And then you have the attorneys like David Wymore in Colorado who,
in capital cases, really gets in there with jurors in the voir dire and from the
very beginning, tells them about a juror’s right not to give in to pressure to
return a death [penalty] verdict. Jurors do not even have to [explain] why they
are voting for mercy. Each juror has the right—even the duty—to vote his or
her conscience and to resist the pressure from other jurors to vote for death.
In one of my books, I tell the story of an anguished juror who voted for the
death of Robert Sawyer, executed in Louisiana in 1993.79 In the jury
deliberations, he was the only one holding out for life. But the other jurors
kept saying, look, we cannot go home until we get this unanimous decision.
You are standing in the way. He gave in to the pressure and voted for death.
Then, the night Sawyer was executed, that juror, ex-juror then, was on the
phone with the defense lawyer; he is drunk, and he is crying, saying, I knew
what I should have done. I gave in to the pressure and I voted for death, and
now they are killing this man.
A lot of times the jurors simply do not know how and why the death
penalty system is broken. They do not know why we have now 185 people
who were wrongfully convicted and sent to death row and later exonerated,
and that number is regularly growing. You have already heard from the
exonerees at this conference. Listen to their stories. Because as Louisiana
Attorney Denny LeBoeuf, a really wonderful criminal defense attorney and
79.
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good friend of mine says, The most vulnerable one walking into the courtroom
for a death penalty trial is the defendant who is actually innocent, because
they know they are innocent, and they say, as soon as they hear my story, you
know, I am not even going to be convicted, much less get sentenced to death.
And what they do not know is that politically driven prosecutors are going to
present a counter-narrative and make sure the defendant’s narrative never gets
told to the jury.
The prosecutors are in possession of the evidence. They have the rape
kit. They can destroy it or not. They can say that it just disappeared along
with all the rest of the forensic evidence. They have the original police report.
And in over ninety percent of cases of those 185 wrongfully convicted people,
it was because of prosecutorial misconduct—and prosecutors barely get a slap
on the wrist for it. There is hardly any accountability for that, nor is there any
guarantee that exonerated people who finally get out are going to be given any
remuneration from the state. It changes from state to state and often they are
thwarted in that effort.
It is really important when you write a book that you do not come off
as the expert where people can resist and reject you, oh yeah, tell me more,
yeah, you are the expert, do you not think those . . . ought to all be killed? The
readers can come along with you much more easily when the readers can learn
right along with you.
They have got to learn, first of all, about the deep racism in the system.
There is a direct line between slavery, lynching, mass incarceration, and the
death penalty. After the killing of George Floyd, our eyes began to open to
systemic racism in law enforcement. And now in our nation we are deepening
our understanding of how the legacy of slavery affects every institution in the
country.
Most people have just a superficial understanding: Look, these people
did really terrible crimes and they deserve to die. Simple justice: they kill,
they die. There is a total lack of reflection, and so what we have to do is take
them deeper. And just say, well look on death row: it is roughly fifty percent
White, fifty percent Black; it looks fair, doesn’t it? And then we have got to
show how the deep racism is in the system. Overwhelmingly—you look at
the over 1,500 people in this country, who have been gassed, shot,
electrocuted, hanged, or lethally injected since 1977—eight out of every ten
of them were put to death because they killed a White person.
In order to have the death penalty, in order to zero in on what many
prosecutors say are the worst of the worst, the murder has to have happened to
someone who has status in the community. Roughly, that is whether the
person is White or not. That is what the track record shows, overwhelmingly,
when you kill a White person, prosecutors are more likely to seek death. When
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people of color are murdered—I witnessed this in New Orleans—it is hardly
a blip on the screen. Often the murders were not even investigated by the
police, or by the district attorney. It is only a Black life.
Long before our consciousness of Black Lives Matter, it was just the
opposite when it comes to picking what is the worst of the worst murder. Did
you kill a White person or not? People do not have a clue about this. How
could they? The art of entering dialogue with the public is to get into these
things with them. Did you know? I understand that you did not because I did
not know. When you can say, look, I only recently learned about this too, I
am still learning about this, you can take people with you. Then you can have
real dialogue.
Another thing jurors and the larger public need to understand, and
most do not have a clue about—I learned this from Patrick Sonnier—is how
crucial the quality of defense is at trial. The Constitution lays out all your
rights when you go into trial for your life, but that is just a document. All the
words are printed in a document, and the one that makes that document come
alive for you is that person by your side, the defense attorney.
In The Death of Innocents, I wrote about two men who were executed,
who likely were innocent.80 One was Dobie Gillis Williams, a Black man from
the little town of Many, Louisiana. A White woman was killed in her
bathroom—her husband claimed that her last words were a Black man came
through the bathroom window and killed me. The conviction was based only
on the word of the husband; there was no forensic evidence linking Dobie; and
Dobie looks out and sees an all–White jury that will determine his fate. The
defense attorney was cowed—overwhelmed—and made no objection to the
seating of the jury. When somebody with high prominence in the community
has been killed, the defense attorney has to deal with a whole community that,
by and large, wants to see the death penalty. You are no Clarence Darrow;
you are just a regular human being doing your best. You do not get invited to
the cocktail parties in town when you are defending that scum.
As a defense lawyer, if you do not raise a formal objection at trial
about that all-White jury being seated, the appellate court cannot even consider
it. It is not in the trial transcript. There was not a formal objection. That
means it has already been decided that those twelve people are going to be the
best we can do for you, even if you do not have a chance. Poor people have
to take any lawyer they are given, and you know this is true in Florida. There
are very few funds for independent forensic testing, or even for DNA tests.

80.
SISTER HELEN PREJEAN, THE DEATH OF INNOCENTS: ANY EYEWITNESS
ACCOUNT OF WRONGFUL EXECUTIONS (Canterbury Press 2005).

2021]

DEATH PENALTY IN FLORIDA

177

That is why you never find a rich person on death row; it is not that
rich people do not do terrible crimes, but they are not going to get an
overwhelmed attorney to [represent] them from the beginning. With a rich
person, the district attorney is going to think fifty times before he or she
decides takes on that defendant and go for the death penalty. They know they
are going to get a hundred pretrial motions; they know they are going to be
fought every inch of the way and they do not want the public to see them lose.
They are going to offer a plea bargain in a flash.
But a poor person? It is the public defender by his or her side that
makes all the difference. That is why I love defense lawyers. Any chance I
get to talk with them, I want to talk with them because they are the ones who
stand in the breach. They go through so much. What is the latest thing I heard?
I think maybe here in Florida where personal injury law firms are trying to
draw off young people out of law school from criminal defense and suck them
into being an injury lawyer where starting pay is $70,000. Law school
graduates can make more money and have more job security by avoiding
defending poor people. There is money in it. There is job security in it. And
to go into public defense? Public defenders are heroes. I love them. For you
public defenders sitting out there, I do not know how much love you have ever
gotten from a nun, but you have got this nun’s love for what you do. Of course,
you do not need my love; you do what you do out of principle because you are
who you are. Not for the money.
Where are we with the death penalty now in this country? We are
shutting it down. It cannot happen too soon. On the other hand, on the federal
level, after a seventeen-year hiatus, look at the horror stories that came out
with the thirteen Trump/Barr executions in 2020–2021.81 They first
announced they were going to kill these people, and then they set out and
methodically they did it. Why did they do it? Because of that discretionary
power that is given to the prosecutors and to the Attorney General to kill or
not.
Because it is up to them: if you do not pursue death, a person lives.
Look at the vagaries of this, the built-in weakness to leave it up to human
beings to decide death or not. All of the Trump executions were tragic, but
none more so than the killing of Lisa Montgomery, a mentally ill woman who
experienced nothing but horrendous abuse while growing up. I am close to
some of the lawyers and investigators who defended her, and they are still in
grief and mourning about what happened to her.
Her date of execution had been in December of 2020. It got pushed
back to January. And when they told her the later date of the execution, she
81.
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kind of looked away for a moment and just said, eight days. She would die
just eight days before President-elect Biden would come into office and
undoubtedly allow her to live. But Trump was President with Barr doing his
work for him, and that meant she was going to die. And all thirteen died before
they left office—no, they did not just die, they were killed.
And we, as a nation are waking up. The testimony of the death row
exonerees is helping us a lot. The education about racism is helping us a lot.
Look at Virginia. I am about to go there for the celebration of their abolition
of the death penalty. They are going to honor that little energizer bunny,
Virginians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, who kept standing up and
getting plowed over during thirty years of executions, but who stayed at it.
Look at the transformative effects of what went on in Virginia—and is going
on in Florida. And I want to just say this about hope: when we are acting,
when we are involved in helping change happen, hope flows through us. But
if we stand on the side, passively watching, we just keep getting overwhelmed
with news pouring over us, which can paralyze us. When we reach out to take
hold of a rope with even the smallest action, then hope becomes an active verb
in us.
In Virginia, George Floyd’s death, Black Lives Matter, and the
moving of Confederate monuments into the basements of museums changed
consciousness about race. Virginia, the largest and longest-lasting slave state,
carried out more executions than any state in the history of our nation,
bolstered most recently by an unspeakably terrible Fourth Circuit that upheld
whatever prosecutors wanted. I was there for the killing of Joseph O’Dell in
1997. All he was asking for was a DNA test on the rape kit that had never
been tested. He had Barry Scheck willing to do it for him for free. Virginia
refused. They executed him, and then they destroyed the rape kit. O’Dell did
not have a chance.
But what happened in Virginia? One of the things we see happening
is that district attorney’s around the country—like Larry Krasner in
Philadelphia—are beginning to speak publicly about how the death penalty
system is broken. And no small issue is its cost. We cannot separate moral
issues from purely economic ones. How we spend our tax money is a deeply
moral issue—like when we spend millions to kill one person when half the
homicides in America are never solved. Look at what we could be doing with
these resources. Look at education. When people are educated, they are more
inclined to take mainstream jobs, and they do not commit crimes. More and
more conservatives are speaking out about the financial waste of the death
penalty.
The waking up that went on in Virginia is sowing the seeds of waking
up that we can see here in Florida. And that is why I want to be with you today
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and have a chance to talk to you. I so believe in what you are doing in Florida.
And I do believe that one of these days, hopefully soon, the death penalty is
going to end in Florida. Thank you for the privilege of being with you today.
DR. LAURA FINLEY: [question from the Zoom chat]: Are there
some blind spots you see in death penalty abolitionist work right now?
SISTER HELEN PREJEAN:
It is very hard for me, as someone
who has so many blind spots of my own, to talk about other people’s blind
spots. When abolitionists talk with each other, they can help each other figure
it out and where our blind spots are. We are getting there. Abolitionists in the
United States have been learning from each other and tweaking the message
for many years, and there are many unquestionable signs that we are doing
better and better at getting the message through to the public.
DR. LAURA FINLEY: I have a couple other questions and
comments that I want to share with you. From Celeste Fitzgerald, who I know
you been colleagues and friends with for any years. She wanted you to know
that we have new strategic plan for Floridians for Alternatives to the Death
Penalty here in Florida. It is a new day here in this state. That includes a new
bill to end the death penalty for folks with serious mental illness in 2023. We
will be talking about that here at the conference later today.
SISTER HELEN PREJEAN:
All the incremental steps toward life
are important. Who knows what that door is going to open up as you get into
the discussion with people about that! That is great.
DR. LAURA FINLEY:
[question from the Zoom chat] Do
think Dead Man Walking can be used in law school classes?

you

SISTER HELEN PREJEAN:
Yes. It is a readable book and
students will find it to be a refreshing break from what they usually are
assigned in their classes. The stories are gripping, and students can see how
the courts work in practice, not just in theory.
DR. LAURA FINLEY: [question from the Zoom chat] How do we
teach forgiveness to those who have been wrongfully convicted or accused?
SISTER HELEN PREJEAN:
We cannot teach them forgiveness.
That question is totally the wrong way to put it; we do not teach forgiveness.
What we can do for them is stand by their side in their humanness and all they
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have been through and help them to find resources in the community so they
can love again; they can be agents in their own life again; and life can flow
through them again because look at what they are up against. Just look at what
they have been up against. Forgiveness can only come when they are ready
for it, and we cannot tell them when they are ready.
The exonerees have many, many things they need to work through.
Juan Roberto Melendez-Colon in Florida said when he got off of death row,
his sister offered him any room in her house, and he chose a little bitty room
up near the attic. He realized he chose a room the size of a cell because he
could not handle too much space. Think of all the things he had to deal with.
For seventeen years, eight months, and one day on death row, he had every
decision made for him—he never even touched a doorknob—so what we can
give them are resources they need to tap into their greatness and their
humanness again. But it is not ours to say they need to forgive. No, we can
never do that.
DR. LAURA FINLEY: [question from the Zoom chat] Do private
prisons hold more death row inmates than government prisons? I know the
answer to that is, but I think the question more broadly was, is there a profit
motive on the death penalty, i.e., somebody financially gaining from that?
SISTER HELEN PREJEAN:
There are no death-sentenced
prisoners being held in private prisons in the United States However, we
definitely have a problem with other prisoners being housed by profit-minded
companies. The people who profit from the death penalty are those who argue
that it is an effective weapon for fighting crime, or who argue that it actually
renders help to families of the victims.
DR. LAURA FINLEY: [question from the Zoom chat] We
are
outliers from the rest of the globe in terms of having a death penalty. Can you
add a little bit more about that international perspective?
SISTER HELEN PREJEAN:
Sandra Day O’Connor was the first
one on the Supreme Court that actually began to talk about international
human rights. On the other hand, we had justices like Antonin Scalia, who
was fond of saying things like we do not get our wisdom from Europeans, they
are not even Christian; they follow Freud more than they follow Jesus. We do
not need to look to international rights; we have got our own.82
82.
See also Justice Anton Scalia, Panelist, Politics and the Death Penalty at the
University of Chicago & Pew Research Center Conference: A Call for Reckoning: Religion
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RACIAL ISSUES PANEL

NGOZI NDULUE:
We are talking about race and the death
penalty, and the Death Penalty Information Center , in September 2020, issued
a report called, Enduring Injustice: The Persistence of Racial Discrimination
in the U.S. Death Penalty.83 My remarks are going to be shaped around the
individual sections of that report, which are, first of all, talking about the racial
history of the death penalty and exploring the role that race continues to play
in the death penalty. When we are talking historically, it is not just so we know
what was in the distant past. In fact, these issues are ever-present as Sister
Helen touched on. Rather, it is thinking about the big picture: about
connecting the racial bias in the death penalty to some of the issues that have
been getting a lot more attention in recent time.
At the Death Penalty Information Center, our job is to provide
information, analysis, and context to what is going on with the death penalty.
Even before my time, we knew at DPIC that there was a lot of information
about racial bias in the death penalty. It is one of the things that is pretty
universally acknowledged, particularly when we think about the race of the
victim and how that affects whether you get the death penalty or not. But we
thought that it was important to think about this in the context of what we say
that we are doing with the death penalty and what we have done throughout
history. We started at the very beginning, and if we do that—we know that
race matters from the very beginning—if we think about early United States
history, there are different capital crimes for White people and Black people.
A lot of times we focus on the deep South, which we definitely see some
patterns there, but it was not limited to the Deep South, even in the colonial
times, nor the colonies, where we were seeing disproportionate use of capital
punishment against Black defendants.
The Colonies of the Deep South were more likely to have very specific
and specified differential crimes that would result in capital punishment. But
you still had the ways that the death penalty was being used in practice, being
affected by race, even in the North. There is also this idea of using executions
to send a message, so you would have more gruesome and torturous executions
of Black defendants. Also, this idea of using the death penalty for social
control to ensure that there were not going to be rebellions, to seeing crimes
that were being committed by enslaved people against their masters as kind of
and
the
Death
Penalty
(Jan.
25,
2002),
(transcript
available
at
http://www.pewforum.org/2002/01/25/session-three-religion-politics-and-the-death-penalty/).
83.
NDULUE, supra note 25, at 1.
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a petite treason [as] they called it. So, there is this idea that there was
something about disloyalty and upsetting the social order.
Although I will be talking about Black history and the effect of the
death penalty on Black people, we also know that there is often a
disproportionate effect on all groups considered [as] other. When we think
about Native American sovereignty, there is a long history of the death penalty
playing a role in pushing back attempts at Native Americans to keep their
sovereignty and helping the United States in its quest on genocide and pushing
people out of their lands.
The largest mass execution in United States history in 1862 was after
the United States-Dakota war. Thirty-eight men were executed in a mass
hanging on the day after Christmas, 1862. It is interesting too, because this is
about crimes that were committed in the course of the war. But they were
supposed to be limited to people who had committed crimes against civilians.
Also interesting, President Lincoln was involved in granting clemency to a
certain number of the people—there over three hundred who originally could
have been executed—whittling it down to thirty-eight. But there were also
political concerns about the clemency process, which we have seen throughout
history and we continue to see to this day. I do not want to ignore the
importance of the death penalty used to challenge and eat away at Native
American sovereignty, we see that continuing to this day.
We also are going to be talking a lot about the connection between the
death penalty and vigilante violence and lynching, and we see that as well in
the Southwest, specifically thinking about Mexican Americans or people of
Mexican descent, in the Southwest as well.
When we are thinking about the death penalty in context, we need to
think about that connection between legal executions, lynchings, and mob
violence. Often in popular telling of the story of lynchings, it is this idea of a
disorganized mob that gets together, is very angry, and comes and commits a
lynching. But there was often official sanction—either explicit or implicit—
people turning the other way. People, for example, leaving the seventy-yearold lone sheriff’s deputy at the jail for when they were pretty sure the mob was
going to come.
This is Ed Johnson’s [lynching] case in Tennessee, where there was
this kind of wink-wink, nudge-nudge about, oh, the mob overpowered law
enforcement here and got the person out of jail, despite all the best efforts.
We have these connections between lynching’s and legal executions, where
[lynchings] were seen as alternatives. In some places where there was a lynch
mob and the local officials thought, this is not great for public relations, this
makes us look kind of disorganized and not civilized, [the officials] promised

2021]

DEATH PENALTY IN FLORIDA

183

folks who would otherwise have been the lynch mob that they will get a quick
and speedy legal execution.
There are also places where officials were considering abolishing the
death penalty, and in that consideration, there was this the idea of, if we abolish
it, we are going to have more lynchings again; lynchings are not great for
public appearances, so we really need this death penalty for that reason. We
will see how those ideas persisted into modern day.
The Equal Justice Initiative has done a great job of documenting these
racial terror lynchings. If you have not been to the Equal Justice Initiative
Legacy Museum and Memorial in Alabama, please visit, because it really tells
us the story that has for so long been untold or told without the proper context
and without connecting it to the legacy of lynching today. We see this [legacy]
in the post-Civil War Era with those laws that were supposed to provide
different capital crimes depending on race. They were not permissible under
the Fourteenth Amendment. These newly passed [civil rights] amendments
were supposed to give, at least, surface-level equality. However, this was a
time where extralegal violence was on the rise as well as public executions
and capital trials that really were show trials. Theoretically, they were
applying the same laws, but we knew they were not applying the same laws to
everybody.
If we think about the civil rights era and the work that the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund did to bring civil rights issues to the surface, one of the
things that was important was the treatment of Black men in the South who
were being accused of rape of White women or some type of sexual
impropriety against White women. [Such accusations] were often a death
sentence, either literally in the courts, or by lynching. For a Florida example,
the story of the Groveland Four is instructive. Devil in the Grove: Thurgood
Marshall, the Groveland Boys, and the Dawn of a New America gives a great
detailed history of the case.84 It discusses how the official death penalty and
mob violence interacted, and how law enforcement officials—the people you
were supposed to be able to look to for protection—were at some points
supposedly quelling the violent mobs, while at other points, implicitly,
allowing mob violence. [Worse], at some points, a particular sheriff would
actually engage in that violence.
These multiple roles played by law enforcement were sometimes the
only hope for some type of protection and safety, not actually being that for
the Black community at that time, until today. It is a great illustration. It is
also an illustration of how the politics of the death penalty also had something
to do with the economics. There were these orange or citrus groves and there
84.

KING, supra note 43.
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was a need for cheap labor. Sister Helen brought up the connection between
the criminal legal system and economic systems where, when the Black
community started trying to organize and trying to escape that role, there was
also the sense of the need to bring people down a peg to make it clear what is
going on. A false accusation was the precipitating factor that allowed for
making an example out of the Groveland Four and sending a message to the
wider community. We can think about Black Wall Street and the Tulsa
Massacre and other examples.
But we also see the increasing role of the NAACP LDF, which started
saying, we are doing these civil rights cases, we are focusing on these innocent
people with very flimsy evidence that are facing executions, but then realized
there needed to be a broader challenge to the entire system of the death penalty.
In doing so, they really wanted to slow down the system of executions and
death sentences by getting people lawyers and getting them representation.
Eventually, [the NAACP LDF] ended up bringing cases to the United States
Supreme Court.
Before I get into the modern era, I want to talk about race effects as
far as crimes [resulting] in executions. Black men accused of rape of White
women was a clear prelude to a death sentence or lynching. Virginia was a
great example, and this is not dissimilar to trends throughout the country. For
example, there was a study of the people between 1930–1969, who were
executed for rape, which found Black men accounted for more than eighty
percent of the executions for murder. And, not even talking about within a
certain time period—whether in the modern era or historical part of the death
penalty—there is no record of any White man ever being executed for the rape
of a Black woman, and when we are talking about this, we are talking about
rape that does not also include murder. Today, you cannot get the death
penalty for a non-murder crime generally, but [historically], while it was still
possible, there was never a case of a White man getting executed for the rape
of a Black woman. We know the opposite was very true where we see the
combination of a Black man and an accusation by a White woman was often
a sure sign that there [would] be an execution or lynching.
Putting that specific case aside, this was one of the starkest racial
disparities that you can see at the time that [NAACP] LDF was bringing these
challenges, but throughout the country, regardless of the underlying crime, it
was still clear that race played a huge role in the death penalty. In Furman v.
Georgia85 in 1972—we are coming up on fifty years—the United States
Supreme Court, not specifically relying on race, but just talking about the way
that the death penalty was applied and saying that it was arbitrary and
85.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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capricious, found that the way the death penalty was being applied across the
country was violating the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual and that
made states start from scratch. Florida was one of the first states that reinstated
the death penalty by adopting new statutes.
But in Furman, some of the opinions by the Justices said, if there is
anything that we could say about why, if there is any kind of through-line that
that explains how the death penalty is being applied, it is really race.86 The
whole Court did not specifically support that, but that is true. The other thing
that was in there—those seeds of lynching and violence whether there as well
because Justice Stewart in his concurrence in Furman says, well, I mean,
retribution is a legitimate purpose of the criminal legal system, so if we do not
have an avenue for retribution, there are sown the seeds of anarchy, vigilante
violence, and lynch law.87 So, the lynchings were there, and in Gregg v.
Georgia,88 Justice Stewart writes the majority opinion and quotes that piece
about, well, if we do not have the death penalty, if we do not have a way to
channel people’s retributive impulses, we end up with chaos, including lynch
law.89
I think the idea that its very presence today is clear. We see here in a
map that is from our report where we see the places that had the highest
number of lynchings of Black people are also the places that have the highest
numbers of executions of Black people. County by county is a little bit harder,
but state by state it is very clear. There are also other correlations that we see
throughout the history of lynching. That history of lynching and where that
fits in our minds right now is very present.

86.
87.
88.
89.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 310.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring).
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Id. at 237–38 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Figure 3: Lynching of Black Victims by County—1883 and 194090

Figure 4: Executions of Black Defendants by County—1972 and 202091
This is some commentary from a judge in Texas, not a criminal judge,
but still a judge, on Facebook posting about somebody who was accused of
killing a police officer being arrested. The comment says, “time for a tree and
a rope.”92 There was an outcry—this was in the end of 2016 when this
comment was made—and the judge got a slap on the wrist. The judge
explained, I do [not] understand why people were so angry, it was from a
commercial about Wild West justice or something not racial at all. Okay, sure.
In our report, we also talked about the case of Andrew Ramseur in
North Carolina in 2010, when he is challenging the North Carolina Racial
Justice Act, where we see the commentary about Oh, in my day, you know,
[we would have just] strung him up. This idea is present in our minds and our
psyches and in our courtrooms, though we would not acknowledge that. We
see some of the results of that. We know that the people who are being
executed are being executed for the death of White people. About seventyfive percent of the cases in which there has been an execution, the victim in
the case was White. That is not saying that seventy-five percent of victims of
homicide are White—it is about half—so this is disproportionate. We are just

90.
NDULUE, supra note 25, at 12.
91.
Id. at 13.
92.
Texas Judge Comments 'Time for a Tree and a Rope' Following Arrest of
Suspected Cop Killer, FOX 29 (Nov. 23, 2016), http://foxsanantonio.com/news/local/texasjudge-comments-time-for-a-tree-and-rope-following-arrest-of-suspected-cop-killer.
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punishing the crimes as they are being committed. We are punishing crimes
differently depending on who the crime is committed against.
We also have sovereignty issues that we are going to skip over since
I am already over my time. But we know that the race of victims effects our
most consistent findings. There have been these detailed statistical studies of
jurisdiction after jurisdiction and we [are] finding this almost everywhere.
Race of defendants—we have [not] found them as much—but there have been
strong findings that the race of the defendant matters. That combination too
is one that is serious.
An example of this is when we are thinking about interracial crime,
and this is example from a study of Philadelphia. I just want to mention, and
this is for anybody who has ever heard the phrase Black-on-Black crime, it is
ridiculous because most crime is intra-racial because of our patterns of
segregation, who we live with, who we marry. We basically are still a pretty
segregated society, so crimes are committed against people close to you most
often, right? Nobody is talking about White-on-White crime, so why are we
talking about it? That is my diversion. What researchers found in this study
of Philadelphia is that when the victim was Black and the defendant was Black,
appearance did not matter. But when the victim was White and the defendant
was Black, it was very clear that appearance mattered. A defendant who had
more traditionally stereotypically African American features—darker skin,
kinkier hair, wider lips, etc.—was much more likely to get the death penalty
than a lighter skin, less stereotypical of the African American person with less
stereotypically African American features. We know it is not even just race,
it is color. It is this idea that we [are] activating these stereotypes about crime,
criminality, and future dangerousness.
I will end this with a slide where we think about race, retribution, and
empathy. There is so much that is going on when there is this life-or-death
decision being made in a case. There is a recent study by Justin D. Levinson
[and co-authors] which was in 2019, that specifically looked at retribution.93
They studied 500 jury-eligible people and the conclusion was that we [are]
automatically associating payback and retribution with Black people and
mercy and leniency with White people.94 That is the association—the easier
association on our brain—and also the stronger your anti-Black implicit bias,
the more that you [are] co-signing the ideas of retribution. If you think about
that, and you think about the way that capital cases work, we know that this
can have a serious effect.
93.
Justin D. Levinson et al., Race and Retribution: An Empirical Study of
Implicit Bias and Punishment in America, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 839, 839 (2019).
94.
Id.
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Race is going to matter at every stage, but thinking about jury
selection, juries have to be death qualified to sit on a capital case. That means
that they are able to impose a death sentence; there is a specific legal standard
around that. But if you think about that, the people who most strongly believe
in the death penalty—if they are the people who most strongly believe in
retributive justice—you [are] going to end up, by design, with people with
more of an anti-Black racial bias. There are also studies that default qualified
juries are more likely to convict when the evidence is ambiguous. And we
also know that death qualification takes out more people of color because
people of color are less likely to support or be willing to impose a death
penalty. We know that a less diverse jury is actually more conviction-prone,
less likely to deliberate for a long time and less receptive to mitigation that is
being presented and based on race too.
There was a California study about Latin defendants, and it was
showing that the predominantly White juries were less receptive to their
mitigating evidence. The idea is that these issues are going to compound
throughout the course of the case, and we are going to see the huge impact of
race throughout the case.
Some of the places where we see this is about intellectual disability.
You are not supposed to be sentenced to death. You are not supposed to be
executed if you have an intellectual disability. But just because you are not
supposed to does not mean that is not how things are working, because we
know people have.
We also see that the majority of folks who are having their cases, after
the fact, reversed based on intellectual disability are people of color. We also
know that race has an effect when we are talking about wrongful conviction.
If we think about the people who have been exonerated on death row, we know
the majority are people of color. We know that official misconduct, including
police misconduct and prosecutorial misconduct is much more likely to be a
factor in their case. And if we think about the connection between policing in
communities that are majority people of color and how that can connect to the
way that false confessions happen, [and] the way that false statements happen,
that is clear. And we also know that people take longer to get exonerated if
they are Black; Black exonerees spend more time between conviction and
exoneration.
DR. MATTHEW BARRY JOHNSON:
I want to make a few
comments before I read my prepared presentation.
I am going to talk about my anti-death penalty work over the years. I
began in the early 2000s. I am a professor at John Jay College of Criminal
Justice in New York City, part of the CUNY system. I actually live and do

2021]

DEATH PENALTY IN FLORIDA

189

most of my work in New Jersey. In the early 2000s, I joined a campaign to
abolish the death penalty in New Jersey. I joined it because I thought it was
an important endeavor. I did not join it with the intention that we were going
to abolish the death penalty, but that is actually what happened in 2007, as a
result of the organizing and relentless work that was conducted. I learned a
tremendous amount through that process.
Early on, I had some doubts about diving into the death penalty work
because of my concern about other areas of criminal justice reform that I
thought might be more critical and maybe should be prioritized. However,
through my anti-death penalty work within New Jersey in terms of abolishing
the death penalty, it was very apparent how there was a tremendous
convergence in working against the death penalty, and also being concerned
about working to fight back against mass incarceration, to fight back against
police brutality and to stand up for victims of crime and violence. I would
imagine all of us here today have some appreciation for these linkages and
how it is important that we continue to advance this work to abolish the death
penalty and the impact that will have on these other criminal justice reform
issues.
One of the things—I did not develop it, but I maybe advanced it,
during that time, was the whole idea of secondary trauma from state
executions. I published a paper on how people other than the death row
condemned inmates are often harmed by state executions.95 However, that is
not what I am going to talk about today.
After the abolition of the death penalty in New Jersey in 2007, I
remained in contact with many other people who are working on these issues.
But I began to focus most of my research on wrongful conviction. And I do
want to mention, earlier this year I published a book titled, Wrongful
Conviction in Sexual Assault: Stranger Rape, Acquaintance Rape, and Intrafamilial Child Sexual Assaults,96 which, the short story is, focused on the fact
that, number one, most of the exonerations in the United States are related to
people who were wrongfully convicted for sexual assaults. That finding is
linked, in my book to, the history of lynching and discrimination against
African American defendants.
Our struggle, to oppose the government’s deliberate taking of the lives
of its citizens, is complex and multifaceted. Today, I want to focus on one
aspect of this journey to abolition. Our challenge to the death penalty draws

95.
Amanda Gil et al., Secondary Trauma Associated with State Executions:
Testimony Regarding Execution Procedures, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 25, 25 (2006).
96.
JOHNSON, supra note 30 at 18.
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from social science data, legal arguments, and invokes human rights, moral,
and ethical perspectives.
But today, I choose to focus on the people who convey our message:
the activists—heroines and heroes—the campaigners who devote their time
and energy to this grand effort. In particular, I will name and recognize
African American freedom fighters who have asserted our message. I will
name and comment on three. But I could have easily named another three (or
another three). The three I am going to talk about briefly today are Frederick
Douglass, Thurgood Marshall, and Coretta Scott King.
Frederick Douglass is significant because of his time. I first learned
of Frederick Douglass’s anti-death penalty advocacy from a source written by
the Attorney Steven Bright.97 Douglass is quoted as stating,
[L]ife is the great primary and most precious and comprehensive of
all human rights—that whether it be coupled with virtue, honor, and
happiness, or with sin, disgrace, and misery, the continued
possession of it is rightfully not a matter of volition; that it is . . .
[not] to be deliberately nor voluntarily destroyed, either by
individuals, or combined in what is called Government.98

Now, I became acquainted with this statement from Douglass early in
my period of tenure doing anti-death penalty work. I knew prior to reading
this quote, that Douglass was as brilliant as he was courageous. I was amazed
at the clarity of this nineteenth century statement, as it resonated for me in the
twenty-first century. A few days later, after my initial amazement by the
statement, I returned to it because I wanted to check and see exactly what year
Douglass made this statement. And I learned that he made a statement in 1858,
which is even more remarkable in my mind.
Douglass was a brilliant orator, journalist, and organizer who
physically fought his own enslavers and became one of the most admired men
in the nineteenth century. He was best known as a slavery abolitionist. And
although he worked tirelessly to bring an end to the system of human
enslavement in the United States, even before the Civil War and emancipation,
he devoted time to campaigning against state executions. Whenever I question
whether my efforts to challenge the death penalty were prioritized properly, I
remind myself that Douglass campaigned against the death penalty, while
97.
Stephen Bright is currently a Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown Law
Center, formerly the President and Senior Counsel of Southern Center for Human Rights in
Atlanta.
98.
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Resolutions Proposed for Anti-Capital Punishment
Meeting, Rochester, in SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 369, 275–76 (Philip S. Foner eds.,
1999).
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simultaneously advancing the fight against the United States system of statesupported human enslavement.
Next, I want to talk about Thurgood Marshall. Thurgood Marshall
carried out the fight against capital punishment throughout his adult life. He,
in fact, risked life and limb litigating against the death penalty, often in front
of all White juries and in Jim Crow courthouses, where his personal safety was
in serious jeopardy, if he was not out of town by dark.
And from these life and death battles he rose to the highest court to
the land, where he labored through legal arguments to abolish the death
penalty. His famous quote from his Gregg v. Georgia99 dissent remains true,
and it outlines the work that is before us. Marshall said, “the American people,
fully informed of the purposes of the death penalty and its liabilities, would in
my view, reject it as morally unacceptable.”100 I believe wholeheartedly in
that statement and I think that lays out our work for us—that what we need to
do, what we have to do, and what we will do—is that we will inform the
American people of the liabilities that surround the death penalty until it is
brought to an end.
Now, what did Marshall mean by this? He knew that the death penalty
was biased, based on race and other non-legal factors. Not only was it racial
bias and hostility, but also the selfish ambitions of prosecutors and politicians.
He knew it was arbitrarily applied and thus, it was inherently cruel. He knew
it was no deterrent and thus, it did not contribute to any legitimate penological
objectives.
Thirdly and finally, I am going to talk about Coretta Scott King and
her personal authority on the death penalty from her lived experience. Coretta
Scott King is widely known as a widow of the slain civil rights icon, Martin
Luther King. However, she was no mere follower of her husband. She and
Martin, in their early life, were together initiated and engaged in civil rights
activism. After the assassination of her husband in 1968, Coretta continued to
campaign for civil rights, for non-violence and peace, for LGBTQ rights, and
also against apartheid.
Coretta’s anti-death penalty advocacy is not widely known but was
firm and substantial. In a 1981 speech at Delta College, Coretta Scott King
advanced her position on state executions. Coretta was a murder victim family
member, whose family had endured one of the most notorious murders in the
United States history. And with her powerful voice, she stated:
I remain firmly and unequivocally opposed to the death penalty for
those convicted of capital offenses. An evil deed is not redeemed
99.
100.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 232.
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by an evil deed in retaliation. Justice is never advanced in the taking
of a human life. Morality is never upheld by legalized murder.101

Coretta added three additional practical reasons to support her
convictions. First, Coretta said that “capital punishment makes irrevocable
any possible miscarriage of justice.”102 It is important for us today to
appreciate her wisdom here, as she made this statement prior to the DNA
informed exonerations that did not begin until a decade later.
Her second point: the death penalty makes the “unwarranted
assumption that a wrongdoer is beyond redemption.”103 Who is qualified to
make such a judgment?
Coretta’s third point is the continuing lack of equity in the use of
capital punishment.104
In noting this, she cited evidence of racial
discrimination associated with defendants, as well as associated with victims
of murder, as the prior panelists described in some detail.105
In closing, I want to say that I continue to draw inspiration from the
work of these three. And I could have also highlighted others. For example,
it would be equally compelling and important, had I highlighted Ida B. Wells,
Reverend Jesse Jackson, and Mumia Abu-Jamal. Or, I could have highlighted
James Weldon Johnson, Maulana Karenga, and Bryan Stevenson. Or, I could
have highlighted Mary Talbert, Benjamin Todd Jealous, Christina Swarns and
many, many others. Whenever I tire, I go back to their work, and it helps me
continue. So that is my prepared presentation and thank you very much.
KRISTINA ROTH:
Of course, it is wonderful to be here and
thank you for having the event. I am so glad to see our Amnesty members
coming together with folks on the ground to celebrate World Day Against the
Death Penalty that just happened this past weekend on October 10, 2021. It is
a delight to be here to talk about race and be with friends like Ngozi and meet
new ones like Dr. Matthew. I am Kristina Roth with Amnesty International,
U.S.A., and I lead AUSA’s work on police accountability, looking closely at
the use of force by law enforcement as well as what we [are] here to talk about
today. I thank my co-panelists for seeing the linkage between these two issues,
extrajudicial executions at the hands of law enforcement are very much also
considered lynching’s of today.
101.
Coretta Scott King, Address at San Joaquin Delta College: The Death
Penalty is a Step Back. (Sept. 26, 1981).
102.
Id.
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
105.
Id.
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I am sure you all have been given a background on Amnesty. Just in
case you have not, Amnesty International has been working to eliminate the
death penalty for over forty years around the globe. When we started this
work, just sixteen countries had abolished the death penalty—this ultimate
violation of human rights in law—and today, over half of the countries around
the world have eliminated the ultimate cruel, humane, and degrading
treatment.106 Our movement is ten million activists strong (globally),
committed to advancing the full realization of human rights. Back to the
international piece, the United States is the only active executioner in the
Americas, and so we really are an outlier there.
I know Dr. Matthew mentioned Ben Jealous, and he is one of the
initial—if not the founder of—Amnesty’s work to abolish the death penalty
here in the United States, so giving some kudos to him as well for my ability
to be here today representing this institution.
Based on the racist roots of the death penalty that Ngozi shared, it
should serve as no surprise to any of us that these sentiments still fester
throughout our criminal legal system today and are glaring in death penalty in
particular. The death penalty has been inextricably intertwined with racism,
from death qualification—as Ngozi spoke about—prohibiting Black people
from serving on juries for those accused of capital offenses, wrongful
convictions, exonerations, or executed by the state.
Racism has marred and prejudiced trials of Black defendants for as
long as we have had a death penalty, and racism shows up as a factor in
determining the future dangerousness. Duane Bunk, as an example for us to
think of, from his trial in 1997, where based on expert testimony, he was
convicted of the death penalty.107 It contributed to his receiving a death
sentence over a life sentence, specifically.108
Racism has showed up in jurors who believed that based on a
defendant’s race, that they were guilty and deserve the death penalty, invoking
racial slurs, like in cases of Gary Sterling, who was executed by the State of
Texas in 2005, and Keith Tharp, whose execution was stayed by the Supreme
Court in 2017, but died of natural causes in prison in 2020.109 And even
despite the precedent of Batson v. Kentucky110—that prevents potential jurors
106.
Death Penalty, supra note 21.
107.
Duane Buck, Whose Death Sentence Was Tainted by Racial Bias, Is
Resentenced
to
Life,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.
(Oct.
4,
2017),
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/duane-buck-whose-death-sentence-was-tainted-by-racialbias-is-resentenced-to-life.
108.
Id.; see also Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 780 (2017).
109.
Tharpe v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 545, 546 (2018); see also Sterling v. Dretke,
545 U.S. 1155, 1155 (2005) (petition for rehearing denied).
110.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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from being struck on the basis of race—for Curtis Flowers’ first four trials
between 1997 and 2007, the prosecution used all thirty-six peremptory
challenges to strike Black jurors from serving as jurors.111 Curtis Flowers is a
free man today, but the system, purported to uphold equal justice under the
law, kept him on Georgia’s death row for twenty-three years, before gaining
his freedom eventually in 2020.112
Now, there have been some bright spots. In 2018, the Washington
state Supreme Court found the death penalty was invalid because it imposed
the death penalty in an arbitrary and racially biased manner.113 The Court cited
a study that had been mandated on the effect of race, which is somewhat of a
blow to the 1987 ruling McCleskey v. Kemp,114 that affirmed the disparities in
the state’s capital punishment system based on race were not enough to
demonstrate intentional discrimination, at least in the individual case. It has
made it more difficult throughout the years for these studies that are excellent
and important and informative to necessarily contribute to what we would
expect to see in advancing the very clear and real discrimination of the system.
From 1976 to May of 2021, Black people in the United States made
up thirty-four percent of those people executed, far exceeding the Black
population percentage in the United States in the same period.115 Today, fiftyeight percent of those on federal death row—twenty-six out of every forty-five
men—are people of color, including eighteen of which who are Black men.116
Some of those Black men were convicted and sentenced to death by all-White
juries. Many of those on federal death row were also sentenced under a broad
expansion of the Federal Death Penalty Act in 1994,117 part of the same set of
policies that have accelerated mass incarceration and inflicted immeasurable
harm on Black and Brown communities.
Now, at the same time, Congress advanced the 1994 Crime Bill118—
and, I am sure based off of our last presidential election, many of you have
111.
Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2228 (2019).
112.
See id. at 2252.
113.
State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 642 (Wash. 2018) (holding the death
penalty unconstitutional, as administered, because it was “imposed in an arbitrary and
racially biased manner.”)
114.
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
115.
Executions by Race and Race of Victim, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/executions-overview/executions-by-race-and-race-ofvictim (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
116.
Racial
Demographics,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/overview/demographics (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
117.
Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–3599.
118.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, 108 Stat. 1796.
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heard of that—it also considered the Racial Justice Acts.119 Given proof of
significant racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty the
Racial Justice Act then would have required the prosecutor to show a nonrace-based reason or explanation for the death sentence. And in fact, in 1994,
the Racial Justice Act passed the House of Representatives as part of that same
now-famed 1994 Crime Bill, but a threat of a filibuster from the Republican
Party caused the Senate to remove or strike this part from the bill.120 I feel like
we are living in a familiar moment where folks are dragging their feet about a
particular thing and things are getting held up in the Senate.
After Congress had that effort in the Racial Justice Act in 1994,121
North Carolina also, many years later, had a Racial Justice Act that allowed
capital defendants to challenge their death sentences if they could successfully
prove that race was a significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the death
penalty at the time of their trials. The law was unfortunately repealed in 2013,
but before then, four men on the state’s death row were re-sentenced to life
from death, which is certainly important.122
Nonetheless, the work in North Carolina helped to inspire California
to try their hand at a Racial Justice Act, and in 2020, California enacted a
Racial Justice Act to prohibit the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal
conviction based on race, ethnicity, or national origin.123 Now, California—
this is actually quite remarkable, in that the law that was passed in California—
their racial justice act is an expansion upon that which was endeavored both at
the federal level and in North Carolina because it applied to anyone who faced
a criminal conviction, which obviously is a much larger population. It is also
quite impressive that the bill—the year it was proposed—passed actually that
year as well, which is unusual, I could say for something this significant.
This year, in 2021, advocates have attempted to make the bill or the
law retroactive. They offered another piece of legislation since what was
enacted last year was only prospective, so that those who have been sentenced
already or already incarcerated might still seek relief under this law. However,
their efforts have fallen short thus far. I am certain, though, that the fight will
continue in the coming years.

119.
See, e.g., Kentucky Racial Justice Act, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.300–
532.309 (West 2021).
120.
H.R. 4017.
121.
H.R. 4017.
122.
North Carolina Racial Justice Act, N.C GEN. STAT. § 15A-2010 (West
2009), repealed by Act of June 19, 2013, ch. 154, § 5(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 368, 372.
123.
California Racial Justice Act, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 745, 1473, 1473.7
(West 2021).
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So, all this is to say, we have seen through the case work and through
both steps forward and steps back, and we have seen attempts to change the
law to address specifically the issue of race and bias beyond what our case law
already says. But in the United States, the death penalty has proven time and
time again to be racially biased, which also violates our right to freedom from
discrimination and the right to equal protection of law. The United States has
a legal obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill these human rights, and has
ratified the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights124 and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,125 which explicitly would protect these rights (though clearly
the United States, violates international law the time, so I would be remiss to
make it seem as though this is particularly onerous, for our record).
For as long as we have a death penalty in the United States, racial bias
will affect people of color’s—and particularly Black people’s—ability to have
a fair trial. So, while race is among the multitude of reasons why Amnesty
opposes the death penalty, in all cases and we [will] continue to work and shed
light on this issue in our efforts to abolish the death penalty in the United States
and everywhere that it exists.
DR. LAURA FINLEY: I just wanted to reiterate, again, the point that
we have been making throughout the day, was that the death penalty is a
broken system, and this is one more facet of why the system is so broken and
it has been broken since it is started, which is what you all so nicely put. I
remember reading at one point that, of all the lynchings, fifty percent of cases
police were actually involved with that lynching, so it was very much a system
problem. In about ninety percent of cases, they at least knew something was
about to happen and yet again lacked a political will to do anything. I do not
know if you want to comment again about how the system is—we are well
aware of the flaws in the system and the courts continue to say no, we do not
want to get rid of the death penalty.
DR. MATTHEW BARRY JOHNSON:
Yeah, I [would] like to make
a brief comment about the complicity of law enforcement in lynchings. I think
Ngozi mentioned this idea that these lynchings were sort of a spontaneous act
of a mob and there were some that had that character; there were some that
occurred at night and under the cloak of darkness. But there were many, many
lynchings that were announced in the press days, in advance, and special
124.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
125.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 5, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
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transportation and rail service was made available for people to come to
observe the lynching; and schools were closed so children could observe the
lynchings.
I do not know if this is new to everyone, but it was for me when I first
learned about this because I saw this as this kind of vigilante justice at night
or something like that, that kind of, you know, apology for it. But these were
well-publicized events oftentimes, and photographs were taken of the lynched
people—the people that were lynched—and the photographs were produced
as postcards that commemorated the activity. The people in the local
community would purchase the postcards and mail them to people and inform
other people, ‘see, this is a lynching we had last Saturday afternoon.’ This
history of lynching really remains untold. So, that was my comment.
NGOZI NDULUE:
Yes, absolutely, and I think that the popular
assumptions about lynching are that a spontaneous mob just happened—could
[not] be prevented—but I think all the things that folks are talking about is
saying that there is official sanction, even if not, and so, in many ways, there
was that parable system of, you kind of had your options like, well, we could
have a lynching or we could have this show trial that just results in a speedy
execution, right? And that was in some ways a political decision that
happened, like press, press about this and issues there. So, it is definitely a
question that is not just a matter of the past. If you think about that, and you
think about that study about retribution, and how that is so racially coated in
our minds it is not surprising to think that this idea of, [you] must make an
example of somebody, you must use the criminal legal system to make that
statement, is there and there is also a lot of great studies about it. Brandon
Garrett at Duke Law School has a study about what the homicide rate’s effect
is on executions and death sentences, and what it showed was the places where
there are more death sentences are places where the White homicide
victimization rate goes higher in comparison to the Black homicide
victimization rate.126 Black people are much more likely to be victims of
homicide, right? But when there is suddenly a gap getting less there, that is
when—because there is this idea of a White Community threat is being felt
and that is why we need more death sentences, we need more of these tough
on crime policies—so we cannot really talk about the nation’s death penalty
without talking about our nation’s continued racial injustice and how that is
affecting the way we even think about crime and punishment.

126.
See BRANDON L. GARRETT, END
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KRISTINA ROTH:
I do not want to take up too much more time
on this, but I just wanted to add, in a different lens to think about it now, as
well. As we think about those individuals who are sentenced to death for the
murder of a police officer, that is also an important way to look at this coin.
In today’s world, we think about Troy Davis, we think about all kinds of huge
cases where there are compelling reasons why the individual may not have
committed the crime. But the idea that the person who was harmed is a police
officer who was killed brings a really different sort of tone to the conversation.
I want to shout out some important research from the Death Penalty
Information Center. Certainly, we know that the death penalty is [not] a
deterrent to crime, and that there is [not] really correlation in that officers are
increasingly safer in places that do or do not have a death penalty.127 We
should think about that as far as how that argument comes up. But we certainly
do think about, is this population—is someone that there is a need to preserve
this particular punishment to protect this population.
DR. LAURA FINLEY: Thank you, and we did have a question in the
Q&A. The person wanted to know if any of you can speak to the case of Julius
Jones from Oklahoma, who is awaiting execution and is innocent.
NGOZI NDULUE:
Yeah, I could say a little bit. He was actually
one of—this case was one of the examples that we wrote about in our report.
Julius Jones in Oklahoma is actually currently—I think there is a new
clemency petition that was just filed today—so he has an execution date; has
been requesting clemency; has a positive recommendation on that but is still
in jeopardy. His case is that situation where the victim was a White man, it
was very racially coated, there were some jurors who clearly had racist beliefs,
and yet he still has not gotten relief on that. Now also putting into the broader
context of the state and the county’s histories, as far as race—the prosecutorial
misconduct that I think has come up a couple times—Cowboy Bob Macy was
the prosecutor who used the number of people who are sentenced to death
under his watch as a badge of honor and was using campaign posters and who
also was involved in significant misconduct at the time. There are so many
issues that, in Julius Jones’ case, to prove that you have a wrongful conviction,
to actually get courts to recognize your claims of innocence, how hard it is
despite the fact that we have at least 186 people who have been exonerated
from death row and that we know that it is this uphill battle that innocent
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people do get sentenced to death. I think Julius Jones’ case shows some
important examples there of what is broken here.
DR. LAURA FINLEY: I think that is very important, and we have
time for one more question if anyone has one, I [will] just ask everybody on
the panel if there was one takeaway that you wanted people to do—like
something you can do after they [have] learned about all this today—what
would be the one thing you [would] like to see people do.
DR. MATTHEW BARRY JOHNSON:
I would like to see people
join an organization that is on the ground in their locality, their state, and get
involved. There is so many things that need to be done in so many different
ways, people can help out. And it is very rewarding, though it is difficult work,
it is very rewarding; you learn a lot, you develop lifelong friendships with
people. So that would be my message.
DR. LAURA FINLEY: Thank you and folks if you were joining us
later, you might not have heard earlier, but one of our sponsors is Floridians
for Alternatives to the Death Penalty (FADP). That is our statewide anti-death
penalty coalition. If either of the other panelists want to speak to what would
you like people to do.
KRISTINA ROTH:
Well, I think this is a bit more my area then
Ngozi’s, so I [will] take the mic. Though I will shout out that I think that the
research that Death Penalty Information Center has provided on this topic,
particularly under Ngozi’s leadership in this report, is really, really important
for us to think about the historical context and the arc of this issue, particularly
with regard to race. There are so many issues with the death penalty, and they
[are] well documented through important research so as we endeavor to take
action, I think it is just as important that we learn and understand. We may
already be compelled to oppose the death penalty, but those who are around
us, they may not have heard the right reason yet. So, I encourage you to
continue to learn and find and try different arguments with those individuals
in your life.
But naturally as someone who represents Amnesty International, I
agree that you should get involved with organizations in your locality to do
what you can. I think Amnesty’s work is twofold: we are engaged with some
cases, but not all death penalty cases, and we do not only work on cases where
there is an active execution date. At this moment, we also are working on a
long-term case of Rocky Myers. He [is] a Black man with an innocence claim,
and also there was racism involved in his trial. The prosecutor has pictures
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taken at a KKK rally, so it feels like there is some racial elements going on
there. We [will] be bringing some of these claims to the UN Special
Rapporteur later this year.
I think it is important to look at the cases as specific examples—as I
know Sister Helen spoke about from some of the time I saw her—it is
important to see it in actual effect, look at the cases and understand someone’s
life and how the system resulted in these particular and in their conviction and
continues to deny them relief, where there are clearly issues that took place at
the trial phase. But we also do engage in the work in the legislative manner,
and I know folks from FADP will probably be talking about those
opportunities. But there are opportunities as well if you are the one kind of
person that wants to go talk to your lawmakers about it. At AUSA, we [are]
deeply engaged and working to end the federal death penalty, but there are
also efforts that are taking place around the States and so please contact Laura
if you want to be involved with Amnesty or she can direct you to me if you
[are] not a Floridian.
NGOZI NDULUE:
And I [will] just note that something that
comes through from both of my co-panelists’ comments, is that so much of
this is state and local, right? 1.2%—we have a 2% report, about 2% of the
counties are responsible for more than half of executions and more than half
of the people on death row—it is even less by now, it is probably about 1.2%
right now. People who have worked to be talking about prosecutor’s races,
people who have worked on state legislation—there is so much that we think
that it is big issues that we do not necessarily have a voice in. But I would just
want folks to take the information that we can provide and use that to educate
and inform on the state and local level, and even with the Federal death penalty
there is activity going on there as well. So much is in our backyard, I do not
think we always realize that.
DR. LAURA FINLEY: That was great, and we could have gone on
forever because you all have lots more to say. But thank you for joining us.
Thank you to all three of you, we really appreciate it.
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